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 Thesis Abstract 
This thesis seeks to understand experiential ambivalence in the later works of American             
novelist Jonathan Franzen (1959-) and Indian writer of English Amitav Ghosh (1956-). Both             
authors note that there is an uncertainty and resistance inherent to our experience of the               
world, as rooted in contested notions of the past. In Franzen’s ​The Corrections ​(2000),              
Freedom (2013), and ​Purity (2016), a disturbing picture of an America at the mercy of               
financial markets, rampant surveillance technology, and cultural trauma caused by 9/11           
emerges. In Ghosh’s ​The Hungry Tide ​(2004) and the ​Ibis ​Trilogy (the final volume              
published in 2016), we also find individuals reaching for an authentic cultural memory only              
to find such memory imbued with the experience of the British Empire, which often works               
actively against India’s attempts at self-understanding and self-identity. Following the tenets           
that Peter Boxall has set out in his ​Critical Introduction to Twenty-First Century Fiction​, I               
suggest that the first decades of the new millennium are unmoored from, yet still haunted by,                
the recent past. Experience and ideas become unsettled, rendering them transient and newly             
dependent upon liquid definitions of power, to borrow a term from Zygmunt Bauman. While              
the novels of Franzen and Ghosh address different aspects of contemporary existence and             
approach the implications of these issues from diametric positions, it is, I contest, a deliberate               
and positive mode of ambivalence which places these two authors and their writings in              
conversation with one another. Such modes of ambivalence find expression within intimate            
spheres of the individual subject (through revised notions of self and society), the self as a                
function of family, and those anxieties that impinge on individual liberty and, finally, that              
systemic institutions of knowledge that promote more flexible thinking about, and towards,            
the future. 
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Introduction 
“An Illegible Present”: Ambivalence, Resistance, and the Novel 
When Amitav Ghosh, a writer of Indian background, who writes predominantly in English, found 
out that his 2000 novel The Glass Palace was submitted, without his knowledge by his publishers 
to the 2001 Commonwealth Writer’s Prize (then run by the Commonwealth Foundation), he wrote 
an open letter of polite protest to Sandra Vince, the Prize Manager of the Commonwealth 
Foundation. In this letter Ghosh objected to being named the Eurasia regional winner and, 
therefore, by implication, a finalist for the prize.1 Ghosh expands upon his objections to being 
associated with the prize in his letter but, in doing so, was careful to draw a fine line between 
noting that “[his] objections to the term 'Commonwealth Literature' are [his] alone”, as well as 
tempering his criticism with a laudatory note, recognising that many of the individuals associated 
with the Commonwealth Prize, including previous recipients and judges are “writers whom 
[Ghosh] greatly admire[s].” Despite being in good company, Ghosh seems to have felt it 
appropriate to remove himself from consideration for the prize in order to uphold a certain set of 
principles and keeping in line with his public opinion.  
 Furthermore, Ghosh explicitly questions the genealogy of the term “Commonwealth,” 
which he takes to represent a “disputed aspect of the past” and its continued assured presence as a 
prize of some literary repute (past winners of the Prize have included J. M. Coetzee and Salmon 
Rushdie, the lattermost who has been identified as a precursor to Ghosh’s writing) does not inspire 
a future wherein these disputes might be challenged on a deeper level. Ghosh draws a telling, if 
ironic, comparison meant to highlight the problematic designation, as if the “familiar category” of 
English literature be renamed literature “of the Norman conquest.” This observation sheds valuable 
 
1 Amitav Ghosh, “The Conscientious Objector”, Outlook India, 19 March 2001. 
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light on how language, both in this particular example and throughout this thesis, often times 
embodies a singular and narrow set of concerns, which depends on questionable histories amplified 
in the present as fact. At the heart of Ghosh’s critique, he is not only concerned with the precarious 
position of the English language, but also alludes to the ways in which such precariousness is 
maintained at the expense of other spectres and across other venues of knowledge. If language is 
not flexible, then it runs the real risk of alienating communicable human experiences.  
 These questions about colouring the past with an ambivalent understanding of what could 
be considered “colonial” history is paramount for Ghosh as he himself identifies this kind of 
dubious curation of cultural memory as central to The Glass Palace and other novels since. 
Anshuman A. Mondal has written extensively on Ghosh’s oeuvre in light of the author’s reluctance 
to participate in politics. This brand of reluctance naturally extends itself into an enriching textual 
ambivalence in his novels. For Mondal, Ghosh is continuously interested in “problematising the 
‘givenness’ of the ‘Western historiographical record.’”2 Ghosh sees the term “Commonwealth” as 
one such means of “givenness,” preserving the past which ignores “choices” and “judgments” that 
make possible a more nuanced understanding of the present.   
In 2001, around the same time, as Ghosh was objecting to the nomination of The Glass 
Palace, the American writer Jonathan Franzen’s third novel, The Corrections, won the National 
Book Prize. On the back of its commercial success (a far cry from his two previous novels) the 
novel was selected for Oprah Winfrey’s book club, complete with a sticker of her book club affixed 
to the cover. Franzen was quoted as seeing the choice in a negative manner: “I see this book as my 
 
2 Anshuman A. Mondal, “Allegories of Identity: “Postmodern” Anxiety and “Postcolonial” Ambivalence in Amitav 
Ghosh’s In an Antique Land and The Shadow Lines”, The Journal of Commonwealth Literature, 38 (2003), 19-36 
(p. 20).  
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creation and I didn't want that logo of corporate ownership on it.”3 On the back of these comments, 
The Corrections was swiftly de-selected as part of her book club and Franzen himself was similarly 
disinvited to appear on her show. More than a decade later, when Freedom was published, Franzen 
and Oprah put aside their differences and there have been murmurs about how the whole debacle 
worked out so well for Franzen that he must have masterminded the entire affair as a publicity 
stunt. In an interview with Matthew Sweet in the Independent, Franzen remained adamant that the 
“media image” of him was “ridiculous,” attempting to paint him as some “raging ivory tower 
elitist” and that such a set of assumptions could only have come about if journalists continued to 
quote him “very selectively.”4 
 While many critics have refrained from commenting in depth about the row, the most 
balanced observation comes, in my view, from Colin Hutchinson, who explains the event using a 
series of ambivalences as he portrays Franzen’s disengagements from social critique and high 
postmodernism in the style of difficult books by William Gaddis, one of young Franzen’s literary 
heroes.5 In an essay disavowing the literary value of difficult books, Franzen eschews Gaddis as 
representative of what he calls “the Status model,” in which the difficulties inherent to postmodern 
works attest to their value. Starting from The Corrections, Franzen reinvents himself as the bringer 
of the “Contract” model, an approach to the novel that prioritises the presence of his reader.6 For 
Hutchinson, the unease surrounding Franzen’s celebrity status is in some ways a seismic event, 
pitting Franzen and his inherent masculine, majoritarian privilege against the likes of Oprah, whose 
 
3 Matthew Sweet with Jonathan Franzen, “Jonathan Franzen: The truth about me and Oprah”, The Independent, 17 
January, 2002. 
4 Sweet, ibid. 
5 Colin Hutchinson, “Jonathan Franzen and the Politics of Disengagement”, Critique: Studies in Contemporary 
Fiction, 50 (2009), 191-207 (p. 191). 
6 Jonathan Franzen, How to Be Alone (London: HarperPerennial, 2004), p. 240. Subsequent Citations abbreviated as 
HBA.   
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whole branding is based on challenging white, male privilege and a positive understanding of how 
minor identities are represented in the media. Hutchinson points out that the same situation could 
equally represent the difficulties faced by a marginalised intellectual presence (here embodied by 
Franzen), who finds himself, conversely, oppressed by corporate and mainstream interests as 
upheld by a television personality like Oprah. While Franzen’s dilemma does not carry as much 
weight as the historical obligations felt by Ghosh, what these two examples illustrate together is 
that ambivalence is broadly felt as a defining characteristic in the early decades of the new 
millennium. While the Commonwealth Prize and being deselected from Oprah’s book club are not 
of the same order of magnitude, they are both addressing the same issue.  
 As Samuel Weber notes, ambivalence is never far from the study of literature. The 
ambiguity which perpetuates this uncertainty of discourse can again be found in language and the 
cultural influences that it carries. While asked to participate in a multi-disciplinary conference 
hosted by the Institut for die Wissenschaften vom Menschen (in English: The Institution of the 
Human Sciences of Man) in Vienna, Weber is struck by the “unusual” phrasing, describing it as 
nearly a “neologism,” a recent word yet to enter common conversation.7 Weber compares the 
German term phrase, Humanwissenschaften (“human sciences”) as an attempt to answer to the 
French les sciences humaines, a term he notes blooms out of poststructuralist thinking. Eventually, 
Weber circles back to the category of the “human” and what it represents in relation to the sciences. 
The English notion of the “humanities,” Weber writes, does not “correspond” to the idea as 
espoused by their German and French counterparts; instead, the English idea of the human is in a 
constant state of flux due to negotiating the relationship that the human condition has to what 
 
7 Samuel Weber, “Ambivalence, the Humanities, and the Study of Literature”, Diacritics, 15 (1985), 11-25 (p. 11). 
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Weber calls “practical, social, and civic virtues,” that are directly shaped by art (presumably also 
crafted by human hands):   
The English idea of the Humanities is not centered upon the Spirit, not at least in the sense 
of Hegel or of Dilthey, nor is it focused primarily upon 'the life of the mind.' Rather, it is 
closer to the ideal of Renaissance Humanism, which in turn is related to the Roman origins 
of the word in the emphasis it places upon the more practical, social and civic virtues felt 
to derive from the cultivation and mastery of certain "arts."8 
Keeping Weber’s designation in mind and understanding modes of existence and experience as 
being at the mercy of a conflicted definition of the human, my thesis juxtaposes Franzen and Ghosh 
as authors whose literary output seemingly could not be more different. Franzen has billed himself 
first as an ambitious social novelist in the stages of his early career, but has since matured to 
become a dramatic storyteller of character focused stories.  
However, by understanding their point of departure as a shared unhappiness with structural 
narratives of the time, there are a number of striking similarities between the two writers and their 
works, which are respectively a reaction, and a proposed solution, to surviving a world that 
increasingly trades on its “illegibility.”9  
 Peter Boxall’s recently published monograph surveying the course of twenty-first-century 
literature so far explicitly addresses this problem. Boxall makes the argument throughout his book 
that it is the “shape of our culture” which is at stake, as the “privilege of the human” -- or the 
ambivalent needs of the human for unchangeable structure and associated modes of knowledge -- 
now lessens the possibility of the new and different and increases the uncertainty of our time.10 
 
8 Weber, p. 12 
9 Peter Boxall, Twenty-First Century Fiction: A Critical Introduction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), p. 2. 
10 Boxall, p. 85. 
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Difference and innovation have now been displaced to the fringe of human experience, 
marginalised as the once homely and familiar concepts of time, self, and society are increasingly 
impossible to understand without a degree of self-alienation:  
 . .[T]he increasing frictionless synchronisation of global culture rather than delivering an 
increasingly secure sense of. . . homeliness in our space and time, has delivered us to a 
condition in which the time. . .is out of joint, in which the narrative forms we have available 
seem no longer to be well adapted to articulating our experience of passing time.11 
Boxall’s statement carefully articulates what it means to live in a world of instant gratification and 
other means of immediacy. The speedy technological advances of the last twenty years, such as 
the various ways of preserving one’s digital self, have become inextricable from our physical 
selves and are largely responsible for this sense of distance. The sudden externalisation and the 
availability of outsourced, notions of subjectivity are yet other ways to ostracise ourselves from 
the past. For Boxall, this failure to exercise experiential judgement points to the structural limits 
of the new millennium. These precise limits are keenly felt in the works of both Franzen and 
Ghosh. In Boxall’s estimation, the shift of the new century is towards uniformity in order to ensure 
the continued survival of the human as the apex definition of identity and, more broadly - through 
how we continue to perceive the world around us -- is a detriment to new experiences. As Boxall 
rightly implies, current narrative forms are made redundant and ambivalent in that they are no 
longer suited to new experiences. 
 My thesis conceives of Ghosh and Franzen’s recent novels, written in the twenty-first 
century, as qualifying to some degree how such limitations shape and continue to contribute to 
deep-seated ambivalences. As Franzen points out in another one of his personal essays, “We live 
 
11 Boxall, p. 15. 
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in a country obsessed with lists.”12 Lists are a way of an individual or a collective consciousness 
pruning itself of excess (often knowledge that disagrees with what is already known) in order to 
preserve a certain way of knowing in the wake of trauma. The idea of trauma and a fresh urgency 
for order in one’s life in the aftermath of this chaos is embodied in the list. Instead of simply 
drifting along somewhere as a result of such negative experiences, it is only human instinct that 
somewhere must be imbued with specificity so that the world does not seem so broad or foreign. 
Stephen J. Burn reads this unmistakably Franzanian statement into Franzen’s second novel Strong 
Motion (1992), which is written before the turn of the century, but is anticipatory of many of the 
issues that his later novels address. In an attempt to seek meaning from chaos, the seismologist, 
Renee Seitchek, organises her bookshelf to create meaning in the aftermath of a series of large-
scale earthquakes. These quakes were generated by the malfeasance of Sweeting-Aldren, a fact 
that Seitchek herself uncovered. Renee, as if anticipating the earthquakes uses the activity of 
sorting to find a system that offers some sort of narrative to her life. She sorts through children’s 
fiction like Watership Down to writing by the Buddhist philosopher D. T. Suzuki, the latter which 
is worth mentioning because it is the only mention of nonfiction on Renee’s list. Furthermore, the 
mention of Suzuki points to a recurring lack of engagement with non-white, non-middle-class, and 
non-Western modes of thought in Franzen’s novels. Throwing out these books and Suzuki, Burn 
argues, is Renee’s attempt to “cleanse herself of the contamination of her previous personal 
failures.”13 The fact that Burn figures Renee’s culling of her bookshelf as an admission of personal 
failure is significant because there does not seem to be any future possibility for Renee to learn 
from her previous self. This impossibility also manifests itself quite clearly at the end of The 
 
12 Qtd. in Stephen J. Burn, Jonathan Franzen at the End of Postmodernism (London and New York, NY: 
Continuum, 2008), p. 28. 
13 Burn, p. 29 
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Corrections, when the matriarch Enid Lambert decides that all of her corrections had been “for 
naught” and that she is going to “make some changes to her life.”14 Enid’s decision comes at the 
end of a long list of “corrections” in the final chapter of the novel. Not only is she last on a list, 
full of recurrent hopeful recoveries otherwise enacted by Enid’s grown children, one wonders, as 
James Annesley does, whether any meaningful changes could be made in Enid’s life as to not 
disturb the “narrow determinism” which guides the novel to its close.15 
 Burn further notes the presence of a list that is central to Alfred Lambert’s experience with 
Alzheimer’s. In Alfred’s list, he doles out blame to everyone by “catalogu[ing] the faults of 
humanity” and names “God” and “frivolous, easygoing townspeople” (C, 244). For Burn, Alfred’s 
list is “a temporary solace for his ills.”16 For Renee and Alfred, and also Enid who does not get her 
own list, then, there emerges an understanding that the presence of a list and their ownership of 
such a catalogue is but an interim solution to their personal sense of loss. In Freedom, the presence 
of the list takes on a much more insidious, but mostly positive connotation in its assumed 
permanence that is absent in Renee’s and Alfred’s lists so that Patty may continue to live her life 
without grappling with an overbearing sense of loss. In the opening paragraph of Patty Berglund’s 
third-person autobiography, she provides this list:  
If Patty weren’t an atheist, she would thank the good Lord for school athletic programmes, 
because they basically saved her life and gave her a chance to realise herself as a person. 
She is especially grateful to Sandra Mosher at North Chappaqua Middle School, Elaine 
Carver and Jane Nagel at Horace Greeley High School, Ernie and Rose Salvatore at the 
 
14 Jonathan Franzen, The Corrections (London: Fourth Estate, 2002), 653. All following quotations hereafter cited 
in-text as C.  
15 James Annesley, “Market Corrections: Jonathan Franzen And The ‘Novel Of Globalisation’”, Journal Of Modern 
Literature, 29 (2006), 111-128 (p. 126). 
16 Burn, p. 29.  
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Gettysburg Girls Basketball Camp, and Irene Treadwell at the University of Minnesota. It 
was from these wonderful coaches that Patty learned discipline, patience, focus, teamwork, 
and the ideals of good sportsmanship that helped make up for her lack of self-esteem.17 
This list serves a double purpose, one to clearly outsource Patty’s upbringing to her coaches (rather 
than her family); this denotes an understanding of the lack of support she receives, and undoubtedly 
feeds into her lack of self-confidence. There is no mention of Patty’s biological family in this list, 
but rather than framing it around the unfortunate absence of her parents and siblings, the paragraph 
is brimming with gratitude about the presence of her coaches and notably, even God in whom she 
does not believe.  The second, we note the lack of male influences in a sport that, while segregated, 
still heavily marginalises its female counterpart, but Patty is still able, by virtue of this list, to 
discover her own place and render her feelings of loss and inadequacy as secondary in her life.  
 Lists also occupy an ambivalent position throughout Ghosh’s fiction. In contrast with 
Franzen’s sense of lists as a preservation of established order, Ghosh’s uses lists either to point 
towards a transformative nature of the novel as written in English, or to point towards chaotic and 
disorderly possibilities. In the second volume of the Ibis trilogy, River of Smoke, which is seen as 
a tangential sequel (as the first and third volumes are more connected to one another), Ghosh 
provides a catalogue of Indian foods that would not look out of place on the menu of a curry house. 
As Christopher Rollason notes, in his comments on River of Smoke, Ghosh continues to expand 
on his interest in how the presence of other languages (often languages subjugated and lessened 
by the British Empire) destabilise the English language including Cantonese and Mauritian Creole. 
English, in River of Smoke and also other volumes, is what Rollason terms “matricial.” Such a 
term expands the possibility of the novel in English:  
 
17 Jonathan Franzen, Freedom (London: Fourth Estate, 2014), p. 29. Subsequent citations given in-text as F.  
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I use the word “matricial” deliberately to describe the book’s English, for the matrix of this 
novel is provided by a third-person, extradiegetic narratorial voice that speaks the 
International Standard English of our day. At the same time, that matricial English is 
frequently, though not invariably sprinkled with words and phrases from Asian languages. 
Meanwhile, [the] dialogue. . .[is] often in either a visibly Indianised English or in a tongue 
that strictly speaking is not English at all. . . 18 
 English in this way takes a secondary role and works in tandem with those marginalised identities, 
which Ghosh endeavours to represent rather than to replace or silence. On the menu of a kitchen 
boat that serves Indian food, “reassuringly familiar” items are found, with “real masalas and 
recognisable oils,” a “chicken curry” and sometimes “pakoras and puris” (RS, 303), but Rollason 
comments that “tawa-fried fish,” or fish prepared in a type of frying pan and “puris” are items that 
might bemuse the non-Indian reader. Something similar occurs with Ghosh’s use of a sartorial list.  
When Bahram, a well-off Parsi trader is getting dressed in order to meet Napoleon Bonaparte, 
unfamiliar terms like “salwar” or “Acehnese leggings” join the very recognisable “pajamas” and 
“turban” (RS, 216). For Rollason, Ghosh’s strategy of “connoting that-which-is-Indian through 
lexical terms” is a way that non-Indian readers might be assimilated into Ghosh’s enriched tapestry 
of a much lesser-told history.19 Ghosh’s lists as present in River of Smoke signify reconciliation of 
different cultures rather than merely curating lists of a specific, narrow, understanding which 
would cut off those less familiar parts of the world.  
 The one instance in which a list in Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide resembles Franzen’s attempt 
to catalogue the self occurs when Kanai, a city businessman who runs a translation bureau in Delhi 
 
18 Christopher Rollason, ““Apparently Unbridgeable Gaps in Language: Amitav Ghosh’s River of Smoke and an 
Emerging Global English?”, Dr. Christopher Rollason: Bilingual Culture Blog, 23 September 2011. 
19 Rollason, ibid. 
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lists every language that he speaks only to note that there is “no money in Bengali literature”; and 
yet this particular pronouncement is itself undermined by the presence of the German poet Rainer 
Maria Rilke’s influential cycle of poems The Duino Elegies; the Elegies, which lends The Hungry 
Tide a sense of structure argues strongly against Kanai’s priorities, as languages are valued only 
for their alleged  economic value. It is only later that he comes to realise the error of his ways. 
 The Duino Elegies is a form of poetry that engages with a world that no longer aligns with 
the expectations that have long being associated with facets of human experience. In the opening 
lines of the “First Elegy,” the speaker of the poem places the consciousness of an all-seeing animal 
as more capable than our own at present, as our gaze is marred by our own expectations of how 
we ought to be living. The animal has no such expectation or inner turmoil and can tell that “we 
are not comfortably at home in our translated world.”20 Ambivalence and associated contradictions 
that have resulted from this discomfort have led me to draw on a wide range of influences, who 
have shared this discomfort. The ideas and works of authors such as Kafka and the Viennese satirist 
Karl Kraus, anchored by the comments of the thinker Walter Benjamin all draw from interbellum 
social unrest. The French thinker Gilles Deleuze and his collaborator the psychoanalyst Felix 
Guattari have collected these marginalised affectations under the late capitalist umbrella of 
“deterritorialisation.” Other influences that have found purchase in these ideas, availing 
themselves to us in the works of both Franzen and Ghosh, include more familiar sources such as 
Charles Dickens (whose influence is especially prevalent in Franzen’s Purity) and Shakespeare. 
Ghosh and Franzen are also duly influenced by their contemporaries, such as the historian Dipesh 
Chakrabarty for Ghosh and fellow writers David Foster Wallace and Dave Eggers for Franzen. 
 
20 Amitav Ghosh, The Hungry Tide (Boston: HarperCollins Publishing, 2004), p. 206. Subsequent citations given in-
text as HT.  
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 That Franzen and Ghosh are both struggling with the inefficacy of expression is signalled 
by their different attempts to render lists in their fiction meaningful even as the twenty-first century 
threatens their validity as a means to order our experience and make sense of the world. Lists, as 
a means by which to orient one’s perspective, is well-documented by the sociologist Zygmunt 
Bauman, in his influential book Liquid Modernity. Unlike traditional notions of postmodernism, 
which see the disintegration of grand narratives, as suggested by Jean-Francois Lyotard, Bauman 
argues that the current state of the world is “liquid” rather than “solid.”21   Bauman’s position 
attempts to avoid the trap of the binary (or its lack) by emphasising a liquidity that takes account 
of the speed of technological advancements and the subsequent inadequacy of linear models of 
time to efficiently contain the possibility of eminent authority. Boxall sees Bauman’s notion of 
“power. . .becom[ing] extraterritorial” as fundamental to understanding the twentieth-century 
novel.22 Accordingly, I have organised my chapters into discrete sites of struggle, where 
ambivalence is read as a literary device that permits the limits of the human to be repositioned 
through understanding new experiences without familiar referents. Consequently, what is 
addressed in my thesis in relation to the fiction of Franzen and Ghosh echoes the concerns found 
in Bauman’s Liquid Modernity. These concerns are threefold: identity, freedom (in the context of 
familial emancipation), and different modes of knowledge. 
 For both Franzen and Ghosh, this ambivalence arrives first and foremost in the mode of 
language. Language is not only the cornerstone of any literary work, but also a tool by which 
individuals communicate with one another. In recognising the significance of ambivalence, both 
authors understand that language also plays an imminent role in upholding certain prejudices and 
 
21 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (London: Polity, 1999), p. 3. 
22 Boxall, p. 4 
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narrow-minded perspectives. After offering an outline of what they each understand to be the 
limitations of language, these limitations are then applied to names and first impressions, which I 
argue is the starting point to all conceptions of identity. Following that, I expand on the 
ambivalence of names and connect them with certain challenges that are particular to Ghosh’s 
2006 novel, The Hungry Tide. The novel is chiefly about the nature of language, both 
incommunicable and communicable, and develops a keen understanding of how language is 
connected to human experience. Ghosh’s understanding of ambivalence is most unusual because 
he does not fall into the usual traps of “postcolonial” experience and instead uses the plight of 
marginalised individuals, such as the illiterate fisherman, Fokir, to underscore the deracination and 
deterritorialisation experienced by minority literature figures to point up a universality of 
experience.  
 Conversely Franzen, as an American writer who is indelibly influenced by middle-class 
ideals, is encumbered by a different sense of marginalisation. His perceived limitations are read as 
encapsulating the difficulty recently faced by authors who do not have the support of a 
marginalised position from which to offer effective criticism; this noted absence leaves Franzen in 
a difficult state when it comes to espousing an opinion which is often criticised as not expressing 
an opinion for the sake of its subversiveness. It also is used as a way to affirm the fact that he 
possesses the platform that is in turn readily denied to those who remain in need of a way to express 
these very criticisms. As we have seen from his very public row with Oprah, Franzen’s identity as 
a member of what could be construed as the stereotypical “middle-class intelligentsia” has caused 
controversy. As a result, Franzen actively faces another form of institutional backlash that is 
clearly at play in all of his novels since The Corrections (2001). This backlash takes form by using 
Franzen’s own perceived privileges to invalidate and, thusly, silence the voice of the middle-class 
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critic. The Lamberts, Berglunds, and even Pip’s complicated family in Franzen’s latest novel, 
Purity, all seem to impinge upon certain privileges, whether the privileges in question are financial 
or intellectual, usually a combination of both. This perceived sort of oppressive silence further 
leads to certain experiences to be incommunicable. We can see this very clearly in Patty Berglund’s 
third-person autobiography in Freedom and also its indebtedness to David Foster Wallace’s 1998 
short story, “The Depressed Person,” in which the eponymous Depressed Person struggles to 
understand her prevailing unhappiness.23 Unlike Ghosh, who uses marginalisation to reach for a 
universal experience, Franzen’s writings appear to be marginalised by the way others perceive his 
attitudes to universality and these types of misunderstandings plague many of his characters.  
 The second chapter follows on from the analysis of the deterritorialised self and extends 
the same deterritorialisation to the construct of family, one of the self’s most formative 
understanding of society. In the works of both Ghosh and Franzen, “traditional” notions of family 
—by which I mean structures that are either sanctioned by law or cultural norms—are 
deconstructed to showcase a degree of ambivalence. This ambivalence is necessarily present 
because individuals are consistently crippled by versions of themselves as enacted upon them by 
others; the same applies for family as each member of the family seems to impinge upon its own 
familial unit their own expectation of what the family must stand to offer to the individual as a 
son, mother, or father. Furthermore, the disintegration of the family is possibly much more keenly 
felt by the individual because the family is the first instance of knowable social experience. Both 
authors recognise the concept of family as a “zombie” category wherein evidence for such 
connections is no longer self-evident; in the event they are taken for granted, familial bonds are 
quickly replaced and displaced by more practical concerns, chief among them purchasing a 
 
23 David Foster Wallace, “The Depressed Person”, Harper’s Magazine, (1998), pp. 57-64. All subsequent in-text 
citations given as “DP”.  
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comfortable life by whatever means necessary.24 The idea of family seems to have become an 
extension of a capitalist system. The moral sensibilities usually imparted by the parent-to-child 
relationship assumes a secondary position in this new order, to ensure that the continuity of an 
upcoming generation each held hostage by the idea of capitalist gain. This in turn leads to an 
upheaval of perspective, as traditional families are presented as inextricable from political views, 
personal ambitions and beliefs, and bound by legislation. To take it one step further, families are 
also viewed, in light of this, as having degenerated from a cornerstone of social morality to an 
imperative, fluid tool without confines in order to uphold a collective consumerist mentality; this 
means that families in their private sphere are no longer able to effectively speak to their children’s 
upbringing when it comes to imbuing them with a moral sense. 
I also claim, after an overview of these families in crisis, that these seemingly disparate 
circumstances can be understood via the disintegration of family in Shakespeare’s King Lear. As 
René Girard argues, Lear is a premier example of a “crisis of degree.”25 Degree and “intense human 
conflict” are at the heart of most of Shakespeare, and in the case of Lear, this crisis illuminates 
itself when the elderly Lear foregoes his fatherly duties in order to fulfill a selfish need for 
continuous authority.26 This action turns his daughters, Goneril and Regan, into not Lear’s 
daughters, but independent agents of desire, competing not for their father’s affection, but for 
Lear’s authority and the representations of such power (i.e. his kingdom), resulting in what Girard 
calls “a mimesis of desire.” Only Cordelia, who remains a daughter to the bitter end, is punished 
by death, as she refuses to take part in the mimesis. In the novels of Jonathan Franzen, this 
 
24 Bauman, p. 6 
25 René Girard, A Theatre of Envy (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 175.  
26 Girard, ibid.  
 20 
 
translates into a conformist, narrow perspective in which socio-economic superstructures rob 
individuals of meaning and ambition.  
However, where critics might see Franzen’s stance as narrow-minded and privileged, this 
privilege gains a new profundity when read alongside marginalised family structures in Ghosh’s 
Ibis trilogy, where individuals are oppressed by various pressures of belonging to a family. Most 
tellingly, Franzen’s idée fixe of a family imprisoned by its own making comes true in the final 
volume of Ghosh’s trilogy. Here, colonial authority and the greed it sanctions, disembody the 
newfound family of the Ibis’s ship-siblings, which is itself hard won by rejecting authoritative 
models of family rooted in antiquated ideas of nationalism. I close with some further reflections 
on the institution of marriage, exemplified by both Ghosh and Franzen, as a complex extension of 
familial difficulty.  
 Throughout the first two chapters, I have suggested that freedom remains a personal 
ambition, sometimes impacted by one’s obligation towards family. The third chapter looks at a 
virtue that is made possible by ambivalence, namely freedom. Freedom remains an ambivalent and 
contrary goal with inextricable ties to problematic discourses such as race, sex, and class. In the 
three examples I offer various types of freedom are underlined by three very different iterations of 
maternal anxiety, each exemplified by incidents of excessive masturbation. This anxiety then 
abides by a concatenation of circumstances which narrows the definition of freedom. Freedom, 
then, is made ambivalent being informed by not just by lesser virtues and prejudices, but also by 
innate anxiety which is brought on by a disdain for difference. In the case of Zachary Reid, an 
American sailor with a freewoman mother in Ghosh’s Ibis trilogy, he willingly gives up his 
freedom of experience in order to inhabit a narrower freedom confined by language and outdated 
sartorial rules. Zachary is told to become a Sahib (an individual of gentleman standing) by a group 
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of sailors, but in experiencing the freedoms of excess, he in turn sets himself up for a different 
kind of failure: the failure that comes with being ordinary and being unable to connect with others 
any longer. His freedom is then ruled by greed and material wealth, which impoverishes him as an 
individual.  
 The obstacles to freedom as embodied by Franzen’s Joey Berglund (Freedom) and Andreas 
Wolf (Purity) are presented on a localised, contemporary, scale, rather than the metahistorical 
approach offered by Ghosh in Zachary’s case. However, it is still telling that Ghosh’s and 
Franzen’s construction of a certain mode of masculine identity is, inextricably, tied to a generalised 
anxiety which has maternal roots. Unlike the more obvious notion and well-documented struggle 
of paternal anxiety, it is the long silence of the mother, or indeed her over-affection (or her desire 
to overcome her identity as a mother) that paralyses the son.  
 Finally, the concluding chapter examines the possibility of ambivalent thought. I address 
here Ghosh’s and Franzen’s unease towards the academy. Ghosh and Franzen seem to find 
common ground in pointing out the precarious nature of higher education and its academics in 
their respective works. Piya from The Hungry Tide, the well-read Raja-turned-convict Neel Rattan 
in the Ibis trilogy (who is not strictly speaking an academic but fits within the privileged notion of 
having access to an education not readily afforded to others), as well as Chip Lambert in The 
Corrections and Andreas Wolf in his associative role as the son of an affluent English professor 
in East Germany, are each hampered in different ways by systemic and bureaucratic privilege. It 
is this same privilege and stubbornness towards knowledge that calls for the tempering of 
ambivalence. In The Hungry Tide, this is demonstrated by Piya’s lack of understanding towards 
the residents of a tide country village as she works to protect an endangered tiger. In Freedom, it 
has been pointed out that Walter and Lalitha’s planned solution to overpopulation privileges a 
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single species of bird (the Cerulean Warbler) rather than the indigenous people. By understanding 
these patterns of thought as ambivalent and consequently flexible, we will be equipped to handle 
the challenges of the coming decades.  
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Chapter One 
Views From Here and There: Navigating Identity and the Self 
 
Introduction: Deterritorialised Subjects 
 
In The Seven Pillars of Wisdom, T. E. Lawrence remarks that there is a “certainty in degradation” 
of the human condition.27 This certainty manifests itself today in a sense of ambivalence, implicit 
in ongoing debates about the tenets of identity and self-expression. This sense of ambivalence, of 
being neither here nor there, of compromising oneself in order to be better understood by others, 
becomes an especially critical tool in the hands of a “displaced” writer. In considering the novels 
of Amitav Ghosh and Jonathan Franzen together, I take a broad understanding of what it means to 
be displaced, and argue that ambivalence in the hands of a culturally displaced writer like the 
Indian writer Ghosh, and an author who sees himself as intellectually displaced, such as Franzen, 
becomes instrumental in scrying for a cohesive definition of identity in the beginning decades of 
the new millennium. While most of their views are diametrically opposed to one another, the works 
of Ghosh and Franzen, retrospectively, appear to suggest that the question of identity is 
incapacitated by the absence of descriptive language and further handicapped by a society that 
unconsciously recognises these limitations.  In other words, we are not able to say what we mean 
because we no longer really recognise the world that we live in.  
 In a series of public essays regarding the curious lack of serious fiction around the issue of 
climate change, the Indian writer of English, Amitav Ghosh, notes that, although the environmental 
crisis has been part of our lives for a long time, the language used to describe such climatological 
disasters remains inadequate. Ghosh, the son of a diplomat and a housewife, has a very personal 
connection with the problem of climate change. He writes: “My parents were ecological refugees 
 
27 T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (London: Vintage, 2008), p. 581. 
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long before the term was invented.”28 They had to escape from their homeland of now-Bangladesh, 
on account of a change in the river that flooded their village in 1956, the year of Ghosh’s birth.29 
This nomadic experience informs much of Ghosh’s oeuvre and reinforces his dedication to the 
representations of marginalised experiences.  
 Several decades later, and on another continent, in 1988 the limitations of literary language 
performed another remarkable feat of separating man from his surroundings. This time, the fracture 
is a cultural one, at home in the upper echelons of middle-class intelligentsia rather than any far 
off “minor” natural calamity. The then twenty-nine-year-old budding American provocateur, 
Jonathan Franzen, had high hopes for both his literary career and the strength of his vision to spur 
his readers into action. However, Franzen’s debut novel The Twenty-Seventh City, a sprawling 
tome about the corrupt workings of St. Louis, Missouri, became the antithesis of a “culturally 
engaging” social novel, spawning only “sixty reviews in a vacuum.”30 His vision became nearly 
synonymous with the parody of himself he presents in another piece of personal writing: “I am a 
fundamentally small and ridiculous person.”31 
These two disparate instances of language failing to uphold a vision of identity are further 
united by two pressing themes that have emerged in the works of both Franzen and Ghosh. The 
first is that both authors recognize a deterritorialising factor in language, which necessarily 
precludes the portrayal of certain experiences for the added validation of others, thus making them 
“minor.” “Minor experiences,” the crux of “minor literature” trades on its supposed distinctiveness 
as foregrounded by marginalisation. Writing about the works of Franz Kafka, Gilles Deleuze and 
 
28 Amitav Ghosh. The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2016), p. 3.  
29 Ghosh, GD, p. 3. The year is misprinted in the essay; the essay misprints 1850s for  the 1950s.  
30 Franzen, A, p. 61  
31 Jonathan Franzen, The Discomfort Zone: A Personal History (New York: Picador, 2007), p. 52. All subsequent 
citations abbreviated as DZ.  
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Felix Guattari note that minor literature must always be necessarily “political,” “collective,” and 
“effected with a co-efficient of deterritorialisation.”32 For Ghosh, his parents’ plight is left defined 
by silence and the absence of appropriate terminology. They become displaced persons disavowed 
by both their geography and their language, a double-edged marginalised experience that continues 
to bear rich pickings in Ghosh’s other works. In a similar vein, Franzen finds himself unable to 
link socially conscious words with socially active discourse, perhaps, to such a degree that 
becoming a writer trapped him by both the notion and reality of his own privilege. The cognizance 
of deterritorialisation (and its somewhat hopeful sibling reterritorialisation which works to 
reintegrate instances of deterritorialization) by Franzen and Ghosh has spurred them towards the 
shared literary register of ambivalence as they negotiate complex issues surrounding identity. 
“Deterritorialisation” is a nomadic philosophy first put forward by Deleuze and Guattari. 
The term initially appeared in Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia to describe the 
disintegration of the modern subject held captive by the confines of a capitalist society. As Mark 
Seems puts it, “deterritorialisation is the product of a subject understanding that he is alienated 
from society.”33 He is no longer seen as an individual with an essence and worthy of personhood, 
but instead as a cog in the capitalist machine. Albert Camus’ narrator M. Meursault, from The 
Stranger, is a standout example of this difficulty; Meursault is a figure who has already 
comfortably retreated to the fringes of society. Cyril Connolly describes Meursault as “an homme 
du midi, and yet one who hardly partakes of the traditional Mediterranean culture.”34 Meursault is 
still not immune to the unhappiness of his boss for taking a Friday off to attend his mother’s funeral 
 
32 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature, translated by Dana Polan (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press), p. 16. 
33 Cf. Mark Seem. “Introduction,” Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, by Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari, translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (London: Continuum, 2004), p. xxiii 
34 Cyril Connolly, “Introduction to the First English Edition (1946)” in The Outsider by Albert Camus, translated by 
Stuart Gilbert (London: Penguin Books, 1961), p, 5. 
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and is unable to avoid the insidious presence of work culture. Meursault seems eager to pass on 
the blame to his departed mother: “Sorry sir, but it’s not my fault, you know.”35 Meursault holds 
value only as an employee during the working week and is otherwise disposable. Nearly a century 
later, Franzen’s parody of a modern academic in The Corrections shows that even the fringes of 
society are dominated by the question of financial means; penniless and unemployed, Chip 
Lambert is “without money . . . hardly a man” (C, 121). Zachary Reid, Ghosh’s American sailor 
in the Ibis trilogy, comically worries about paying his exorbitant legal fees and fails to take any 
real comfort in the fact that he is cleared of murder charges against him in Flood of Fire, the final 
volume of the trilogy. The clearing of his name and his newfound freedom are quickly superseded 
by a debt of “almost one hundred rupees.”36 In all of these instances, money and the confines of 
one’s identity are for all practical purposes the same.  
It is not only the practical notion of acquiring capital that has made modern citizens less 
than themselves. Ambivalence and deterritorialization have much in common with one another 
and participate equally in prohibiting and avoiding change. The former has inevitable ties to a 
society which has little choice but to trade upon its inherent instability for the comfort of sameness. 
As we have already encountered (see introduction) Boxall’s delineation of the uncertain nature of 
the twenty-first century novel, quoting Jean-Paul Sartre, that the present is nothing but “a 
disordered rumour” makes the construction of selfhood in an uncertain space doubly challenging 
when the deterritorialised self does not even retain the advantage of external objectivity.37 On this 
point, Boxall reaches for the Italian critic Giorgio Agamben, who describes the task of being 
contemporary as neither here nor there: “those who truly belong to their time, are those who neither 
 
35 Albert Camus, The Outsider, translated by Stuart Gilbert (London: Penguin Books, 1961), p. 13. 
36 Amitav Ghosh, Flood of Fire (London: John Murray, 2015), p. 10. All subsequent quotations cited in-text as FF. 
37  Qtd. in Boxall, p. 3. 
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fully coincide with it nor adjust themselves to its demands.”38 In both Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide 
and Franzen’s Freedom which occupy much of the focus of this chapter, this uncanny distance 
between experience and the narrative of such experience plays a central role in understanding a 
newfound fragility when it comes to speaking about identity. Previously undisputed norms of 
knowing oneself and judging others become destablised and deterritorialised by the proximity of 
others. In a world which increasingly demands that selfhood is shed for the good of others, this 
collective alienation is magnified tenfold. 
Hannah Arendt clearly articulates this crisis of selfhood and failure of language in her 
introduction to Walter Benjamin’s essay collection Illuminations. Arendt observes - and rightly 
prefaces - the following statement with the proviso that the systemic nature of all categorical and 
hierarchical thought also contributes to most forms of social discrimination: 
The point is that in society everybody must answer the question of what he is – as distinct 
from who he is – which his role is and his function, and the answer of course can never be: 
I am unique, not because of the implicit arrogance, but because the answer would be 
meaningless.39 
As Pip states in Franzen’s Purity: “And never mind. . . specialness means nothing when 
every kid is special.”40 Specialness, or the idea of individuality is less of a concern when function 
takes a clear precedence over form in the recent decades of this century, not least of which because 
function translates into order keeps things as they are; the status quo remains a touchstone for 
human experience. Form here also becomes dependent upon function, suppressing uncertainty of 
our contemporary life. Ghosh and Franzen are two authors who recognise, in spite of important 
 
38 Qtd. in Boxall, ibid. 
39 Hannah Arendt, “Introduction” to Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, by Walter Benjamin, edited by Hannah  
Arendt, translated by Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), p. 3. 
40 Jonathan Franzen, Purity (London: Fourth Estate, 2016), p. 233. All subsequent quotations cited in-text as P.  
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cultural and social differences, the difficulty of reconciling the question of who versus what as the 
crux of human consciousness. Both authors illuminate the path of ambivalence as a conduit for the 
reterritorialisation of language as a means to move forward. 
In the following sections, I explicate Ghosh and Franzen’s respective positions about 
language and its ambivalent position in literature, and then discuss that ambivalence in practice in 
terms of given names in The Hungry Tide and Purity. If names, as a paramount signifier of personal 
identity, are ambivalent and open to interpretation, then ambivalence is implicated in the question 
of representation. For Ghosh, this ambivalence is discussed in relation to issues of postcolonial 
representation, a subject from which he tries to distance himself; through Ghosh, we come to see 
that the problems surrounding postcolonialism are self-imposed, as an issue that betrays deep 
anthropological insecurity. For Franzen, a more generalised form of ambivalence takes the shape 
of a self-imposed silence, as a comment to such insecurity generated in comfortable “cul-de-sac” 
circles couched in all manners of privilege and where “niceness” remains an asset.”41  
 
“Whose Language?”: Circumscribing Margins in Narrative 
Following Jacques Derrida’s “prophetic” notion that “Man is in the process of perishing as the 
being of language continues to shine. . .upon our horizon,” Gayatri Spivak reminds us of the need 
to consider the context of the approaching horizon in her famous essay “Can the Subaltern 
Speak?”42 As the title of her piece implies, she asks, “to whom does [the horizon] belong?”43 
 
41 Jonathan Franzen, Freedom (London: Fourth Estate, 2013), 8. All subsequent quotations are cited in-text as F. 
For more on Franzen’s deployment of “niceness” in Freedom, see Philip Weinstein, Jonathan Franzen and the 
Comedy of Rage (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), pp. 160-164 Weinstein concludes that this recurrent 
obsession with being nice is but a recognition that the protagonists of Freedom (Patty, Walter, and their friend 
Richard Katz) are only playing at nice, and unable to escape the reality that they are “supersaturated with 
competitive urges” (Weinstein, p. 163).  
42 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory, edited 
by Laura Chrisman and Patrick Williams (New York, NY: University of Columbia Press, 1993), p. 87. 
43 Spivak, ibid.  
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Whose language do we speak?  Ghosh’s answer cleverly avoids Spivak’s usual denotation that a 
subaltern voice must necessarily be impoverished and silenced, secondary to, and circumscribed, 
in all instances by an authoritative (usually Western) figure. Ghosh appears to indicate that 
language is for everyone, even those who do not subscribe to conventional means of language. 
Ghosh’s inclusive attitude towards language means that he does not see himself as a 
representative of a minor voice. However, this does not prevent some critics, such as Lisa 
Fletcher, from arguing in terms of The Hungry Tide, that Ghosh is not only “speaking up about 
the Sundarbans, he is speaking up for the Sundarbans.”44 Fletcher’s observation underlines two 
critical features of Ghosh’s writing that, while he himself is ambivalent about the complexity 
behind his work in representing others, Ghosh still manages to capture the experiences of others 
in his narratives in a way that is recognisable to his readers. This reflective quality, then, enables 
others to see themselves in and through Ghosh’s writing, which, in turn empowers their own 
narratives. 
 In an interview with Alex Tickell and Neluka Silva, Ghosh says that his works are not 
meant to “supplant the visions of others” and considers himself an “ethical” writer.45 Anshuman 
A. Mondal offers this assessment of Ghosh’s attitude towards language, which points away from 
the finer points of categorization between languages to encompass the possibilities of language as 
a whole. According to Mondal, Ghosh moves away from language as “a thematic” (which 
concentrates more on the categorisation of language) and towards a sense of language as a 
“metaphysic.”46 Mondal emphasises the unity of a system of language, rather than abiding by the 
 
44 Lisa Fletcher, “Reading the Postcolonial Island in Amitav Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide”, Island Studies Journal, 6 
(2011), 3-16 (p. 3) 
45 Neluka Silva and Alex Tickell, with Amitav Ghosh, “Interview with Amitav Ghosh” in Amitav Ghosh: Critical 
Perspectives, edited by Brinda Bose (New Delhi: Pencraft International, 2003), p. 215. 
46 Anshuman A. Mondal, Amitav Ghosh (Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 2007), p. 51. 
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categorization between languages, which then are necessarily differentiated into distinct 
definitions. Broadly, language under a more generalised metaphysic is no longer singularly limited 
to singular understandings, such as “English, Bengali, Arabic” and so on. Ghosh advocates 
evolving beyond the specifics of language to encompass a holistic system of knowledge. Language 
becomes a way of knowing the self and also represents the possibility of knowing someone else. 
In The Hungry Tide, the American scientist Piya rebukes the city translator Kanai, when he makes 
fun of her inability to communicate with Fokir, an illiterate, mostly mute crab fisherman. She 
points to the transformative power of this linguistic metaphysic: “There is already so much in 
common between us, it doesn’t matter” (HT, p. 205). 
    The understanding of language-as-metaphysic enshrines Ghosh as someone who is 
aware of his personal relationship to displacement and this awareness seems to continue into his 
desire to understand the drive behind narrative assumptions. Ghosh’s approach to categorisation 
and its claim to uphold the function of society thereof, is to question not only the validity of 
systems and labels based upon their face value, but also to point towards the instability of such 
assumptions by looking towards the margins and how these assumptions continue at the expense 
of repressing marginalised histories. This is a meditation upon difference and multiplicity that does 
not merely descend into appropriation and fetishization, as Neil Lazarus criticises Spivak for 
doing, by propping up difference under a rubric which prioritizes “difference” to the detriment of 
other points of literary context.47  
To that end, the German Romantic poet Rainer Maria Rilke, whose Duino Elegies functions 
as an eminent intertext for The Hungry Tide, perfectly encapsulates the reality of a singular 
language and its consistent need for validation in a world that is increasingly devoted to the 
 
47 Neil Lazarus, The Postcolonial Unconscious (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 3. 
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understanding of singularities. Attuned to Rilke’s sentiment, Ghosh uses the intrinsic dislocation 
of many of his third-world, marginalised characters, to his advantage and through them widens his 
perspective rather than trying to understand the limitations of writing from a marginalised 
perspective. In fact, Ghosh disparages such a self-imposed, narrow perspective. In the same 
interview cited above with Silva and Tickell, Ghosh expresses his dislike of so-called “minor,” 
marginalised positions, and wonders how critics such as Homi Bhabha could stand to write from 
a position that privileges, in Ghosh’s view, such marginalisations and have no choice but to 
become “the representation of a representation. . . it’s like they have retreated into a house of 
mirrors.”48 A similar observation has also been made by Louis A. Renza about the shortfall of 
post-colonial approaches to minor literature. Renza contends that the distinction of minor literature 
does not aid its endeavour in actually becoming a minor literature as minor literature is meant to 
produce its own language, or to stand in reproach to more “official,” “major” literatures. It is then 
entirely possible to perpetuate the continued isolation of minor literature while working towards 
the acceptance of minor literature. Renza warns that we run the risk of making a “minor literature” 
more “minor” as the criticism trades upon its outsider perspective.49 The presence of a “major” 
minor literature necessitates the creation of lesser “minor” literatures.50 
Brinda Bose is one critic who offers the following definition of deterritorialization as 
present in Ghosh’s work and who remains sensitive to Ghosh’s hesitation to be included among 
those authors who trade so heavily upon notions of marginalization; Bose acknowledges the 
ambivalence that characterizes an author resigned to deterritorialized language. Ghosh sees 
deterritorialization neither as a form of nostalgia (a “romantic detachment”) nor, indeed, as a 
 
48 Silva and Tickell, p. 216. 
49 Louis A. Renza, “A White Heron” and the Question of Minor Literature (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 1984), p. 35. 
50 Renza, ibid.  
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definition which presents a form of absence, a lack in which often drives modern society to be 
presented as “a cosmopolitan rootlessness.”51 Such “rootlessness” must be subtended by a presence 
which is only made possible by its minor origins. Bose notes that deterritorialisation is “peculiarly 
apt” to apply to Ghosh’s work because Ghosh understands that which seems to privilege the 
enriching act of reterritorialisation over deterritorialisation. Bose asserts that “prior states of the 
homeland are not reducible to an imaginary origin.”52 In many cases, the search for straightforward 
origins collapse under the weight of its own contradictions. Ghosh uses the ambivalent undertone 
of deterritorialization to discover his own voice, undeterred by the usual obligations which 
normalise marginalised identity. 
In order for an identity to be marginalized, we must understand its boundaries, and Ghosh 
makes clear that sometimes such boundaries are not so easily discerned. The etymology of the 
Sundarbans, where The Hungry Tide is largely set – rebuking familiar spectres of New Delhi and 
the United States – is a clear instance that language is vital and nonconformist to the needs of 
tourists and colonialist reduction. The Sundarbans is located in Lower Bengal on the Megha River 
and, as if to preface his etymological conundrum, Kanai’s late Uncle Nirmal offers this compelling 
description of the landscape: 
There are no borders here to divide fresh water from salt, river from sea. The tides reach 
as far as three hundred kilometres inland and every day thousands of acres of forest 
disappear underwater only to re-emerge hours later. The currents are so powerful as to 
reshape the islands almost daily – some days the water tears away entire promontories and 
 
51 Brinda Bose, “Introduction”, in Amitav Ghosh: Critical Perspectives, edited by Brinda Bose (New Delhi: Pencraft 
International, 2003), p. 30. 
52 Bose, ibid.  
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peninsulas; at other times it throws up new shelves and sandbanks where there were none 
before (HT, p. 7). 
Unique to the swiftly changing geography of the area are a series of confluences that Nirmal refers 
to as “mohanas,” a term in the native language that bears no direct translation, but also has no need 
of one, as the word, for Nirmal, already suggests “layers of beguilement” (HT, p. 7). The 
Sundarbans embodies ambivalence through words and the local language. While Nirmal observes 
that there is “no prettiness here to invite the stranger in,” most of the world knows the area as the 
Sundarbans, which translates to “the beautiful forest” (HT, 7). Nirmal further contemplates the 
possibility of the Sundarbans being derived from sundari, a common species of mangrove trees.  
Nirmal lastly notes a possible etymology not found in Bangla itself, but within a meaning 
lifted from the “record books of Mughal emperors.” The record indicates that the Sundarbans have 
a connection with the bhati, the tide. The local name “tide country” takes its name in reverence of 
one particular tide, the “ebb-tide” which allows for the odd miracle of the high tide “falling. . . to 
give birth to the forest” (HT, p. 8). Nirmal shows a clear preference for the origins of the tide 
country, not for its seeming authenticity as it is in widespread use with the natives, but for the 
metaphor of birth and creation that is inherent within the description; birth holds true to possibility 
and rejects demarcations set by human oppression. The tide, bound by no other characteristic save 
for change, is the only etymology capable of encompassing the other two meanings. The flood is 
able to swallow the trees and give birth to the forest once more. These marginalised, localised, 
meanings serve to undercut colonial presence, but also still allows for its ambivalent existence. 
If margins are the starting point of Ghosh’s postcolonial project, then the margins are the 
idealised end point for Franzen. As Jeremy Green aptly puts it about Jonathan Franzen and his 
well-documented struggles with public perception: “those in the middle desperately search for the 
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margins.”53 Similarly, Colin Hutchinson notes that the “white, middle-class, white male author is 
in crisis,” and proceeds to argue that such a label, once applied to Don DeLillo, is now passed onto 
Franzen. Franzen himself confirms the passing of such a baton as he writes to DeLillo, despairingly 
about the muddled state of the social novel.  In an e-mail correspondence to Philip Weinstein, 
Franzen puts the idea of the holistic self into question, as if the idea of a fractured self would better 
allow him to write from a marginalised position: “I am a divided person; I have multiple selves.”54 
While these various selves are put into place to serve different functions in Franzen’s life both as 
a public authorial figure and as a private citizen, the curated existence of these somewhat separate 
selves only points to the possibility of a holistic self, and yet do not guarantee its existence. We 
are selves in conflict, subject to continuous discomfort and Franzen’s multiple selves underline -- 
in the modern human -- a sense of loss. Weinstein connects this ambivalent sense of self to 
vacillating observations that Franzen makes about his first marriage.  Weinstein quotes the 
following from The Kraus Project:  
That we do things that we’re not aware of doing; that we often, and without hypocrisy, say 
the opposite of what we really mean. . .because a motive is irrational doesn’t mean it makes 
no sense, that we strenuously deny precisely the things that are the truest about us. . .we so 
often unaccountably sabotage ourselves. . . And I went ahead and did a thing that makes 
no sense to me now: I married somebody I was unlikely to stay married to.55 
 Weinstein puts it this way, regarding the restrictions upon language as inherent to the craft 
itself rather than a sense of connecting language to its craftsman; language becomes not 
instrumental towards communicability, but rather to preserve a sense of unease:  
 
53 Jeremy Green, Late Postmodernism: American Fiction at the Millennium (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 
p. 89. 
54 Weinstein, p. 13. 
55 Jonathan Franzen, The Kraus Project (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013), p. 215. 
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Language appears. . . not as a truth telling resource, but as an estranged medium, 
manipulated by its users, incapable of accurately re-presenting what it purports to 
represent. To make its estrangement appear, Franzen need only bug it – make it rebound 
on itself, reveal its reliance on predictable cliché. Only those who have grasped the 
conventional heart of language are capable of exploiting range of deployment.56 
In many of Franzen’s novels, Franzen seems to latch onto a distanced sort of language to ensure 
the strangeness of language’s presence in the lives of his characters. In Freedom, Patty Berglund’s 
sprawling third-person autobiography, which makes up at least a quarter of Freedom, the language 
is twice removed. Patty is neither an authoritative I-figure, who commands the attention of her 
readers, nor, as we will see in a discussion about her rape, a you, a sympathetic character made to 
affectively grab at her “Reader.” Her language is impersonal, in the third-person, with curious 
meta-interruptions such as “the autobiographer is mindful of how dull it is to read about someone 
else’s drinking, but sometimes it’s pertinent to the story” (F, p. 65) and “this was not an interesting 
or plot-advancing thing to have said” (F, p. 74). These two tangents, Weinstein notes, speak more 
to “Franzen’s need to get on with his novel” and erodes Patty’s agency in telling her own story. 
Walter, her husband, also experiences shades of this as he rages against the fact that “there is no 
controlling narrative: he seemed to himself a reactive pin-ball” (F, p. 318). Franzen’s meta-
interruptions demarcate Walter’s inability to harness language to rediscover and anchor himself as 
a person of meaning. As such, Franzen’s characters are speaking for themselves, but they are 
intentionally deterritorialized from their own narratives. By embodying the white male author in 
crisis, Franzen seems to affirm the Derridean notion that a horizon where language is overtaking 
the human possibility of expression is imminent. However, it must be accounted for that Franzen 
 
56 Weinstein, p. 51. 
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himself remains ambivalent to such a crisis because it affords him the advantage of continuing to 
write from a minor position.  
The seeming lack and ambivalent distance which continues to hold through much of 
Franzen’s novels is on full display in a telling moment in Freedom. Jessica Berglund is trying to 
connect with Bengali-born Lalitha, her father’s new assistant at work by telling her parents’ friend 
Richard Katz that she (Jessica) “knows quite a bit about Indian regional cooking. Because a lot of 
my friends in college were Indian?” (F, p. 353). Franzen painstakingly emphasises practicality  as 
a key aspect of Jessica’s character as other members of her family are stuck between versions of 
themselves that they dislike. By contrast, Jessica is supposedly a well-rounded young woman 
brought up with just the appropriate amount of attention from her parents and as such her quarrels 
with the world and those around her start with other people. Lalitha’s response to Jessica’s gesture 
of friendliness is that she “couldn’t even cook an egg” (F, p. 353). Jessica’s ignorance which leads 
her to conflate knowledge about regional cooking and having friends is the invariably shallow 
affectation of someone in the throes of a liberal arts education, an experience which Franzen 
remains keen to ironise. 
In attempting to understand Lalitha’s culture, it would appear that she has none, outside of 
being a product of the American melting pot. Lalitha’s lack of culture outside of what is available 
to her in turn-of-the-century America counts against her. Jessica’s ignorance is superseded by 
Lalitha’s lack of connection to her Bengali heritage and this nod towards culinary discord places 
Franzen away from the familiarity and connection of Ghosh’s Indian menus; moreover, Lalitha is 
seen as mostly unsympathetic, as her main role in the Berglund household is chiefly that of a 
homewrecker. Similarly, the sartorial is also disconnected as Richard Katz, who fancies himself 
an admirer of women, picks up on Lalitha’s accent: “subtle subcontinental. . . percussive, no-her 
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face is everrynonsense” (F, p. 209). Katz also surveys Lalitha’s body, “hoping [she] would prove 
to be big in the butt or thick in the thighs” (F, 211). Katz’s desire to catalogue Lalitha into a certain 
class of attractiveness or even to relegate her into the confines of plainness, is a jealous response 
to Lalitha’s lack of interest in him. Both food and clothing, instead of offering Franzen a position 
of capacity, work to marginalise him as someone who essentially places blame on characters from 
other cultures who do not have experiences to align with their appearance. Yet this ambivalent 
pattern in Franzen’s work is revealing in itself, because as Jesus Blanco Hidalga points out, most 
of the antagonists who appear in Franzen’s novels occupy either end of the social spectrum, from 
either the very poor Appalachian farmers symbolised by Coyle Mathis, or the members of the 
upper-middle-class (sometimes of dubious Jewish origin) like Howard, the father of Joey’s 
roommate.57 Franzen’s favoured identifier, that of the middle class to which he himself belongs, 
manages to stay above the fray. 
 
“Is That Your Real Name?”: On Expectations and Uncertainty 
One thing that is clear in the fictions of Ghosh and Franzen is that they are both interested in the 
dubious nature of first impressions I argue in this section that Franzen and Ghosh reveal in their 
own way, the name of an individual as an ambivalent signifier which sometimes gives credence to 
unhelpful assumptions about another person. Furthermore, a name is used as a way of 
foregrounding an individual’s identity, or the identity of a certain place; it is relied upon as a label 
of introduction and offers a perspective, rightly or wrongly, through which the individual must be 
seen and judged. Yet the notion of names failing to provide an accurate representation of either a 
 
57 Jesus Blanco Hidalga, Jonathan Franzen and the Romance of Community: Narratives of Salvation (New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), pp. 30-33. 
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self or a place, as we have already seen from the explication of the tide country’s etymology, is 
rather a commonplace experience.  
The ensuing confusion is mostly due to the multiplicities of language, as described by 
Walter Benjamin in “On Language as Such and the Language of Man.” While Benjamin asserts 
that man “communicates his mental being (in so far that it is communicable) by naming all other 
things” and also observes that by identify[ing] naming language with language is to rob linguistic 
theory of its deepest insights. -- It is therefore the linguistic being of man to name things.”58 In 
trying to preserve language and assure its relevance to quotidian life, names are downgraded to a 
generalised cohesive glue meant to waylay an experience of “alteriority” as given to names.59 
Remarking upon the question of representation in Benjamin’s personal writings, Gerhardt Richter 
describes Benjamin as “a self that remains to be defined.”60 Even at just a cursory glance, names 
are given an impossible task: to take up the difficult mantle of judge and jury and to traverse this 
lacuna in a singular vein. At best, this undue pressure renders the name as a degraded, often 
unreliable signifier of identity, sometimes even becoming an instrument of irony which works 
against accruing a reliable understanding of any given individual. 
Names similarly mislead and complicate the main trio of protagonists in The Hungry Tide. 
Unlike Benjamin, who only seems to imply that the naming nature of man’s language takes away 
from a deeper meaning, Ghosh seems to imply that these deeper meanings are simply not yet 
accessible to an individual who has not yet come to terms with his own relationship towards 
language, a nod towards Benjamin’s own construction of “kinship,” wherein each singular 
 
58 Walter Benjamin, “On Language as Such and The Language of Man”, in Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings 
Volume 1, edited by Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1996), p. 64 
59 Gerhard Richter, “Acts of self-portraiture: Benjamin’s confessional and literary writings” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Walter Benjamin, edited by David S. Ferris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 221 
60 Richter, p. 221. 
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language does not appear to be connective to its siblings, but is instead understood as a deeper 
desire to communicate across languages.61 Clearly distancing himself from the colonial position 
which assumes that language must always be in the possession of whoever speaks it, Ghosh 
suggests a gentler linguistic osmosis, whereby an individual understands that there are inevitable 
gaps in language which provided much needed fresh perspective for its speaker.  
The Hungry Tide is set chiefly in the Sundarbans, where we are introduced to two outsiders 
who are first portrayed as narrow-minded and ill-suited to a location that trades upon a distinct 
lack of boundaries. The translator, Kanai, and the cetologist, Piya, each embody carefully curated 
systems of thought which prioritize knowledge that does not allow for flexibility of thought. This, 
in turn makes both Kanai and Piya ambivalent in the way they approach the tide country. 
Throughout the novel, Ghosh presents them with a set of challenges which leads to a more enriched 
understanding of their experiences.  
As a translator who is fluent in a number of languages, Kanai clutches on to his “addiction” 
to language and fancies himself a seasoned judge of character (HT, p. 4). Just like an addict, Kanai 
is overly dependent on language as a paramount aspect of his worldview and he assumes that 
language is comparably as important to everyone he meets. Writing about the difference between 
addiction as experience and addiction as destruction of experience, Agamben, notes in relation to 
the addicts of the nineteenth century that they “could still delude themselves that they were 
undergoing a new experience, while for the [modern addict] this is nothing more than the 
discarding of all experience.”62 When we are first introduced to Kanai, he finds himself drawn to 
Piyali “Piya” Roy, an American cetologist of Bengali descent, who has come to the Sundarbans in 
 
61 Benjamin, “Language”, p. 73. 
62 Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: Essays on the Destruction of Experience, translated by Liz Heron 
(London: Verso, 1993), p. 16. 
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hopes of conducting a dolphin survey. His linguistic addiction carefully lessens her as another 
person and reduces her to his thinking. While he admires that she “is not without some experience 
in travel,” this compliment is overshadowed by the fact that he also seems to view her as a sexual 
object, priding himself on possessing the “true connoisseur’s ability to praise and appraise women” 
(HT, p. 3). 
Their first conversation, spurred on by Piya spilling chai over Nirmal’s papers, is rife with 
further misunderstandings. Despite sharing English as a common tongue, the language fuels 
resentment between them and is not a suitable instrument to bring them together. For Piya, Kanai’s 
bitter retort over his ruined papers – “Does anyone have a choice when they’re dealing with 
America these days?” – seems to conform to her belief that Kanai is the “last person” who she 
would have wanted to offend in the train carriage (HT, p. 10). Kanai continues to feed onto his 
certainty of being able to parse out others at a glance; he thinks that he is justified in minimising 
her experiences in favour of the more generalised assumptions which accompany her gender. 
Kanai and Piya are bound by their first impressions of each other, and it is through learning each 
other’s names that their respective identities become more complex. Even though Kanai has 
already ascertained her Indian background, he can’t help but be “surprised by the unmistakably 
Bengali sound of her name” (HT, p. 12). It is significant that Kanai sees Piya’s name as a cultural 
anomaly, in that an American name would have aligned with his diatribe on the encroaching 
presence of American tourists. This postulate again contradicts itself, when Piya mispronounces 
Kanai’s name. Kanai recognizes Piya’s lack in understanding Bengali culture and displaces 
himself in order to connect with her, reaching for an American landmark: “Say it to rhyme with 
Hawaii” (HT, 13). 
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Kanai’s seamless extension towards America implies that Piya’s  identity is rootless and 
able to be easily taken up by others. Sandra Meyer observes Piya is “formally homeless,” in that 
being American becomes a nearly meaningless tenet of identification because it is defined by the 
absence of any formal boundary.63 Meyer argues that “it becomes clear that she does not feel at 
home anywhere at all, and occasionally has the feeling that she uses avoidance so as to not admit 
her inner emptiness.”64 In a similar vein, Ismail S. Tahlib has remarked upon Piya’s “distrust” of 
language, as her experience of verbal language has been largely hostile and limited.65 Piya’s 
discomfort with her American identity and her daily contention with the alienation of her Bengali 
heritage can be extrapolated from these arguments. America, rather than standing in for the land 
of opportunity represents here—on the train to Canning—as an omnipresent sense of exile. Any 
expectation of American greatness is overtaken by the reality of America as an invasive amalgam 
of culture. Piya’s American identity is most ironically embodied by Piya’s minority presence as a 
“mascot” within her department, which emphasizes its role as an ambivalent signifier, born out of 
Piya’s Bengali heritage rather than celebrating her American identity (HT, p. 74).  
Completing this trio of protagonists is Fokir Mondol, a local illiterate fisherman who 
becomes Piya’s guide in the tide country. He possesses a connection to Kanai, in that Kanai used 
to be friends with Fokir’s mother Kusum, although Kanai fails to use this fact to establish a 
meaningful connection with Fokir. Both Kusum and Fokir stand in reproach to the ambivalence 
embodied by Kanai and Piya, because their names both signify a lack or a disconnection with who 
they purport themselves to be. Meanwhile, Fokir stands in reproach to such lack, and signifies that 
 
63 Sandra Meyers, “‘The Story that Gave this Land its Life’: The Translocation of Rilke’s Duino Elegies in Amitav 
Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide”, in Postcolonial Translocations: Cultural Representations and Critical Spatial Thinking, 
edited by Marga Munkelt, Markus Schmitz, Mark Stein, and Silke Stroh (Amsterdam: Rodolpi, 2013), p. 153. 
64 Meyer, p. 153. 
65 Ismail S. Talib, “Ghosh, Language, and The Hungry Tide” in  History, Witness, and Testimony in  Amitav 
Ghosh’s Fiction, edited by Chitra Sankaran (Albany: SUNY Press, 2012), p. 141. 
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he is quite happy to live in conjunction with the land and forego expectations of material comforts. 
This distance from the cosmopolitanism inhabited by Kanai and Piya is implied in Fokir’s name, 
derived from the term “fakir,” refers to spiritual figures who reside solely upon necessities 
provided to them by their environment. However, Fokir’s vocation as a crab fisherman is clearly 
under threat by political movements which continue to sanction the use of catchall nets. Fokir’s 
peaceable existence, while in line with nature and self-sufficient, is mostly seen by others (namely 
Kanai and Fokir’s wife, the enterprising Moyna) as unsustainable. It is only with Fokir’s death at 
the end of the novel during a flood, that Piya and Kanai come together to assess a possible path 
towards sustainable conservation. In the end, Fokir fulfils his namesake by illuminating such a 
future possibility for his companions. 
A comparable vein of displacement is revisited and extended in Ghosh’s Sea of Poppies, 
the first of three books set during the First Opium War in the 1840s. Ghosh furthers this theme of 
displacement to suggest that one’s name is a product of being nameless and a way to assure 
continued avoidance with recognisable personhood. Kalua and his wife Deeti are on the run after 
he rescues her from being burned alive, and the pilot of the Ibis enquires about Kalua’s name in 
order to register him. Kalua uses his father’s name to avoid detection from the authorities; his 
father’s name “Madho” is immediately corrupted on paper as “Maddow” and pronounced “apt.”66 
Kalua is subsequently pressed for his father’s name for no reason other than a Kafkaesque 
bureaucratic exercise that is never explained; left without choice, Kalua gives his own name. This 
is an odd inverse of the Western-centric narrative in which the father frees the son from his duties 
and allows for him to circumvent authority rather than to be constrained by his heritage. However, 
 
66 Amitav Ghosh, Sea of Poppies (London: John Murray, 2008), p. 261. Subsequent citations noted in-text as SP.  
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even this symbolism dissolves under a misunderstanding. Kalua is asked to spell his father’s name 
(in this case also his own) in accordance with English custom: 
“If I can moot out one proposal, sir, why not do like this? First write C-o-l—just like ‘coal’ 
no?—then v-e-r. Like-this like-this we can do.” 
. . . “Theek you are,” said the pilot. “That’s how I’ll put him down then – as Maddow 
Colver.” 
. . . “Deeti, standing beside her husband, heard him whisper the name, not as if it were his 
own but as if it belonged to someone else, a person other than himself. Then he repeated 
it, in a tone of greater confidence, and when it came to his lips again, a third time, the sound 
of it was no longer new or unfamiliar: it was as much his own now as his skin, or his eyes, 
or his hair: Maddow Colver (SP, pp. 261-2). 
Kalua’s new name, though he is quick to take to it, should not be glossed over as merely a 
bastardisation of his origins. The pilot Mr. Doughty and Baboo Nob Kissin the well-meaning but 
complicit gomusta are deliberately emphasised as neither menacing nor particularly authoritative, 
as they are unable to qualify Kalua as a person until they wrongly contextualise his name to assert 
power over him. This is an instance of Ghosh using inaction (here the failure to learn Kalua’s 
correct name inasmuch as it can be learned in a deceitful context) to stand in for an interaction that 
prioritises power rather than truth. Yet these displays of power are not born out of specifically 
created authority to cement the grasp of Britain over India, and instead should be understood as 
gestures of ignorance. 
            This ignorance, or what Ghosh calls “colonial conditioning” maintains a currency in the 
other side and can also be found in the incapacity of former colonies to reflect “upon [their place] 
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in the world.”67 In an interview with Chitra Sankaran, Ghosh asserts that these ironies and 
mistranslations remain common in the ex-colonies and are also found in the collective intellect of 
the former colony’s past subjects. The interview with Sankaran takes place in Singapore, and 
Ghosh points out the “self-unaware[ness]” that comes to light in the naming of establishments such 
as the Ellenborough Café, which celebrates Lord Ellenborough, an advocate of smuggling opium.68 
Resisting colonial conditioning also plays a large role in the broader project of 
resignification.  As Shanthini Pillai’s article, “Resignifying Coolie: Amitav Ghosh’s The Glass 
Palace”, argues that although “coolie” is a term used to refer to Indian labourers, frequently in 
hand with a deep humiliation through the course of colonial history, the broadness of “coolie” 
slowly gains specifics which then distances them from the generalisations impressed upon them 
by colonial discourse. Labourers are seen as “docile” and such meekness is therefore compounded 
by their “outsider status” when then assures them of being “less than human” and more as a “unit 
of production” as they migrate from colony to colony.69 In The Glass Palace (2000) Rajkumar’s 
description as a coolie of agency, according to Pillai is “reflective of Ghosh cutting through older, 
docile depictions. . . that [the coolie] has the ability to shape his own narrative, which can be 
juxtaposed against pejorative depictions.”70 I contend that Ghosh continues the resignification of 
the coolie with Kalua, Deeti, and later “Fami Colver,” a term used to encompass all of their 
descendants (SP, p. 262). Although Kalua’s name is taken away from him under bureaucratic 
circumstances that directly lead into his migrancy, it is also this enforced identity that has ensured 
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70 Pillai, p. 48. 
 45 
 
him his freedom. Such freedom is again a product of colonial ignorance through which he regains 
his capability of shaping his own narrative. 
  Among the later generations of Fami Colver, the name “Maddow” recurs frequently in the 
family tree. While it cannot be denied that the origins of Maddow derive from Kalua’s docility, as 
he is not even given the opportunity to speak his own name, Kalua’s mishap with the pilot and the 
gomusta presents his descendants with unprecedented possibilities for self-fashioning. We learn 
that only a few of Kalua’s and Deeti’s grandchildren and subsequent generations abide by 
Maddow’s humble beginnings. Others prefer to imagine and invent much more “fanciful” and 
“grandiose” mythos for the name (SP, p. 262). 
Where the names present within Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide and Sea of Poppies work to 
undermine certainty behind names, the significance given to names by Franzen emphasises a 
confounding of expectations. Even though some individuals will eventually gain the privilege of 
changing their names of their own accord, names are chosen for a variety of reasons and then given 
to an individual in question. The idea of potentiality behind a name should be seen as distinct from 
the individual naturally embodying the narrative possibilities of the novel, as names are chosen in 
order to subvert, emphasise, or obfuscate expectations. In Franzen’s most recent novel Purity, 
names are at the forefront of Pip Tyler’s mind. The Dickensian echoes that are present in her name 
are pointed out by Charles Blenheim, “I like your name. I have great expectations of you” (P, p. 
206).  
Blenheim is a has-been professor whose namesake not only evokes the author of Great 
Expectations, but also bears more than a passing resemblance to the unhappy Chip Lambert of The 
Corrections. In addition to sharing a name and a profession, Chip and Blenheim both share a 
career-threatening taste for younger female students. Chip’s liaison with Melissa Paquette ends 
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with him losing his tenure-track job and Charles’ second marriage to former student Leila Helou 
ends up stagnant. Charles Blenheim is one possible evolution of a life that Chip Lambert might 
have had, although this contention is not without its caveats. This comparison also depends upon 
the slightly distasteful idea that both men further display a like-minded disdain for women.  
This is significant because while Franzen is somewhat well regarded as a novelist, an 
enduring critique is that his various portraits of masculinity have often been made at the expense 
of lesser female agency or even the prevailing problematic belief of female privilege. Where 
Melissa is represented as intelligent, and yet vapid and rebellious on account of her youth, Leila’s 
redeeming trait remains her maturity. Interestingly, Leila herself implies this when she starts up a 
relationship with Tom Aberant, a level-headed journalist. Tom has an ex-wife (Pip’s mercurial 
mother) but Leila underscores the idea that their relationship should in fact be free of guilt also on 
the account of her age: “I’m forty-one, older than Anabel was when you divorced her. You don’t 
have to feel as if you’re trading up” (P, p. 233). While she later reflects upon her relationship with 
Tom as “New Testament” rather than “Old Testament,” like her marriage with Charles, it is 
significant that Leila sees her “New Testament” liaison with Tom as one that is defined by both 
“choice” and fate (P, p. 233). Still, the addition of “choice” to such an act of fate is cheapened by 
a willing absence of female agency. The same can be said for the “expectations” that are bestowed 
upon Pip. Rather than being “her” expectations, Blenheim takes over her hopes and dreams.   
The significance of Franzen’s names has not gone unnoticed by critics. My designation of 
Chip Lambert as an earlier draft of Charles Blenheim is touched upon by Stephen J. Burn. Burn 
argues that the names of the Lamberts (Alfred, Chip, Denise, Enid, and Gary) link them as a family. 
When the names are put in alphabetical order, a pattern emerges that leaves the Lamberts unable 
to deny their closeness as a family. Burn notes that the A-C-D-E-G pattern signifies who in the 
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family is close to whom.71 Chip, under these parameters, is close to his father Alfred and his 
younger sister, Denise. However, Burn extends the tie between Chip and Alfred beyond the fiction 
of The Corrections. If we assume, as Burn does, that Chip’s name is a diminutive of Charles, then 
buried within letters of Charles is also E-A-R-L, the name of Franzen’s father, and Shakespeare’s 
King L-E-A-R which will be explicated in the next chapter. However, this interpretation of Chip’s 
family ties is made slightly dissonant by the fact that he is never outright stated to be “Charles” in 
The Corrections although at one point, Alfred does refer to him as “Chipper” as if reiterating that 
any nickname bestowed upon him would still pull him closer to his father instead of putting much 
needed distance between them (C, p. 401). Whether the figure of the father is implicit or explicit, 
there is little doubt that he is present in the text. 
            Conversely, Pip’s name makes her out to be an orphan and an individual with scant 
personal connections. Although her mother is all at once too-present in her life, and Pip cannot 
help but occupy an inordinate amount of her mother’s attentions – “she was like a bank in her 
mother’s economy that was too big to fail” (P, p. 3), it is the absent figure of the father that drives 
both Pip’s motivation and the main plot of Purity. Her mother Anabel (only known to Pip as 
Penelope, because she keeps her real name a secret) also seems to be missing a man in her life, 
although she is characterised as a radicalised feminist. Anabel brings to mind Poe’s “Annabel 
Lee;” as if to distance, and yet call attention to this comparison, Franzen notes that Anabel is “vain 
about her name and spelled it for whoever was over the phone” (P, p. 372) Her insistence on the 
spelling also suggests, that Annabel only exists within the memory of her lover, and any attempts 
that she makes to curate her own existence renders her incomplete as Anabel. Anabel’s alias 
Penelope is not much better, as the name harks back to Penelope, the loyal wife of Odysseus, who 
 
71 Burn, p. 124. 
 48 
 
is waiting for her husband’s return. Therefore, no matter how much Anabel wishes to become a 
person on her own, her origins will always lie with her ex-husband. 
            Pip too, is waiting, if not for a father figure that she desperately needs, then for her life to 
start and to get out of debt. Blenheim asks her about her “expectations” in a seemingly tired pun 
(P, p. 157). The expectations which Blenheim saddles upon her are more reminiscent of his own 
past achievements and more recent failures while ignoring Pip’s own traumas and experiences. On 
account of her name, Blenheim’s expectations of Pip are notably not her own, but rather a 
reflection of his expectations for himself. Wanting to join the ranks of literary greats, Franzen even 
manages a dig at the innate privilege of his own name through Blenheim’s petty assertions: “Do 
you like Jonathan Safran Foer?” and that the New York Times Bestsellers’ list is under siege from 
“a plague of literary Jonathans” (P, p. 158). Blenheim, in a typical show of masculine force, seeks 
to erase Pip’s identity and instead impose upon her the possibility of expectations not yet fulfilled, 
as if to grant himself a second chance. 
            Even though Pip plays along with Blenheim and pronounces his analysis of her namesake 
as “succinctly put,” Blenheim’s expectations are founded upon patently false information and 
therefore are more telling of Blenheim’s own shortcomings than Pip’s herself (P, p. 206). For one, 
even though Pip shares Pip Pirrip’s destitute circumstances towards the beginning of the novel, it 
is significant that Dickens’ Pip “came to call himself” Pip.72 Pip Tyler’s name is a distinct nod to 
one’s lack of expectation and fulfillment and this sense of futility is absent in Dickens. In Purity, 
after a failed “retreat into casual sex” with Jason, he takes issue with not just her lack of 
commitment (“coitus interruptus maximus!”) but also tries to imply that her being unable to 
perform this act of ritual intimacy is due to her either being a lesser person or simply a dishonest 
 
72 Charles Dickens, Great Expectations (London: Wordsworth Editions, 1992), p. 3. 
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individual (P, p. 25). Jason suggests as a parting shot to Pip that her personhood is invalid because, 
“Pip. . .Pip, I don’t know. It just doesn’t sound like your name when I say it” (P, p.  26). 
Pip’s name is “Purity” and rather than carry the name with her as an initial form of 
identification, her name becomes something that is imbued with deep “shame” (P, p. 61). Purity 
gives the novel its title, and yet as Tim Adams points out in his review of the novel, all forms of 
purity in the text stay elusive.73  As an outspoken proponent against social media usage and a self-
proclaimed Luddite, Franzen presents the World Wide Web as a strangely corseted version of the 
Wild West. Anything goes on the Net, so long as its users are happy to remain subjects of mass 
surveillance.74 Security concerns are twinned with lewd behaviour and perpetuate Pip’s shame. 
The looming presence of the Internet, Franzen later tells us through the ever charming and “aptly 
named” predator Andreas Wolf, has become just as common in our daily lives as oxygen (P, p. 
59). Whether “sitting in prison” or elsewhere, Wolf argues that it is impossible to “opt out” of the 
system of the Internet (P, pp. 447-8). Hidalga finds this assertion “compelling”, as it is under the 
strangulation of the internet that Pip gives away her dearest secret: her name.75 Adams additionally 
notes, that as long as Pip is a part of Purity she remains unable to find real peace, as she cannot 
place herself at the centre of an experience that by all rights should have been hers.76 She seals her 
own fate when she gives away her name to Wolf, entrusting him with the power that is inherently 
attached to her name and also allowing for Wolf to shape who she is. 
 
73 Tim Adams, “Purity by Jonathan Franzen review – piercingly brilliant”, The Guardian, 6 September 2015, n.p. 
74 A compelling counterpoint to the negativist vision set out by Franzen in Purity might be found in Dave Eggers’ 
technophilic novel The Circle, wherein the main character Mae is slowly swallowed up by various technologies and 
ceases to be able to contend with the chaos that is real life. See Dave Eggers, The Circle (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 2013).  
75 Hildalga, p. 313. 
76 Adams, “Purity”, n.p. 
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            While Pip’s name has assured her position as Wolf’s hostage, he, too, is held hostage by 
his name and the indelible connection to his WikiLeaks-like organisation, The Sunlight Project 
which stands for lofty ideals including “freedom” and “truth” (P, p. 22). These allegedly egalitarian 
properties take on dark, ambivalent meaning in the third chapter about the self-imposed limits of 
personal freedom, but even at a glance, Wolf’s name stands in stark contrast to his wish to uphold 
these principles. Wolf’s name recalls Fenrir from Norse mythology, a figure who not only devours 
the sun but is also the bringer of Ragnarok, the end of the world. The latter could be seen as 
corresponding to the spread of mass surveillance through the Internet. Although Wolf claims to be 
the bringer of sunlight, the opposite is true. Wolf is another individual who is constrained by 
expectations of his name, and the ubiquity of the Internet holds him to account. Despite espousing 
a certain brand of purity and crowing that “sunlight is the best disinfectant!” before leaving the 
east German bloc under the protection of a television crew, he is once again asked to repeat himself 
for the television (P, p. 167). Here, Wolf is hamstrung by his own branding; even though he wants 
to expose truth to the wider public, he is still stuck paying homage to the performative ways of 
television and media, which is also a tactic for shying away from the truth in favour of 
sensationalism. Wolf’s flair for the dramatic is not so much tied up in trying to rid the world of 
corruption but more about protecting the charitable reputation of his organisation.  
By understanding Wolf’s pathology and the way his identity actively works against his 
brand (in the name of preserving the brand), the loss of Pip’s name to Wolf via electronic 
communication is first a strategic connection on her part to “feel closer to an Internet celebrity,” 
(P, p. 67) an act which is swiftly punished by the reminder of the “existence of” all of Wolf’s 
“other women” (P, p. 147). Secondly, it is a re-confirmation that something as simple, and yet as 
significant, as a name can work insidiously against the identity of an individual. Information is 
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used not to add to the enlightenment of the community, but to control and detain individuals from 
within. Such performative undercurrents of ambivalence necessarily lend novels their narrative 
drive. 
 
“Her Face is Everywhere”: Postcoloniality in The Hungry Tide 
The specific signifier of names is implicated in broader issues surrounding representation in 
postcolonialism and postmodernism especially focusing on minor voices (broadly defined here to 
include non-Westernised experiences, problematically-Westernised experiences, working class 
experiences, and experiences of women). The idea of representation being “postcolonial” occupies 
a pertinent position in Ghosh’s writing despite his desire to distance himself from this mode of 
discourse. Regarding the ongoing issue of representation in postcolonial representation, Neil 
Lazarus writes:  
It is important to problematise the question of representation and the issues around it where 
a writer’s desire to speak for others (emphasis in the original) – to endow ‘them’ with 
consciousness and voice, – shades over to ventriloquisation, into speaking instead of them: 
what starts out as an attempt to speak on behalf of others, or at least about others (in the 
interest of putting them ‘on the map’) ends up paradoxically as a silencing of ‘them’ 
through the writer’s own speech.77   
Lazarus is sceptical about an author’s ability to keep the delicate balance between the author’s own 
intellect and the limits that are sometimes inherent to the othered voices they endeavour to 
represent due to various constraints upon opportunities whether educational, financial, or 
something else. Lazuarus’s reading of The Hungry Tide underlines Ghosh’s commitment to a form 
 
77 Lazarus, p. 139. 
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of humanism which succeeds in completing, to borrow a phrase from Theodor Adorno, “the almost 
insoluble task [of letting] neither the power of others, nor our own powerlessness stupefy us.”78 
Incommensurability is the theorised distance between a specific (often marginalised) individual 
and the perceived incapability of such a repressed subject to give voice to his own experience in 
his own terms. 
The Hungry Tide commits to making sure that all manners of experience are presented to 
the reader on an equal footing and incommensurability in particular takes centre stage as a new 
possibility that is not beholden to history. Both semantic and semiotic communication are 
entangled together to suggest a symbiotic relationship. I would further contend that verbal 
communication in the novel is secondary to gestural language. English as a language is dominant 
in the novel, but is eventually superseded by broader means of communication; whenever the 
language of gestures and spoken English are made to confront each other, Ghosh does not hesitate 
to illuminate the possibilities of incommensurability to neutralise some of the more problematic 
aspects of English. Incommensurability and the perceived inability to communicate does not give 
way to English. Instead, during Piya’s and Fokir’s first meeting, Ghosh makes clear that the 
English deployed by the the Mej-da and the forest guard should be seen as indicative of a 
“cosmopolitan rootlessness,” to borrow an earlier term used by  Bose, to distinguish Ghosh’s 
writing as anchored in lesser histories. Fokir, who does not have the traditional access to English, 
realises silence as a powerful weapon. The Mej-da and the forest guard accuse Fokir in broken 
English of being a “poacher” (HT, p. 32). Piya can see right away that this is only a ploy to bring 
trouble to Fokir. English asserts itself here as a dominant and culturally overwhelms all other 
possibilities around it. Gareth Griffiths describes the role of silence in The Hungry Tide as a 
 
78 Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, translated by E. F. N. Jephcott (London: 
Verso, 1974), p. 57. 
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“process of revision,” traversing from the need to “acknowledge silenced human beings” to 
“listening to. . .the many other ‘silenced’ entities of the Tide Country.”79 
At first, Piya too, makes a version of the same mistake, using her previous understanding 
of local fishermen to impose an initial identity on him. As Piya is a field scientist who frequently 
works with locals, the basis for her understanding is not entirely out of place and should not be 
blamed for her assumption. Seeing that Fokir possessed a “grizzled look of an experienced hand,” 
she stops the boat and interviews him using display cards about the presence of dolphins on the 
river (HT, p. 42). It is not until later when Piya approaches him, that she realises:  
. . . He was not the elderly graybeard that she had taken him to be -- he was about her own 
age, in his late twenties. His frame was not wasted but very lean, and his long stringy limbs 
were almost fleshless in their muscularity. . . Yet there was a defiance in his stance at odds 
with the seeming defencelessness of his unclothed chest and protruding bones (HT, 46).  
There are several things of note in this passage which lessens the power of the Mej-da’s English, 
and also demands that Piya change her initial assessment of Fokir and his station. Fokir’s 
nakedness not only speaks to to Mej-da’s command of English, but poses a threat that pales in 
comparison to non-manmade threats, which Fokir has already experienced, such as the ever-
present threat of the man-eating Sundarban tiger.  Fokir’s nakedness also speaks to the clarity with 
which he sees the world.  
Ghosh seems to suggest that the confined and defined ways in which Western-oriented 
individuals like Piya and Kanai approach language as a singular project leads to feelings of 
hostility and discomfort. An antithesis to these seemingly self-inflicted visions is Fokir, who does 
not see a division between language and the self. This is quite evident in Nirmal’s surprise, when 
 
79 Gareth Griffiths, “‘Silenced Worlds’: Language and Experience in Amitav Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide”, Kunapipi, 
34 (2012), 105-112 (p. 107). 
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Fokir as a boy is able to recite the local legend of Bon Bibi, a nature goddess, from memory. 
Nirmal’s first reaction is that Fokir has become a savant who has become literate over a short 
period of time, but Kusum’s response is, “I have told him so many times that it is all inside his 
head” (HT, p. 133). The knowledge of Bon Bibi in fact enriches Fokir’s ties to his surroundings, 
rather than dislocates him from how he sees the world.  
Although Fokir does not have direct access to the channels of education so prized by the 
likes of Kanai and Moyna, a mode of education has come to him through experience and oral 
tradition, a pedagogical channel esteemed by Walter Benjamin. In his essay “The Storyteller,” 
Benjamin distinguishes between oral tradition and the relatively recent formulation of reading 
novels. Oral tradition invites community, as a narrative is told to an audience and actively 
absorbed. This differs from the novel, which is both produced (written) and consumed (read) in 
isolation. Benjamin notes that novels prevent individuals from seeking “counsel” from the 
imagination of others. In other words, humanity has sustained a great loss in collective experience. 
Benjamin observes: 
But if today “having counsel” is beginning to have an old-fashioned ring, this is because 
the communicability of experience is decreasing. In consequence we have no counsel either 
for ourselves or for others. After all, counsel is less an answer to a question than a proposal 
concerning the continuation of a story which is just unfolding.80 
For Kanai, Piya, and even Kanai’s radical, Marxist-reading Uncle Nirmal, language paradoxically 
appears to be the common thread of this incommunicability as each of them are careful to curate 
their own boundaries of identity as seemingly impervious from exterior influences. Fokir, an 
 
80 Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller”, in Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, edited by Hannah Arendt, 
translated by Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), p. 86. 
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individual who has grown up reading rivers as texts, holds no distinction between language and 
the human being. It would not be accurate to say that he is without language, as his wife does in a 
joke. Moyna makes a “clever” pun in gan (knowledge) and gaan (song) to suggest that her life 
would be much easier if her husband had more of the former rather than the latter (HT, p. 
212) .However, all this joke manages to showcase is that its teller and its listeners are constrained 
by language and are not able to look beyond such a prescriptive understanding. The discomfort 
here is played out within an elitist understanding of knowledge, one that deliberately chooses to 
forego any sense of inclusivity and trades upon a person’s inability to understand.  
This experience not only serves to alienate Fokir, who is full of “song” but remains unable 
to share his “knowledge” with others but also Piya, whose sense of knowledge is still untethered 
from local experience. As Moyna’s joke trades upon its bicultural and bilingual exclusivity, 
Lazarus observes that Kanai appears to approve of the joke, adding an element of “symbolic 
violence.”81 In other words, Kanai moves to preclude Fokir’s experiences because they are unlike 
his and he does not understand them. This is a more serious invocation of the ignorant coloniser 
that we have already discussed above in Sea of Poppies.  In trying to showcase their understanding 
of the English language, both Kanai and Moyna highlight language’s shortcomings in their own 
respective prejudices. Without paying closer attention to the experiences which language purports 
to describe, we do so at a detriment to ourselves.  
Fokir’s knowledge is incommensurable so long as those who speak to him remain unable 
to look outside of themselves. On a rare occasion, Fokir opens his mouth to ask Kanai “if he is a 
good person?” It is no coincidence that this exchange takes place on the mystical island of 
Garjontola near Lusibari, where much of the novel is set. Fokir offers Kanai the gift of 
 
81 Lazarus, p. 142. 
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understanding experience outside of oneself, and it is this boundless understanding of nature which 
allows for Fokir to feel a connection with his mother even after her death. He tells Kanai, “How 
could I miss her? Her face is everywhere” (HT, p. 305). However, Kanai is only able to take his 
question within the context of the pressures of modern society. He finds himself angry and unable 
to express himself – to the point where he realises the irony of the well-trodden expression “beside 
himself” (HT, p. 348). The difference between Kanai and Fokir is made clear; Kanai is left without 
language in that particular experience because he remains incapable of reconciling himself with 
language, to work alongside it rather to dominate it. He admits to Piya after his ordeal: “at 
Garjontola I learned how little I know of myself and of the world” (HT, p. 353).  
 
“At the Suggestion of Her Therapist”: Loss of Self in Freedom 
Kanai’s realisation that he is indeed a “citizen of the world” rather than a “citizen above the world” 
underlines Ghosh’s resolutely humanist perspective across cultures. Kanai and Piya have gained a 
measure of themselves by being in conjunction with the world. Conversely, the plight plaguing the 
Berglunds, Franzen’s liberal well-to-do family at the heart of Freedom is perhaps the exact 
opposite, suggesting that such connections should be viewed on a spectrum and Spivak’s notion 
of a continued silence which precludes minor voices from representing themselves. As Bauman 
points out: 
Identities seem fixed and solid only when seen, in a flash, from the outside. Whatever 
solidity they might have when contemplated from the inside of one’s own biographical 
experience appears fragile, vulnerable, and constantly torn apart by shearing forces which 
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lay bare its fluidity and by cross-currents which threaten to rend in pieces and carry away 
any form they might have acquired.82 
How each individual’s identity is crafted and presented to others for judgement forms the crux of 
Freedom’s human drama. Each family member, save the curiously “even keeled” daughter Jessica, 
is wrapped up in a deeply private, individualist crisis in which the world is deliberately unkind to 
them and they struggle with the personal mores, public expectations, and navigating the daily 
difficulty of maintaining a cohesive identity (F, p. 235).  
     To extend this astute observation about the fleeting existence of one’s holistic existence, 
we might go on to wonder whether or not our growing fascination with community, or more 
broadly, how any individual might fit and be functional within society is a poor attempt at 
preserving an idealised sense of self. The closed, airless suburban community envisioned by 
Franzen in the novel acts as a threat to individual freedom and subsequently drives its participants 
towards decisions that usually go against the safeguarding of one’s personal liberties. Sam 
Tannenhaus clearly articulates this contradiction in his review of Freedom, emphasising an 
emergent contradiction that hovers over the fissure of collective manners and the near impossible 
expectations placed upon the individual to fulfill and perpetuate these norms: 
Franzen grasps that the central paradox of modern American liberalism inheres not in its 
doctrines but in the unstated presumptions that govern its daily habits. Liberals, no less 
than conservatives – and for that matter revolutionaries and reactionaries; in other words, 
all of us – believe some modes of existence are superior to others. But only the liberal 
committed to a vision of communal pluralism, is unsettled by this truth.83 
 
82 Bauman, p. 78. 
83 Sam Tanenhaus, Peace and War: Book Review of Freedom by Jonathan Franzen", New York Times, 19 August 
2010. 
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Tannenhaus defines a distinct difference between the manneredness of the suburban middle class 
and the underlying assumptions which assure the continued fragmentation of the self. It is quite 
telling that Franzen represents the fragmentation of the human psyche in Freedom as depression. 
Depression not only becomes an affectively ambivalent experience on the part of the individual, 
but also deterritorialises the language which is available to the individual, making sure they are 
excommunicated socially and unable to discuss their feelings. Franzen’s portrayal of Patty’s 
depression expresses a deep distrust of language and self-censorship. Understanding depression is 
the logical first step to untangling Franzen’s remark in Sydney about “happiness been largely 
unwriteable” during a visit in 2003.84 Happiness, translated narratively into a sense of closure, 
does not necessarily guarantee a great story. As Leo Tolstoy, whose masterpiece War and Peace 
features as reading material for Patty after the consummation of her affair with Walter’s friend, 
Richard Katz, remarks: “Every family is unhappy in its own way.” Happiness here, then, is perhaps 
not viable as a literary form because happiness necessarily points towards the end of conflict. In 
her unhappiness, Patty’s reading of War and Peace becomes not a sprawling adventure romance 
that represents a form of escapism, but a form of competitive consumerism, emphasising the 
inevitable form of human freedom as one that fosters unhappiness and that continues to uphold 
capitalist values.   
Depression creates a much-needed distance between how a subject (in this case, Patty) sees 
herself and how she is seen by others. A contradictory self emerges from this tangle between 
personal understanding and personal responsibility towards others. This is clear in her third-person 
autobiography titled: “Mistakes Were Made: The Autobiography of Patty Berglund (By Patty 
Berglund At the Suggestion of her Therapist.”) (F, 21). The title is passive and implicates a move 
 
84 See Camilla Nelson, “Life, Liberty, and Happiness in Jonathan Franzen’s Freedom”, Australasian Journal of 
American Studies, 32 (2013), 1-12 (p. 1.) 
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away from an individual taking responsibility for their actions. Instead, someone’s mistakes (most 
likely Patty’s, but at the same time, we cannot be sure) are in full view, and the question remains 
whose mistakes? Who should be atoning for them? The person allegedly responsible for the 
mistakes, or perhaps a separate party whose carelessness has made possible for these mistakes to 
occur in the first instance? The whole of the paratext is meant to decentralise the reader’s distance 
from Patty and also makes us question whose perspective of Patty Berglund we are seeing right 
now. Patty is less a person, than a strange depiction of a person who wants to please her therapist, 
who also threatens her selfhood.  
Even when Patty’s inner personhood and goodness is not in question and she is in fact held 
up as the paragon of her neighbourhood, Franzen makes sure to undermine such a perception of 
her by snipping away at parts of her personality: “a game could be made of trying to get Patty to 
agree that somebody’s behaviour was ‘bad.’” As a long-timer in her slowly gentrifying 
neighbourhood of Ramsey Hill, Patty is described as not a person, but “already the thing” strove 
by the rest of her street. While Patty is upheld as an ideal, “perfect” mother figure, an ideal 
neighbour with whom one could consult about the ins-and-outs of communal politeness, Franzen 
sets up a tangled web which Patty appears to navigate with deft light-footedness, and yet, in the 
face of her ardent “niceness” her neighbours, the better adjusted Paulsen’s remark on Patty’s un-
personhood: “I don’t think they have yet learned how to live” (F, p. 20). Instead of using her 
autobiography as a way to safely “migrat[e]” through her social life, and also to realise “a number 
of possible identities,” Patty is trapped by the way others define her.85 
It is implied that Patty does not have the tools to learn how to live, because she has never 
been allowed to step out of the shadows of selves that other people have foisted upon her. Though 
 
85 Peter L. Berger, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner, The Homeless Mind: Modernisation and Consciousness 
(New York: Random House, 1973), p. 73.  
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she doesn’t mention her therapist in her list of thanks, her autobiography starts with an extended 
list of acknowledgements, mostly basketball coaches who have instilled in her the sense of 
competitiveness. Patty’s competitiveness is notable here, as a cry for help and attention, a bid for 
a self, outside of fulfilling a purpose. Patty’s competitiveness has repeatedly won her the validation 
that she so desperately needs from others, but later, without her identity as an athlete, or a wife, or 
a mother, she ambivalently floats from signifier to signifier, hoping for someone’s attention.  When 
Patty goes to live with Richard as his lover in Jersey City towards the end of the novel, one gets 
the sense that she ceases to be a person, only someone that Richard comes home to, an entity 
separate from his scores of women. Although Patty respects Richard’s needs for other women “in 
the abstract,” this still doesn’t stop her from “feel[ling] lonely” (F, p. 510).  
 Patty’s abstracted sense of self as understood through her relation to others has always 
been particular to her person, which seems to be a comment regarding the deterritorialized nature 
of oneself in a bout of depression and yet a person in a depressive state must necessarily be self-
centred. This odd balance is at the forefront in the way   Patty recounts her rape. She is raped by a 
son of a family friend, Ethan Post during a party. While Philip Weinstein’s monograph, which 
attempts to make sense of Franzen’s writing in light of a “comedy of rage” of largely champions 
Franzen’s novels without putting his subject’s treatment of women to task. However, his reading 
of Patty’s rape is a standout and recognizes not only the wrong that has been done to her, but also 
forces us to recognize that she continues to be disempowered by this experience, and that the rape 
becomes a present and informative absence which colours her perception of men throughout the 
novel. One wonders why this level of caution isn’t followed in Weinstein’s other interpretations. 
Weinstein illuminates the lack of Patty’s own presence in her own ordeal. Weinstein writes that 
instead of a “you (emphasis in the original),” employing a certain kind of “specialness” now 
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rendered all but meaningless in the face of Patty’s failure to give meaning to the words which 
would otherwise inform her of the communicability of her experience. Weinstein even goes on to 
suggest that should the rape have happened to Patty’s more creatively-inclined sisters, the affective 
measures of the rape would likely be in full force, but as Patty has already dismantled the meaning 
of words behind her experience, such affective measures are rightly absent. The whole experience 
is removed from her as its “epicentre” and as such, she plays no part in the experience of her own 
rape. Her victimhood does not make her special, but in fact renders her even more invisible. 
The distance between Patty’s perception of the rape and how others treat her because of 
her experience is already stated by Patty’s own confusion. As she states, she is a “nobody,” the 
furthest possibility away from a special you (F, p. 34).86 The aftermath of her rape, therefore, is 
dedicated to not her personal struggles as a victim, but to a series of translations, so that others are 
able to make sense of, and take advantage of, her situation. Weinstein observes, Patty is not a 
“you” and thus is discounted from her own experiences. Patty’s rape is at odds with her mother’s 
liberalised, political ambitions, and such ambitions are secondary to her role as Patty’s mother. 
There is something uncanny about the parroting language she uses when she reminds Patty that 
she “has to” tell her, because Joyce has the seeming right as “[Patty’s] mother” to this information, 
Joyce appears to grasp that reminding her daughter of their relationship to one another is faintly 
ridiculous and Franzen conveys this vague layer of irony in Joyce’s “embarrass[ment]” (F, p. 34). 
Joyce being embarrassed (just a hair away from individuated shame) is wholly an external emotion 
that is for the most part self-centred. Embarrassment represents Joyce’s politicised ambitions as 
she distances herself from her daughter and her troubles.  
 
86 See Weinstein, p. 68. 
 62 
 
Similarly, Weinstein views Patty’s well-meaning coach and her court judge father as 
incapable of understanding the magnitude of his daughter’s dilemma. The coach, whose job it is 
to foster teamwork, values leadership, competitiveness, and through Ray’s derisive comments 
regarding Patty’s coaches, there is an added element of heavy-handed feminism as her father tries 
to figure out whether the coach is a lesbian. I think it would be unfair to say, as Weinstein has 
heavily implied, that her coach has removed Patty from her trauma and hopes merely to make a 
name for herself as an educator who looks out for her students. Rather, it would probably be more 
fitting to note that Coach’s concern for Patty is all the more heart-breaking and postmodern; Patty’s 
pain and injury is understood, but the trauma is taken away from Patty to be displaced among 
Ethan Post’s future (as yet non-existent victims). Even the very physical, practical aspect of her 
pain and trauma is rendered without meaning when applied to Patty as an individual.  
As for Ray’s conversations with Patty, he echoes Joyce and in fact, underlines the validity 
of Coach’s position but also the difficulty that surrounds the Coach’s perspective. Ray, a seasoned 
officer of the court, both minimises and emphasises Ethan’s supposedly harsh punishment; “let me 
see if I can’t talk to Mr Post about a deferred prosecution. . . a quiet probation. . .a proverbial sword 
over Ethan’s head.” The language goes from strangled legalese designed to mislead the average 
person, to finally, a violent metaphor deferred for Ethan, rubbing further salt into Patty’s wounds. 
As Franzen notes in one of his essays, “the self is full of contradictions,” and Franzen within his 
narrative of Patty’s autobiography, in which the account is first buried by deterritorialized concerns 
(again alluding to the fluid borders between personal life and public community) notes a 
devastating consequence. Under these difficult circumstances, Patty becomes, in her own words: 
“a nobody,” merely an idea of a person beaten down by both expectation and (Coach), reality 
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(Joyce and Ray respectively). These two viewpoints arguably make up the community at large, 
which Patty is still unable to join.  
A curious lack of personalised language also characterises David Foster Wallace’s 1998 
short story, “The Depressed Person.” As Foster Wallace and Franzen were personal friends as well 
as literary colleagues, one can see shades of influence in Franzen from Foster Wallace’s earlier 
work. Foster Wallace’s short story tells the story of the eponymous “Depressed Person,” a young, 
middle-class woman and her shifting relationship with both professional and unprofessional 
therapy. Its opening sentences reads:  
The depressed person was in terrible and unceasing emotional pain, and the impossibility 
of sharing or articulating this pain was itself a component of the pain and a contributing 
factor in its essential horror. Despairing then, of describing the emotional pain itself, the 
depressed person hoped at least to be able to express something of its context—its shape 
and texture, as it were – by recounting circumstances related to its aetiology. (“DP”, p. 57) 
The Depressed Person seems to take refuge in the exactingly difficult causes of her disease. Her 
depression is most obvious when she attempts to explain it to others. The cognition of depression 
as a disease further removes the Depressed Person from reliable communication. Like Patty, the 
never named depressed person is beleaguered the by lack of language. Even though she is invited 
to express herself, she remains unable or unwilling to do so and her many attempts to explain 
herself leaves her as a “nobody.” Her therapist, who she considers to be a best friend, is never 
named. Perhaps the lack of names is a nod to the lack of judgment as discussed earlier. The 
depressed person, we learn is the course of her story remains unable to communicate her problems 
in as much as put herself at the centre of attention. While the narrator does not want to play “The 
Blame Game,” she makes sure to talk about her unfortunate role as a bargaining chip in her parents’ 
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acrimonious divorce, her difficulty with making friends in boarding school, and her belated 
experience with her orthodontist (“DP”, p. 59). Her friends, who are mostly from her graduate 
school cohort are referred to not as friends, but as a Support System that seems, to the depressed 
person, to be constantly annoyed with her, which raises serious questions about what kind of they 
are able to provide .  
Patty’s and the Depressed Person’s lack of language is on par to the social role that 
depression places on individuals who are feeling oppressed (rightly or wrongly) by society, which 
relates back to deterritorialization and an isolation that is now inherent to the individuals of 
contemporary society. This situation is seamlessly observed by Darian Leader, who writes, 
depression is a way of saying ‘no’ to what we are told to be.”87 
Franzen’s officious use of silence contributes to an ambivalent understanding of identity 
as held hostage by orderly codes. This is a variant of incommensurability that has its place in the 
echelons of middle-class intelligentsia, as what is special about these individuals is not found in 
the way they speak for themselves, but in the way they keep up an injured silence. Patty and the 
Depressed Person hold no language for judgment nor progress because it is not within their best 
interests to upset their place in society, and so they turn to depression as a possibility of personal 
expression. Moreover, depression further cements this silence, securing the ambivalence of their 
position. In the next chapter, we see the same stringent society turned on the newly ambivalent 
notion of family.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87 Darian Leader, The New Black: Mourning, Melancholia, and Depression (London: Penguin, 2008), p. 3. 
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Chapter Two 
Family Views and Political Values: The Question of Degree 
Introduction: Families in Crisis 
The family, asserts the sociologist Ulrich Beck in an interview with Jonathan Rutherford in 1999, 
is a “zombie category,” an institution that is - to all intents and purposes “dead, but still alive.”88 
As Beck explains:  
Ask yourself what actually is a family nowadays? What does it mean? Of course, there are 
children, my children, our children. But every parenthood, the core of family life, is 
beginning to disintegrate under conditions of divorce. . . [G]randmothers and grandfathers 
get included and excluded without any means of participating in the decisions of their sons 
and daughters. From the point of view of their grandchildren the meaning of grandparents 
has to be determined by individual decisions and choices.89 
This definition of family as a category that has outlived the tenets of the family’s natural indicators 
echoes the distance found between individuals in the new millennium. Where the previous chapter 
has taken a wider view of the relationship between the individual removed from society by the 
expectations of others and structural capitalism, this chapter extends the argument and assumes 
that this burden is conferred upon the family. In this scenario, the family is similarly left with little 
choice but to conflate public and private projections of one’s “self”. Most of this has to do with 
the perceived function of choice within the family unit. New definitions emerge by way of 
consumerist behaviour, thus allowing for the public to subsume the private. Under this recent 
inclination towards structural capitalism, Families come to resemble miniature corporations and 
group units more concerned with production than affection by way of biology. In the family units 
 
88 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Cambridge: Polity, 1999), p. 6. 
89 Bauman, ibid. 
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represented by Franzen and Ghosh, the authors each seem to take up the family in particularly 
Baumanian terms, as a newly liquid formation no longer protected by solid traditions such as caste, 
parental authority, or even gender roles. These families are instead, dependent upon and at the 
mercy of the choices of the individual. The choices of the individual frequently go against the 
models of the previously self-evident family unit and in turn contributes to an added sense of 
ambivalence within the family.  
 In this chapter, I discuss the intrinsic ambivalence found in the family units in Franzen’s 
family sagas The Corrections and Freedom. Franzen takes an ironic eye towards how capitalist 
ventures shape the family and strip away any sense of private agency. Conversely, Ghosh’s Ibis 
trilogy is focused on a found family unit which stands against a stringent political and caste system 
used to work against the individual. Ghosh’s ship-siblings thereby reconstitutes the meaning of 
individual agency.  Where Franzen’s ambivalence can be seen as rooted in a fear of capitalism and 
its ability to disenfranchise the family, Ghosh makes use of this fear to drive the creation of the 
ship-siblings on the Ibis.  
The construct of family in the works of both authors enacts what René Girard interprets in 
his reading of King Lear as a “crisis of degree.”90 Girard suggests that the family unit is thrown 
into a state of chaos and into “crisis,” as previous hierarchies are lost and delegitimised. This is 
due to natural cycles of conflict, which then cause cultural norms to be broken down and repeated. 
The only way to resolve these is to find a scapegoat: Girard cites Julius Caesar though Caesar’s 
death sparked a long period of civil unrest it enabled the creation of the Imperial Age of Rome and 
its artistic golden age. More contemporary models might be found in Franzen’s patriarch Alfred 
 
90 Rene Girard, A Theatre of Envy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 6. 
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Lambert, and Ghosh’s greedy businessman Benjamin Burnham. While the absence of both of these 
figures signal fresh starts, it also signals a loss.  
As such, Girard sees these cycles as both positive and negative: “The omega of one cultural 
cycle is the alpha of another.”91 This then requires individuals to realize troubling public problems 
within the private sphere. A close explication of Girard’s ideas as present in King Lear will proceed 
this introduction, which attempts to read beneath the surface of impressions of family and its 
ambivalences in Franzen and then in Ghosh. This order also makes narrative sense, as the paternal 
struggles as realised in Franzen’s fiction mirror the first half of Shakespeare’s play. The ageing 
Lear, who is aware that he is losing grip on the more public forms of power seeks consolation in 
his private role as a father. In this vein, Lamberts and the Berglunds struggle with various degrees 
of authority complicated by ambivalent definitions of the public and private.  Ghosh’s ship-siblings 
on the Ibis, formed in a transnational setting and without the complex relationship of caste (yet 
another translation of the public/private divide), embody more of the sentiments present in the 
latter half of the play. Lear is forced without his kingly authority, to examine other aspects of his 
identity and discover another side of fatherhood without the constraints of added considerations. 
However, as Girard also shows in his insightful reading of the play, Lear continues to be held 
hostage by the question of “degree” and it is the lingering presence of degree and public otherness 
that keeps families from realising their full potential.  
 The publication of The Corrections in 2009 marked a turning point in Jonathan Franzen’s 
career. His two previous novels were nearly unreadable long postmodernist tomes, more dedicated 
to the ideas as enacted by people rather than the plight of being human in a world that is 
increasingly becoming more ambivalent against the existence of the individual. Nowhere -- 
 
91 Girard, ibid.  
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Franzen asserts during an interview with the A. V. Club in 2010 -- is the plight of the human and 
its innate impossibilities clearer than looking at the family:  
Family’s the one thing you can’t change, right? You can cover yourself with tattoos. You 
can get a grapefruit-sized ring going through your earlobe. You can change your name. . . 
But you cannot change who your parents are, who your siblings are, and who your children 
are. So even in an intensely mediated world, in a world that offers the illusion of radical 
self-invention and the radical freedom of choice, I as a novelist am drawn to the things you 
can’t get away from. Because much of the promise of radical self-invention, of definition 
yourself through this marvellous freedom of choice, it’s just a lie. It’s a lie that we all buy 
into, because it helps the economy run. Family is one of the clubs I reach for to beat up on 
that particular lie.92 
For Franzen, the idea of family is an unchangeable genealogy translated into an unconditional 
obligation between parent and child, child and parent, sibling and sibling, and so on. It is this sense 
of unconditionality that gives family a postmodern sense of being entrapped in an intimacy that in 
turn is itself ensnared by the very political ideas Franzen hopes to “beat up on” with his familial-
club. Yet this understanding is often marred by a defeatist move that we have already seen applied 
to his first two novels. S. Jammu and her cohort are defeated by political apathy and an ill-timed 
football game in The Twenty-Seventh City and the corporate conglomerate Sweeting-Aldren 
remaining unpunished for its part in causing severe earthquakes along the Eastern Seaboard in 
Strong Motion. Family, rather than standing up to these complex ideas, become a retreat from 
political commentary. The novels following The Corrections, Franzen seems to come to a new 
understanding that family is not so much a way to upheave social unhappiness, but to understand 
 
92 Jonathan Franzen with Gregg LaGambina, “Interview: Jonathan Franzen,” The A.V. Club, 9 January 2010. 
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how this particular register of ambivalence affects contemporary notions of what it means to be 
family. 
In a flashback scene in The Corrections, this hellish family dinner and its subsequent effect 
upon the Lambert children recalls the poetry of William Wordsworth, who extols that the “child 
is the father of the man.”93 In Franzen’s construction, the child is already crushed by layers and 
layers of parental obligation and unhappiness and even the slimmest chance of the child’s private 
life disappears in favour of more public parental strife. In the middle of the famous “dinner scene”, 
the second son Chip Lambert is held hostage by some rutabaga. It becomes clear as the dinner 
progresses that Chip’s dislike for root vegetables is only a thin veneer for a larger battleground, 
even though the Lambert parents have “agreed for the sake of the boys’ welfare never to allude to 
[Alfred’s] own dislike of vegetables” (C, p. 257). Enid takes advantage of this agreement, unhappy 
with her husband’s work habits and perceived lack of ambition, and seeks to punish him with his 
least favourite meal.   
Furthermore, the meal gains the troubling symbolism of the archetypal power struggle in 
the family, starting with the parents and then conferred upon their offspring without the offspring’s 
knowledge. According to Freudian symbolism, Enid in her position as the matriarch of the Lambert 
household enlists the phallic object of the rutabaga in her struggle with the patriarch, her husband 
Alfred. Even though Enid still sees herself as a mother and in charge of traditionally womanly 
tasks such as cooking in the kitchen, this does not stop her from attempting to reclaim the phallic 
symbol by subjecting Alfred to a dinner which would take away from his patriarchal power. This 
event then generates a complex psychological neurosis in Chip: an Oedipal complex combined 
 
93 William Wordsworth, Selected Poetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 122. 
 70 
 
with a castration complex that would later inform his sexual infidelities with Julia and Melissa 
Paquette.  
Nine-year-old Gary, Chip’s seemingly better-adjusted older brother, is subject to a different 
perspective of his parents’ unhappiness. During the same evening, Gary attempts to exercise 
creativity alongside his keen eye for detail by recreating a jail for a school project. At first glance, 
the project appears innocent enough, requiring ordinary school supplies such as glue and popsicle 
sticks; materials that should be just as benign in the hands of a boy. However, Gary’s project soon 
grows to have disturbing implications when he adds an electric chair, made out of “semi-soft glue 
and broken popsicle sticks. . .in the jail’s largest room” (C, p. 271). Gary's understanding of the 
electric chair and its purpose suggests that he has lost his childhood innocence before he has even 
had a chance to experience it. This can also be considered as one of Gary's first experiences with 
death, though an indirect one. Yet it is his clarity in constructing the electric chair that foreshadows 
his unhappy marriage to his wife Caroline and his inability to engage with his sons.  
The theme of the traumatising dinner overall is that of imprisonment and a clear lack of 
choice on all of the parties involved. Gary attempts to stand up for Chip, saying to his mother, “he 
really doesn’t like vegetables.” Instead of offering an explanation for her behaviour, Enid attempts 
to bestow some misguided affection back towards the family unit, telling her son that his concern 
is appreciated and that he “should always be this loving” (C, p. 268). That said, Chip’s dislike of 
said vegetables remain only a passing concern for his mother, and baby Denise, as Philip Weinstein 
reminds us, is an unwitting sufferer of this family discord before she is even born.94 In this single 
meal, Franzen has clearly demonstrated the “imprisonment” felt by individuals of the 
contemporary family, but at the same time, this sense of “family” and the way in which it 
 
94 C.f. Philip Weinstein, Jonathan Franzen and the Comedy of Rage (New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2015), p. 132.  
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understands each member of the family -- the overworked mother, the distant father, the suffering 
sons, and the yet unborn daughter already subject to such trauma before birth -- it is a prison of 
their own making. As such, there is some truth to the rather scathing way the critic James Annesley 
interprets Franzen’s grasp on the metaphor of family-as-world:  
[Franzen’s approach is] informed by a sense of determinism. Private lives are tied to social 
change, with the stock market providing a dominant and defining correction. The result is 
a homological novel that sees capital, technology politics, and industry as parts of a base 
upon which superstructures of individual lives are built.95   
Annesley’s comments regarding the novel’s end, that “as if sensing that he has overplayed his 
hand, Franzen allows the novel to unravel its rigid scheme and correct itself.”96 The Lamberts then 
become a product of a socio-political system impervious to personal decisions.  
However, where Annesley’s notion of a consumerist base upholding the private lives of 
Franzen’s families may appear deterministic, Ghosh seems to be reaching for the same set of 
deterministic circumstances when attempting to illuminate the hardships of minor characters, who 
are often disenfranchised by this very sense of determinism. When considered in tandem with 
Ghosh’s championing of marginalised figures, Franzen’s deterministic choices for the family unit 
provides much needed context. As we shall see in varying incidents, family as legitimised by 
wealth and privilege, and what Anshuman A. Mondal terms “colonial dissonance”, openly 
threatens the well-being of the individual.97 Regardless of whether the opposing, authoritative, 
individual in question might share a similar position of being secondary to the British Empire, 
 
95 James Annesley, "Market Corrections: Jonathan Franzen And The ‘Novel Of Globalisation’", Journal Of Modern 
Literature, 29 (2006), 111-128 (p. 124). 
96 Annesley, p.126. 
97 Anshuman A. Mondal, “Allegories of Identity: “’Postmodern’ Anxiety and ‘Postcolonial’ Ambivalence in Amitav 
Ghosh’s In an Antique Land and The Shadow Lines”, The Journal of Commonwealth Literature, 38 (2003), 19-36 
(p. 20). 
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which elicits authority only by structural means. This observation is further supported by Andrew 
N. Rubin’s observations with respect to how British colonialism continues to preserve itself with 
a physical presence, where postcolonial (or in the case of the Ibis trilogy, fledging colonial) 
subjects are drawn into a hegemony that carefully preserves British authority.98 Therefore, where 
Franzen’s families are seen as privileged and narrow-minded, Ghosh’s representations of an 
inherently marginalised so-called found family against the confines of imperial rule appear to 
contribute new dimensions to Franzen’s apparent unwillingness to engage in social critique 
through the family. Conversely, it is through understanding Franzen’s problematic construct of the 
family which leads Ghosh to see colonial authority through an ironic lens during the First Opium 
War.     
 In the first pages of Sea of Poppies, the notion of family is presented in the tenuous 
relationship that Deeti, a young woman crushed by familial obligations, shares with her daughter 
Kabutri. Deeti is painfully aware that “in three or four years, the girl would be married and gone; 
in her few remaining years at home she might as well rest” (SP, p. 5). Deeti reinforces the idea that 
even as Kabutri’s mother, she would be cut off from her daughter’s married life with her husband, 
which stands in stark contrast to Pip’s mother Penelope/Anabel, who cries: “I have the right to 
love you more than anyone in the world.” (P, p. 73). The sense of determinism is once more 
inverted and yet emphasised when Deeti agrees to subject herself to a great amount of debt on 
behalf of her daughter: 
Deeti resisted the offer till she thought of Kabutri: after all, the girl had just a few years left 
at home -- why make her live through them in hunger? She gave in and agreed to place the 
impression of her thumb on the seth’s account book in exchange for six months’ worth of 
 
98 C.f. Andrew N. Rubin, Archives of Authority: Empire, Culture, and the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2012), p. 71. 
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wheat, oil and gurh. Only as she was leaving did it occur to her to ask how much she owed 
and what the interest was. . . Better to eat weeds than take out such a loan: she tried to 
return the goods but it was too late (SP, p. 143).  
Deeti’s experience with the money-hungry seth implies that the comfort and obligation of one’s 
family (in this case, Deeti’s relationship with Kabutri) is only legitimised though her having the 
means to provide her daughter with enough comfort. The threat to the mother-daughter bond is 
imminent, as Deeti’s incapacity to provide for Kabutri also means that their familial bond is just 
as tenuous as the relationship that Kabutri will have with the family of her future husband, which 
is defined by not comfort nor intimacy, but work and productivity. Marginalised presences, which 
are consistently excluded from the most basic of considerations have no choice but to adhere to 
societal structures that hold little regard for them.  
     From this exchange, we can see that Ghosh uses family as a way to delegitimise the 
authority of institutions which rely upon a capitalist definition. Again, we return to the move away 
from the initial assumption of cultural dominance of the British Empire, represented here as a 
greedy seth (a title generally given to a wealthy individual). Ghosh understands that the reach of 
the British Empire as an “incoming stain” of the “Red Empire,” and that the reach is not only 
limited to English speaking authorities (SP, p. 207). This can be seen as an effort on Ghosh’s part 
to recognise “colonial dissonance,” which goes in hand with his consistent (later, this trope inverts 
itself as Neel, a well-to-do Raja who is accused of forgery) attempts to make himself as an alienated 
subject of the British; as a prisoner, one of the first words he encounters from an English sarjeant 
is “syphilis,” a venereal disease. Likewise, Neel’s initial sway towards British culture and its 
supposed fineries is akin to a metaphor of ill-health, as trying to conform to the presupposed limits 
of the illness Neel seized this opportunity to communicate with his captors in English, perhaps 
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underlining not the nature of his crime, but what the crime purports him to be. Neel decides that 
“as a prisoner, he would only speak English” (SP, p. 216). Though it is only when Neel lets go of 
his prejudices and his devotion of English language, even as a means of subverting his new identity 
as a that he finds himself finally able to experience othering perspectives that was previously 
closed off to him due to his rigid religious and classist beliefs. By the trilogy’s final volume, Neel’s 
idea of what constitutes a family has shifted considerably. As he explains to Zhong Lou-Si, a 
Chinese acquaintance in Hong Kong with whom he has become friendly, the idea of family has 
come to take on a flexible meaning, but Neel discovers that he “could think of no word [in 
Cantonese] for ‘caste’” and has to settle for “clan.” (FF, 47). This compromise serves to underscore 
in the distance between languages how different families are from place to place. The exchange, 
which tapers off because Neel cannot seem to adequately discuss to Zhong’s satisfaction why 
Indian sepoys would want to fight for the British, also emphasises that Neel has gained important 
insight from the perspectives of others, rather than just ignoring them, as he previously would 
have, given his prejudices that are hereditary and familial in the first book. However, even with 
the enlightenment of this knowledge, a new ambivalence in Neel’s knowledge that allows him to 
understand others without giving up his own point of view. Neel is still hard-pressed to circle back 
to the problem of familial oppression: as he tells them that many of the soldiers in questions are 
“not from poor families,” and are in fact “from families who own their own land” (FF, 47). As 
such, they do not fight due to “necessity,” but rather because the notion of “loyalty” is tied to how 
they make their living (FF, 47). Family, even in a circumstance that does not oppress the individual 
is still passed over, overshadowed, by singular notions of the nation, a dominant construct that 
Ghosh has often argued as problematic. The fluidity (and therefore the absurdity) of nation is put 
this way by Neel: “At one time their leaders were Indian kings, but some years ago it was the 
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British who became the major power. Since then sepoys have been fighting for them just as they 
did for rajas and nawabs. For them there is no great difference” (FF, 47). Neel’s dismissal of a 
lack of difference is meant to imply that there is indeed a difference, and this dismissal is likewise 
interrogated by Zhong, in order to underscore its contrarian nature.  
 
The Lear Model: Understanding the Crisis of Degree 
As Stephen J. Burn reminds us, Shakespeare’s King Lear is a shadow which looms large when 
speaking about Franzen’s father figures, being an anagram of E-A-R-L Franzen (See Chapter one, 
p. 27). Franzen’s treatment of his literary fathers have gotten successively more benign, from the 
dictatorial Alfred Lambert, to the “nice” liberal conservation lawyer Walter, and finally, to the 
amiable absentee father Tom Aberant. This progression poses certain questions about the impact 
of ignorance and the absence of knowledge. These are all father figures who either abstain their 
duties through a lack of knowledge, or they become obsessed and crippled by the perceived 
confines of fatherhood. Since they are Franzen’s fathers, Alfred, Walter, and Tom are also coerced 
into understanding fatherhood through the means of a base superstructure that has little regard for 
parental authority. As Tom describes his job as editor of a student run paper to Anabel: “Authority 
can be delegated in various ways” (P, p. 344). In other words, authority becomes a question of 
degree, to be exercised according to the context at hand which intrinsically goes against the nature 
of authority.  
 In his explication on the nature of the crisis of Degree in Shakespeare, Girard reinforces 
that such a crisis only prevails in circumstances wherein human conflict seems to be directionless 
and, to borrow a word from Bauman, lacking in “velocity,” the crisis takes a hold of human conflict 
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and transforms them into meditations on subjective selfishness and very human insecurity, which 
again touches upon the question of human privilege:  
. . . Human conflict in Shakespeare takes the form of mimetic rivalry, [itself] the product 
of internal mediation; internal mediation does not normally occur until a society becomes 
“undifferentiated.” The comic and tragic process par excellence is none other than this 
vicious circle of “destructuration” or “desymbolisation” that we heard Ulysses call “the 
wizarding,” “the choking” and “the neglection” of Degree. We ourselves now call it “the 
crisis of Degree.”99 
Girard’s “degree” is contingent upon the question of conflict between characters, and also how 
characters tend to misinterpret conflicts which unsettles and reconstitute the conflict at hand with 
added dimensions which keep the characters from resolving the conflict, which leads the narrative 
to take on an ambivalent quality. In King Lear, on its surface about an ageing king who struggles 
to validate his authority in a manner that also seems to mirror the conflict between a nation’s 
identity, and the identity of insecure fathers. Lear does not appear to understand that his kingdom 
should be separate from the affections of his daughters. Private concerns become matters to be 
solved with public policy meant to give structure to an individual’s emotions.  There is no small 
amount of irony present in Lear’s approach to trying to become a human being via public policy. 
Even as he attempts to "shake all cares and business form our age/ conferring them on younger 
strengths," his desire for power still remains.100 As Nietzsche writes in Thus Spake Zarathustra, 
“there where the state ceases, only there does the human being begin who is not superfluous.”101 
This can be translated to illuminate the urgency found in Girard’s crisis, where Lear’s inability to 
 
99 Girard, p. 174. 
100 William Shakespeare, King Lear, edited by R. A. Foakes, (London: The Arden Shakespeare 2003), 1.1.28-39. 
101 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, edited and translated by Graham Parks, (London: The Folio 
Society, 2012), p. 39. 
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maintain a degree of separation, or his incapacity to accept to some degree the ambivalent 
relationship between King and Father, causes his downfall.   
While King Lear admittedly holds less of an immediate sway in the writings of Ghosh, the 
connection to Shakespeare’s play is still important, in that Ghosh appears to assign the idea of 
family as being critically distanced from the sometimes overwhelming idea of nation in the 
postcolonial imagination. This idea of established distance (either in its direct proximity to nation 
or its enforced separation and detachment from being able to participate with any meaning towards 
the project of nation) is clearly linked to the problem of degree. The problem encountered in the 
Ibis trilogy is also one curated by the context of untenable degrees, as Ghosh obfuscates the role 
of the nation in relation with family.  In a series of published letters with the historian Dipesh 
Chakrabarty about the former’s book, Provincialising Europe, Ghosh similarly attempts to call the 
ambivalence role of nation in the lives of everyday individuals by repositioning the family into 
focus. As Ghosh tells Chakrabarty, my using the “family to displace the nation should not be seen 
as a compensatory move” in postcolonial literature.102 By decentralising the idea of nationhood, 
Ghosh may have found a way to accent aspects of family life that is prone to being relegated to 
the realm of minor experience, but we must not forget that by not putting them on a scale does not 
completely remove the threat of nationalism. Whereas Ghosh successfully subscribes to a critical 
distance in order to exercise the family as a means of “displacing the nation,” such a move can 
only make sense and maintain its critical energy when it maintains nationalism as part of the 
discourse.  
In trying to distinguish Ghosh’s position from that of other authors, who more easily accept 
the postcolonial context as a place from which to write, Mondal cites a list of success stories 
 
102 Dipesh Chakrabarty and Amitav Ghosh, “A Correspondence on Provincialising Europe”, Radical History 
Review, 83 (2002), 146-172 (p. 151). 
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including Ghosh’s fellow authors Salman Rushdie and V. S. Naipaul. Both Rushdie and Naipaul 
also discuss the fragmented nature of diaspora in their work and very much featuring intrinsic 
struggles that comes with individuals who are alienated by their community. M. K. Naik argues 
that the narrator of Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children, Saleem, is left to fend for himself in a hostile 
world, where his identity is regularly challenged (“reduced to animal level,”) by his talent of 
“giving birth to parents.”103 This leaves him constantly ‘handcuffed to history,’ and unable to move 
forward. Naipaul’s observational memoir The Middle Passage conversely clings on to history 
because it gives a sense of coherence to the communities in Trinidad, who would otherwise have 
little in common. They have no other choice but to hold on to their “Britishness, our belonging to 
the British Empire, which gave us [a] sense of identity.”104 All this would point to postcolonialism 
and the diaspora struggling to come to terms with a distinct lack of culture. Ghosh in turn argues 
that it is not a lack, ‘[the lack] is in itself the form of Indian culture. . .to be different in a world of 
difference is irrecoverably to belong.’105 Where Rushdie’s and Naipaul’s approaches to 
understanding “Indian-ness”with trying to distance themselves from the idea of the British Empire, 
Ghosh approaches the same idea with nation not as a given, but as very much a construct. 
A question of degree also arises from the constructive view with which Lear appears to 
view both his kingly authority and fatherly privileges as given, but in recognising them as a given, 
Lear is still further dependent on these ideas that have long governed his sovereignty as having an 
ambivalent presence in his life. This ambivalence is then challenged and contested when Lear 
misunderstands the fluidity of this power and instead tries to conform and confer his power to 
much narrower means.  We already know that something is amiss within the play’s first lines, as 
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 79 
 
Kent and Gloucester wonder why Lear does not decide the fate of his kingdom and the inheritance 
of his three daughters based on the character of the Duke of Albany and the Duke of Cornwall, 
who are married to Lear’s older daughters Goneril and Regan respectively; the utilisation of the 
two husbands would draw a fine line to keep Lear from using his identity as ruler (sometimes 
transliterated easily into a role of a tyrant) to impose patriarchal ideas upon his daughters. Here, 
the word patriarchal elevates itself to become patriotic, or one who is loyal to the nation. Facing 
this daunting task, the daughters do not only have the affection of their father at stake, they also 
have to contend with each as loyal citizens of their father’s kingdom. For Girard, King Lear 
exemplifies the difficulty of authority when the individual who occupies the position of power 
does not understand the collective nature of his authority. Girard suggests that Lear only 
understands his desires on a selfish level, which holds consequences for those who refuse to 
participate in his dark venture of self-validation. Lear, overcome by competitiveness in that he 
shirks his kingly duties, his “dark purpose” takes on proponents of what is understood as “dark 
leadership.” Put simply, dark leadership describes a set of negative behaviours which might leader 
individuals to “direc[t] themselves to personal rather than organisational goals.” Such is the case 
with Lear.106  
Additionally, Girard describes Lear’s plight in the terms of a man who is unable to free 
himself from the confines of human experience, which is limited to entirely selfish emotions: 
Lear is a father and a king who, in both capacities, ceases to be the model of external 
mediation that he should be for his children and his subjects. Thus King Lear combines the 
two domains of the mimetic crisis that we regard as inseparable. . . The mimetic desire of 
the sisters first takes the form recommended by Lear but he can no longer inspire respect, 
 
106 See Sonny Fascia, “The Value of Dark Leadership,” Journal of Strategy, Operations, and Economics, 3 (2018), 
(1-6) p. 1. 
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so the rivalry for his favours quickly turn into a competitive reduction of the rights and 
privileges that the old king had reserved for himself. 107 
As Girard further points out, degree, or the differentiation of individuals and their desires always 
must remain in conversation with how an individual sees himself or herself, it becomes not a 
question of an individual’s desire, but the ambivalence which necessarily must accompany one’s 
desires because desires are the representation of something entirely selfish. This selfishness first 
manifests itself within the immediate sphere of the family rather than at the level of an entire 
kingdom, left without a ruler. 
Harry Berger, in an extensive reading of the play as a family romance which predates but 
supports the notion of degree, notes that the play carries with it “simplistic modes of. . .parable.”108 
The simplicity of inherent to parable, being a subset of narrative, which is more concerned with 
the message than the messenger, is a premier example of the question of degree. Each of Berger’s 
set examples only makes sense when degree is at the forefront of how these various relationships 
are held in perspective. Tropes, as long-respected tenets of narrative are perhaps themselves a 
forerunner to the idea of Degree, which questions the precise relationship between such ideas and 
how the ideas might resist or react to change. Berger provides a comprehensive list including “the 
Good and Bad Sibling. . .the Terrible Father and Helpless Child (or Helpless Father and Terrible 
Child).”109 Berger argues that these stock labels for characters serve to heighten the character’s 
“inevitability of plight,” which calls to an uncontested degree because the hardships experienced 
by the characters.  
 
107 Girard, p. 181. 
108 Harry Berger, Jr, “King Lear: The Family Romance”, The Centennial Review, 23 (1979), 348-376 (p. 350). 
109 Berger, ibid. 
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These tropes also allow for the same inevitability to play a part in a political narrative and 
less so a familial one, as Lear says one thing and means another. He means to gain reassurance 
from his family in his twilight years that even without the burden of kingship (a step’s translation 
to patriarchal power), still means something to those closest to him. Lear is aware, more than 
anyone else of political ambition, as he himself exemplifies the trait in his ask for his daughters. 
Tropes are easily subverted and changed in language, and in asking “Which of you [daughters] 
shall we say doth love us most, / that our largest bounty may extend” (i.i.56-7) Lear turns what 
could have been a touching, vulnerable moment into a power play. Instead of preventing strife, 
Lear inserts himself into political competition with his family and continues to stir hostilities 
among his family.  
 The following readings are concerned with how an upset of degree colours an individual’s 
perspective with their family. Instead of posing oneself as being open to the plight of a loved one, 
individuals are more often rewarded for understanding and pursuing goals that are aligned closely 
with not their own personal goals, but instead goals that are more readily seen as part of delineating 
the project of degree. 
“America’s Basement”: Franzen’s Shrinking Family Values 
The above quote in the subtitle is taken from The Corrections, in a telling moment where Alfred 
Lambert has fled to the basement in order to soothe what Stephen J. Burn cleverly terms Alfred’s 
“reptilian brain” riddled with Alzheimer’s.110 As he has matured into a keen observer of family 
dramas, Franzen has found a new way in which to implicate wider social ills upon the unhappiness 
of the family. Franzen’s families, while not exactly representative of the country, are familiar with 
all registers of the way families are unhappy in ways that are deeply emotive, so far to perhaps 
 
110 Stephen J. Burn, Jonathan Franzen at the End of Postmodernism (London and New York, NY: Continuum, 
2008), p. 121.  
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become even emotionally manipulative. Yet, Franzen seems to want us to regard such intimate 
manipulation of those closest to us as another consequence laid out in Gary’s toy-sized prison: that 
a family knows little alternative, especially in a shrinking America. 
 While the family unit is unsuited to realising social critique, what Franzen manages to do 
with the microcosm of the family snapshot is yet unrivalled and brings to mind Melvin Jules 
Bukiet’s notion of a “crackpot realist” novel which he defines as separate from a novel which 
transcends the times; a crackpot realist novel “perfectly reflects [the times in which it is 
written].”111 Bukiet names among its proponents David Foster Wallace, Richard Powers, and 
Jonathan Franzen. Susanne Rohr uses crackpot realism to elevate The Corrections to a new brand 
of the novel form, the novel of globalisation.112  While Rohr’s reading has been heavily disputed 
by both James Wood and James Annesley, it is worth noting both sets of opinions to show how a 
text can sustain its own ambivalence. Both Annesley and Wood note that as a novel The 
Corrections is too conservative to stand as a novel critical of the new millennium with Wood 
casting the sharp comment that The Corrections is left like a “glass-bottomed boat.”113 However, 
in the face of such critiques, I would like to return to Franzen’s familial club; if he has truly set out 
to reflect contemporary times as he is living in them, they are impossible to critique. In the words 
of Giorgio Agamben, “Those who coincide too well with the epoch. . .are not contemporaries.” 
Boxall takes this to mean that in order to have the “capacity” to “frame” the specifics of our time 
we must be at least a little “ejected” from it.114 Taking into account the notion of Girard’s 
 
111 Melvin Jules Bukiet, "Crackpot Realism: Fiction for the Forthcoming Millennium”, Review of Contemporary 
Fiction, 16 (1996), 13-22 (p. 13).  
112 Susanne Rohr, “‘The Tyranny of the Probable’—Crackpot Realism and Jonathan Franzen's The Corrections", 
Amerikastudien / American Studies, 49 (2004), 91-105 (p. 92).  
113 Annesley, p. 122.  
114 Peter Boxall, Twenty-First Century Fiction: A Critical Introduction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), p. 18. 
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comments about human conflict being a result of difference in absentia, but the idea of Degree can 
also help to understand why conversations within the family is so often plagued with unhappiness.  
 Further, even if Franzen is hampered by the Girardian question of degree, which from a 
certain angle could be made to resemble determinism, his novels still work to increase the volume 
of domestic discontents. Along the lines of Philip Weinstein’s proposed “comedy of rage” in which 
he becomes the novelist that he is by understanding the dispassionate, “domestic white noise” of 
family squabbles.115 It is worth visiting one of those arguments, as the startling remarkable engine 
which continues to give drive to Franzen’s writing through to Purity. The argument gives his 2006 
collection of personal essays The Discomfort Zone its name. The titular “discomfort zone” circles 
one of Irene’s and Earl Franzen’s ongoing arguments regarding temperature in the house. Small 
details take on worldly importance: 
Earl: Leave the GOD DAMNED THERMOSTAT ALONE. 
Irene: Earl, I didn’t touch it.  
Earl: You did! Again! 
Irene: I didn’t think I even moved it! I just looked at it, I didn’t mean to change it. 
Earl: Again! You monkeyed with it again! I had it set where I wanted it. And you moved 
it down to seventy 
Irene: Well if I did somehow change it, I’m sure I didn’t mean to. You’d be hot too, if you 
worked all day in the kitchen. 
Earl: All I ask at the end of a long day at work is that the temperature be set in the Comfort 
Zone. 
 
115 Weinstein, p. 26. 
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Irene: Earl, it is so hot in the kitchen. You don’t know because you’re never in here but it 
is so hot. 
Earl: The low end of the comfort zone. Not even the middle. The low end! It is not too 
much to ask!116  
At the core of this marriage is rancour amplified, and later. Franzen takes this exchange to its 
extremes, as deep, familial unhappiness eventually plays out on the world stage. Chip marvels at 
the guns in Lithuania; Walter trades his ethics for money and oversees the mountain top removal 
of a patch of rural West Virginia. Like father, like son, Walter’s son Joey, who is by now registered 
Republican and in great defiance of familial obligations, becomes a dealer of rusted tank parts 
collected from South America to sell to the U.S. military.  
This exchange is just as poignantly disturbing between father and son. In Freedom, Walter 
berates teenager Joey as he prepares to move next door to be with his girlfriend Connie and her 
blusterous Republican family. Connie’s mother, Carol, especially relishes any chance to retell the 
story of Joey’s exodus from his family:  
“. . .And that’s when Walter loses it. Just loses it. He’s got tears running down his face he’s 
so upset – and I can understand that, because Joey’s his youngest, and it’s not Walter’s 
fault Patty is so unreasonable and mean to Connie that Joey can’t stand to live with them 
anymore. But he starts yelling at the top of his lungs, like, YOU ARE SIXTEEN YEARS 
OLD AND YOU ARE NOT GOING ANYWHERE UNTIL YOU FINISH HIGH 
SCHOOL. . .DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA WHAT YOU’RE DOING TO YOUR 
MOTHER?” (F, p. 23-4). 
 
116 Jonathan Franzen. The Discomfort Zone (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2006), pp. 50-1. 
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Here, we have a retelling of King Lear in its close-cut contemporary cloth where it is also worth. 
Walter is Lear, who has asked for family loyalty from his son, who refuses to grant it. As a result, 
most of the conversations between Walter and Joey, including a telling moment when Joey starts 
selling customised watches to Connie’s unsuspecting schoolmates. When the school finally 
catches up with Joey’s scheme, banning watches with text on the wristbands. Walter offers a dry 
response: “You were benefiting from an artificial restraint of trade. I didn’t notice you complain 
about the rules when they were working in your favour” (F, p. 13). Joey and Walter fail to have 
any real familial conversation and most of their dealings more or less end up being arguing over 
certain territories that are familiar and American like money, authority, and the state of the Middle 
East. However, this exchange in its practicality is one that is sanctioned by society. Walter is in 
turn dispensing good financial advice about how to survive in a world dominated by liquid power. 
When Joey decides to “accoun[t]” to his father after a disastrous showy in South America, Walter 
is disinterested at his son’s predicament (F, p. 442): 
 “Yeah, well, so, I guess the thing is, I’m sort of in trouble.” 
 “What?” 
 “I said I’m in some trouble.” 
It was the kind of call that every parent dreaded getting, but Walter, for the moment, wasn’t 
feeling like Joey’s parent. He said, “Hey, so am I! So is everybody!” (F, p. 344).  
Read in the most uncharitable way, Walter’s own fiscal and political problems overwhelms his 
previous natural responsibilities as Joey’s father.  
Near the end of the novel, Walter tells Connie who has married Joey, in a vague echo of 
Joyce-the-politician: “I like you a lot. I’m really glad you’re part of the family” which emphasises 
the thinness of the familial bond (that it has to be said out loud) and the fact that he is perhaps 
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saying it to convince himself (C, p. 477). Jessica, on the other hand, chooses silence after her 
father’s affair with his assistant Lalitha not only to keep the peace in the family but also to illustrate 
that the Berglund family might not be capable of seeing each other as family while they are in the 
public eye. Her phone message to Walter, “carefully timed while he was out to dinner” carries a 
public cautiousness in the vein of someone handling a PR crisis: “I’m sorry I haven’t return your 
messages. . . I hope you had a nice day. . .Maybe we can talk sometimes, although I’m not sure 
when I’m going to have a chance” (F, p. 470). Jessica is an expy of Cordelia in the contemporary 
world: one who understands her own worth in keeping silent; unlike Shakespeare’s Cordelia, who 
is imprisoned by her lack of language, Jessica is granted both agency and salvation in her silence 
in hers. 
“Ship-Siblings”: Beyond Traditional Family Structures in The Ibis Trilogy 
The Ibis Trilogy is Ghosh’s latest work, featuring three large volumes, which details the fantastical 
journey of an unlikely set of ship-siblings, all of whom have found an uncommon familial bond 
aboard the eponymous ship at the height of the Opium War during the early part of the nineteenth 
century. The Ibis, a schooner which carries opium to be traded and human chattel to be auctioned 
off as labour upon reaching the island of Mauritius, represents at its surface, the diametric between 
intimate familial connections and the fluid, expansive reach of colonial power, which structurally 
erodes the meaning of family. Yet, the ship is given meaning distinct from its colonial powers, as 
it is first described to Deeti, a recent young widow from Ghazipur (SP, p. 9). Owing to her 
“colour[less]” eyes, she is first given an image of the ship through a vision (SP, p. 5). Such a vision 
so vivid that even “seasoned sailors” found her drawing of the ship in her family shrine to be an 
“evocative rendition of its subject” (SP, p. 9).  
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    The uncanny likeness of the ship as portended in Deeti’s vision has heralded the uncanny of 
dangerous ideas, this time involving the notion of sisterhood, a familial structure that bypasses 
patriarchal power. Certainly, sisterhood continues to play a secondary role to a family structure 
that has traditionally valued patriarchal power and has long serviced its ongoing dedication to 
caste. Whereas women, most often in the role of a housewife, are expected to play a complex role 
of acknowledging the order and discipline that is embodied by mem-sahibs (British women). 
Writing about the modern Bengali woman in 1920, Indira Devi envisions the Bengali housewife 
as “unaffected by nature, of pleasant speech, untiring in their service [to others], obliviously of 
their own pleasures. . . and capable of being content with very little.”117 
  Only a woman of such an idealised calibre is fit to be within society. In the ship’s hold, in 
the company of other women, Deeti finds the courage to use her own name: “No sooner had she 
said it than it becoming real: this was who she was – Aditi, a woman who had been granted, by a 
whim of the gods, the boon of living her life again” (SP, 216). In the most unlikely of 
circumstances, Deeti has been given a voice of her own and in her own name and is not beholden 
by the name that reminds her of. Unlike Kalua, who finds a new freedom in his father’s name, it 
is important that we recognise Deeti as a woman who finally can negotiate the world on her own 
terms, although the idea of Deeti as a married woman still going by her own name is “not lost on 
the others” (SP, 216). Personal identity has no place in a familial structure that is first concerned 
with caste, and then concerned with marriage and children.  
    It is notable that one of the other women on the ship, Heeru pities Deeti too. The description 
that Ghosh provides of Heeru curiously does not have much of her in it and depicts her as a woman 
who is all but invisible save for:  
 
117 See Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for ‘Indian’ Pasts?”, 
Representations (Special Issue: Imperial Fantasies and Postcolonial Histories), 37 (1992), (1-26) p. 17. 
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[Heeru] too, had been a mother once, and her name was, properly speaking, Heeru ki-ma. 
Although her child had died a while ago, through a cruel irony of abbreviation, his name 
had lived on in his mother (SP, 216).  
Heeru’s history is mired not by a failed marriage, but the death of her son, who according to 
tradition would have grown to become the head of her household. And yet, by such “cruel 
abbreviation,” (one wonders perhaps, who started calling her by that name, given the incidental 
birth of Maddow Colver) she is still accepted in society more so than Deeti, who carries with her 
the freedom of her name. This freedom, according to the other women, is only granted to her 
because she is childless and therefore her freedom is rendered as “less” and a status to be pitied. 
Juxtaposing Heeru’s freedom as a mother of a dead son and Deeti’s freedom gained as a result of 
her supposed childlessness challenges the notion of family and nation as earlier evoked by Naipaul 
and Rushdie.  
Ghosh recognises the problems standing behind an Indian undertaking the task of 
representing their own experiences. The slow construction of family in the Ibis trilogy exemplifies 
Ghosh’s understanding of how British culture has assimilated into India. Even though Ghosh is 
looking back into the past with contemporary eyes, he does not ignore the cultural difficulties 
presented to him. The assimilations lead characters to make complicit decisions in order to 
undermine the project of nationalism – to “displace” nationalism as such, the idea of Deeti 
abandoning her (or, in this case, Kalua’s) caste in order to complete her escape from her whole 
life. If her caste had not been “an intimate part of herself” the idea of all of the women becoming 
“sisters” would have carried with it such narrative emotion (SP, 217). Munia, one of the younger 
girls who is eager to claim Deeti as her bhauji-hamar (sister in law) is rebuked by the others, who 
see the added sense of specialness as a barrier to the newly achieved quality of apolitical equality. 
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In other words, they are keen to : “What’s wrong with you? How does that all matter now? We are 
all sisters, aren’t we?” Munia’s insistence and the other women’s annoyance suggests that they are 
aware of the intimacy of their bond now as a sisterhood, and therefore aware of the traditional 
legal statutes that sets such intimacy against them.  
When Deeti meets Paulette, who has also run away from an impending marriage with Judge 
Kendelbush, Paulette’s revolutionary inclinations cements their sisterhood. Paulette bluntly shuns 
the idea of “losing caste”: 
On a boat of pilgrims, no one can lose caste and everyone is the same[.] From now on, and 
forever afterwards, we will all be ship siblings. . .to each other. There’ll be no differences 
between us. [She said.] This answer was so daring, so ingenious, as fairly to rob the women 
of their breath (SP, 328).  
This moment is one of the first throughout the Ibis trilogy which privileges the agency of the 
individual over the role that the individual must play in order to satiate a frequently oppressive 
system. This is only possible, Binyak Roy argues quoting from Bill Ashcroft’s influential The 
Empire Writes Back, when the space aboard the Ibis is seen as a “transnational” space, that is a 
space that isn’t only reliant upon a singular, prefigured and oppressive definition, transcends 
singularity and moves towards a mode of ambivalence, in that in understanding transnationalism 
as a negotiable “relation,” it then becomes 
Transnation is neither simply universal, nor simply between or across nations, but is the 
“embodiment of transformation: the interpolation of the state as the focus of power, the 
erasure of simple binaries of power. . .118 
 
118 Bill Ashcroft, The Empire Writes Back (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2002), p. 8. 
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Ashcroft’s formulation, Roy claims, afford those who are taking this journey different ways of 
seeing their often tragic circumstances: “Cross-cultural caste, class, gender, and national 
collaborations blur all sorts of boundaries and enable the formation of new alliances.”119  The 
individual begins, as Lear does in his madness and lack of personhood in the latter half of the play, 
to realise that there is yet a complete world beyond the sliver of it they have been allowed to 
experience due to legislation and traditions which are mostly familial.  
 Paulette’s radical reconfiguration of their destiny aboard the Ibis is remarkable enough for 
its direct way of injecting the notion of individuality and choice within a group of migrant labourers 
who have not had the chance to fully recognise themselves as subjects who are just there to provide 
“coolies” for a planter since “[he] may no longer have slaves in Mauritius” (SP, 20). Paulette’s 
pronouncement, which can be seen as conservative (meaning that the idea isn’t necessarily new to 
her and that she is the expected messenger to deliver this message to others, being the daughter of 
a failed French revolutionary, Pierre Lambert, should be contrasted with the transformation of 
Neel, the former Raja who is branded as a “forger” (SP, 269). He comes onboard the Ibis as a 
prisoner. This identity of being falsified, or indeed given his position under slightly precarious 
conditions, takes Neel away from a stringent understanding of his family, in which he has never 
made to understand as family. However, after taking pains to clean up after his fellow prisoner Ah 
Fatt, that Neels thinks to enquire after Ah Fatt’s home and family. This is something he would 
have never done in his position as the Raja of Rakshali. Ghosh interposes the passing of the 
Rakshali estate as to give the impression of two ships passing in the night. Neel must embrace his 
new life without wealth and the immediate protection of others if he is to survive: 
 
119 Binyak Roy, “Reading Affective Communities in a Trans-national Space in Amitav Ghosh’s Sea of Poppies”,  
Nordic Journal of English Studies, 15 (2016), 47-70 (p. 54). 
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It was not because of Ah Fatt’s fluency that Neel’s vision of Canton became so vivid as to 
make it real: in fact, the opposite was true, for the genius of Ah Fatt’s descriptions lay in 
their elisions, so that to listen to him was a venture of collaboration, in which the things 
that were spoken of came gradually to be transformed into artefacts of a shared imagining. 
So did Neel come to accept that Canton was his own city as Calcutta was to the villages 
around it -- a place of fearful splendour and unbearable squalor, as generous with its 
pleasures as it was unforgiving in the imposition of hardship. (SP, p. 345).  
Neel’s newfound ability to connect with Ah Fatt, who is himself alienated from all walks of his 
life, is better known by the name Leong Fatt, given to his mother, a Chinese boat woman rather 
than the name bestowed on him by his father whose name for Freddie links him to an impressive 
Parsi family who has made much of their wealth in trading opium. Freddie’s mother, Chi Mei,  
“who knew far better the probable fate of children who were neither Dan nor Fanqui,”  alienates 
Freddie from his father’s side of the family in order to protect him.120 However, this connection is 
then restored and revalidated by Shireen, Freddie’s father’s widow, after his death. In the most 
obvious of Ghosh’s moves, the family is removed from being patriarchal and therefore is no longer 
so obligated to the nation (SP, p. 346). And yet, Ghosh still understands that these agencies must 
at some point answer to the power of the British Empire and also to simple human greed within 
the historical context of the trilogy. This too, is another transformation of Lear’s degree.  
Scenes from a Marriage 
Lastly, we come to marriage, a dearly personal institution that has caused much political upheaval, 
and yet offers, at least in America through means of spousal privilege, the greatest amount of 
privacy and intimacy, as such that husband and wife cannot legally incriminate each other. And 
 
120 Amitav Ghosh, River of Smoke ((London: John Murray, 2011), p. 72. All subsequent citations given in-text as 
RS.  
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yet, it is because of this particular protection that there exists no privacy within a marriage which 
erodes upon an individual’s personal liberties. We again return to the scene of surveillance that 
underlines the marriage of Gary Lambert, the oldest Lambert progeny in The Corrections to the 
fickle Caroline, yet another version of Irene Franzen who wants to understand her husband’s 
feelings. It is the oppressive nature of her feelings that tightens the impossibility of fatherhood 
around her husband’s neck. As Weinstein aptly puts it: Caroline takes full advantage of Gary’s 
anxieties and his blooming depression in the wake of such anxiety, pushing his buttons “to 
perfection,” as only befitting of “a long suffering spouse.”121 She has even involved Gary’s sons 
in a scheme to make him more compliant to her whims. Notably, where depression is a tool used 
for political self protest, Gary’s depression is another prison which helps him win back his family. 
He has the following conversation with his son, Caleb: 
 “Surveillance is not a hobby.” [Gary] said. 
“Dad, yes it is! Mom was the one who suggested it. She said I could start with the kitchen.” 
It seemed Gary another Warning Signs of depression that his thought was: The liquor cabinet is in 
the kitchen. (C, p. 156) 
While this conversation is not explicitly about the state of Gary and Caroline’s relationship, his 
concerns over liquor and the fact that his son appears to view surveillance as child’s play states 
without words the crushing extent of Gary’s depression. As we have seen in Patty’s case in Chapter 
1, that depression could be retooled as a way of standing up for one’s beliefs and self-hood, the 
crushing notion of depression as a familial tool leaves Gary with little choice. He is trapped in his 
family and all of his opinions about the financial markets and his father’s medication are only 
 
121 Weinstein, p. 122.  
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secondary to the needs of his family. Depression then, becomes an all-consuming family affair, in 
which Gary becomes imprisoned, and the first of these steps is his marriage.   
 Ghosh too, understands the difficulties of the English notion of “companionable marriage.” 
In trying to arrange a suitable match for Paulette in the Ibis trilogy, from which she runs away, 
Ghosh employs a range of complex manoeuvres between the legal and the personal, but all of these 
scenarios seem to not include Paulette, as a way of critique a woman’s role in her marriage. Early 
in Sea of Poppies, Paulette has caught the interest of local judge, Justice Kendalbushe. Mrs. 
Burnham, who acts as Paulette’s surrogate mother is thrilled at the prospect of Paulette “scoring 
such a hit” (SP, p. 243): 
“Are you not glad of the judge’s interest? It is a great triumph, I assure you. Mr Burnham 
approves most heartily and has assured Mr Kendalbushe that he will do everything in his 
power to sway you. The two of them have even agreed to share the burden of your 
instruction for a while” (SP, p. 252).  
Kendalbushe’s interest in Paulette also solves the majority of her financial situation as an orphan, 
because Mrs Burnham directly reminds Paulette of her “situation” (SP, p. 252). Paulette attempts 
to give her material gains that would come from marrying the judge and pronounces them “dross,” 
only to be rebuked by Mrs. Burnham as being ungrateful. Mrs. Burnham’s scolding of Paulette in 
this matter is Ghosh’s irony at work, implying that although Mrs. Burnham is a staunch Christian 
who believes in strict adherence of the Bible, she is unable to see the misalignment between 
Paulette wanting to throw away her material wealth for a real chance at a companionable marriage. 
Notably, this irony continues further with Mrs. Burnham’s eventual affair with Zachary Reid in 
the final book. Mrs. Burnham’s Christian morals also renders her blind to her husband’s sexual 
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abuse of Paulette, something that she continues to not acknowledge, as Mr. Burnham disguises his 
abuse of Paulette under the veneer of her “instruction” (SP, p. 251).   
 Since Paulette’s instruction is entangled with sexual abuse, the idea that she “could learn 
to love the judge,” a charge which Mrs. Burnham places on her becomes absurd and chilling. 
Paulette accidentally admits that she has romantic feelings towards Zachary Reid, but since he has 
no money to his name, Mrs. Burnham tells her that she must marry Judge Kendalbushe, a fact that 
might have been more palatable to Paulette had Mrs. Burnham allowed her to understand the 
arrangement as a point of law. Given her romantic feelings towards Zachary Reid, it is also of 
interest to understand how emotions and legal jargon fails to point towards marriage, willing the 
collapse of a family before the arrangements are even made. Paulette beseeches Zachary to help 
her escape from her impending nuptials with the judge, and he at first rejects her proposal that she 
be allowed to travel on the Ibis. However, given a new “instinct of protectiveness,” he offers her 
a possibility that “if I had the means to be a settled man, I would this minute offer to make you…” 
(SP, p. 281). While this goodness only exists in his imagination, it doesn’t achieve the desired 
effect. At this point, Zachary is open to other experiences, but he is too, beginning to realise the 
very present effects of this openness, as this openness is quickly judged and negated by others with 
a narrower perception.  
 Given the idea of marriage and the legal precedents that are set against her were emphasised 
as cornerstones of Paulette’s reality from her conversation with Mrs Burnham, Zachary says 
exactly the wrong thing. Paulette now views marriage as a fatherly “adoption” and states that “I 
am not a lost kitten . . .in search of a husband” (SP, p. 281). None of her romantic feelings towards 
Zachary are visible here, nor do they appear anywhere in her thoughts. Although Mrs. Burnham 
has tried to sweeten the girl towards the idea of a companionable marriage, her idea of order and 
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contradictory values has robbed Paulette of any possibility of romantic feeling. Later, she meets 
Neel the disgraced Raja on the Ibis and his idea of her alleged station is wholly unkind: Neel had 
heard Elokeshi speak of a new class of prostitute who had learnt English from their white clients” 
(SP, p. 362). Paulette’s misadventures with marriage and romance only serve to cement Deeti’s 
idea of a marriage: “a child exiled from home” (SP, p. 366).  
 Overall, family, and by extension the institution of marriage, must in some way fit into and 
therefore be made ambivalent by those political institutions that have long circumscribed our sense 
of self and further how these politics have shaped and deterritorialised the family. Families, as 
examined here through two very different perspectives, are no longer culturally nor sociologically 
bound. Parents used to experience culture with their children to cultivate some sense of identity. 
Family now is about one generation of people teaching the next generation how to be better 
consumers only for those lessons to oftentimes be ignored. This then leads to deterritorialisation 
as each person becomes disenfranchised from his or her means of production and identity becomes 
fragmented as man is, by nature, a social animal.  
This fragmentation is obvious in the remains of language and to explicate upon it would 
provide a telling link to the next chapter. Nowadays children can seek emancipation from their 
parents. This was originally a word used when a slave was released from slavery in Roman society. 
However, there is a psychic schism involved in this: Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil describes 
our pre-capitalist morality as a slave morality: 122 in our freedom we are still slaves and it is the 
inability to resolve this seeming paradox that causes psychic trauma and, perhaps leads to (or 
makes us more disposed towards) the idea of mimetic desire. We are still enamoured of the concept 
 
122 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil / On the Genealogy of Morality, translated by Adrian Del Caro 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press 1995), p. 170. 
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of the self as supreme but unable to make judgements for ourselves, hence we seek out what has 
been pre-validated by someone whose values in that area we respect. This lack of choice, we shall 
see in the next chapter, is dangerously masqueraded as freedom, one of the impeachable virtues in 
the human condition as perceived in the West.   
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Chapter Three 
Freedom, Anxiety, and Ambivalence in Ghosh and Franzen 
This chapter understands the different “modes” of freedom as enacted in the novels of Ghosh and 
Franzen. Following on from the previous two chapters, which have addressed the unstable nature 
of social relations, it seems prudent to dedicate some time to the prized idea of Western civilisation 
of freedom that has long informed such relations. I am specifically interested in how “modes” of 
freedom are impacted by discourses of race, class, and sex and also comment on a wider sense of 
social anxiety. This prolonged anxiety is indelibly connected to a sense of surveillance and 
uncanny which is propagated by a world which ambivalently understands its own place is 
increasingly delineated by anxiety, whereby notions of freedom become necessarily beholden to 
lesser, more worldly virtues. In turn these virtues further impose confines upon individual freedom. 
In other words, illusion of choice and the control it purports to afford to uphold an individual’s 
sense of self is then to the detriment of the individual’s experiential self. Freedom is only then 
imparted to the individual as a sense of loss and, instead of pushing for liberty, freedom underlines 
a sense of censorship within these novels.  
In this introduction, I offer three different modes of freedom and its relation to choice and 
anxiety. Then, in the following sections, I will show that, applied to the narratives of the ship’s 
carpenter-turned-captain Zachary Reid of the Ibis Trilogy, the privileged Joey Berglund of 
Freedom, and the lawless but idealist Andreas Wolf of Purity, all these archetypes embody 
ambivalent freedoms, as shown by their contradictory choices and underlined by their anxiety. 
These models represent the contradiction between law and freedom as proffered by John Locke; 
“creaturely” freedom as exemplified by Rainer Maria Rilke’s “Eighth Elegy” and theorised by 
Eric L. Santner, which seeks to understand the contradiction of freedom, society, and status and 
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Santner argues via Rilke that freedom is only understood outside of societal confines.123 Within 
such confines, it is easy to descend into the third circumstance, a situation readily governed by 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s depiction of “bad faith,” which raises questions about freedom, personal 
responsibility towards freedom, and willing self-deception.124 The most willing deception 
perpetrated by Zachary, Joey, and Andreas is that they each seek emancipation from their lives as 
such, but return to troubling points in their psyches, manifested as maternal anxiety.  
First, Ghosh and Franzen are disparately interested in the intersections between freedom 
and the law. In his Second Treatise of Civil Government, written in 1690, John Locke perceives 
that there is no break between the ideals of freedom and choice. He argues that choice expands the 
largesse of freedom and that this generosity in turn is protected by an individual’s will to follow 
the law: 
The end of the law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom: for in 
all states of created beings capable of laws, where there is no law, there is no freedom: for 
liberty is, to be free from restraint and violence from others; which cannot be, where there 
is no law: but freedom is not, as we are told, a liberty for every man to do what he lists: 
(for who could be free, when every other man’s humour might domineer over him?) but a 
liberty to dispose, and order as he lists, his person, actions, possessions, and his whole 
property, within the allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein not to be subject 
to the arbitrary will of another, but freely follow his own.125 
 
123 Eric L. Santner, On Creaturely Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), p. 13. 
124 Jean Paul Sartre, On Being and Nothingness, translated by Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square 
Press, 1993), p. 47. 
125  John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, edited by Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988), p. 306.  
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For Locke, the guiding hand of the law becomes naturally entwined with the task of expanding 
and protecting notions of freedom, and liberty is granted to the individual precisely because they 
freely choose to follow the law, rather than to view themselves as subjugated to the letter of the 
law without choice. Locke understands the capacity of jurisprudence to protect the idea of freedom 
is born out of the human capability of choice. Locke assumes too, that freedom remains intimately 
guarded by law so long as its citizens have made a choice to obey the law. 
           Locke’s position regarding the integration of law and order is demonstrated clearly in 
Freedom, where Franzen dwells at length on Patty’s visit to her daughter Jessica’s small liberal 
arts college for a Family Weekend. Patty, as ever a collection of reliable contradictions, is faced 
with a plaque donated by the class of 1920: “Use well thy freedom” (F, p. 184). This “wisdom” 
appears to imply that freedom has clearly demarcated boundaries and individuals entrusted with 
such freedoms must make temperate use of them or else risk existential dread which Patty 
represents. In 1920, temperance and prohibition clashed with society’s natural instinct for excess. 
The year saw the passing of the Eighteenth Amendment, which banned the production and 
consumption of alcohol. Alcohol in Freedom is a recurring physical manifestation of Patty’s 
misbehaviour. This highlights the impossibility of one’s freedom being used while also being 
cognisant of the law. This irony is further embodied by Patty, who is narratively bound to misuse 
her freedom and stands outside of such expectations. Patty is aware that Jessica poses as “the real 
grownup of the two of them” (F, p. 185). 
The Lockean spectre as provided by Jessica enhances Patty’s lack of freedom, rather than 
to circumscribe the better circumstances of Jessica’s own life. Jessica’s freedom is made 
contradictory because she has no function but to act as a foil to the lesser freedoms pursued by her 
family: “Mom, I make your life so easy for you. . .I don’t do drugs, I don’t do any of the shit that 
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Joey does, I don’t embarrass you, I don’t create scenes, I never did any of that[.]” (F, p. 185). 
Jessica’s tirade against her mother does not only serve as an example of an idealised freedom, but 
emphasis the distance by which Patty is removed from it. It is worth noting here that Jessica, who 
Patty loves only “an appropriate” amount, is not given due attention in the novel (F, p. 112); the 
novel concentrates on the excesses of freedom, the unhappiness caused by these excesses, and 
Jessica’s seemingly normal appearance is remarked on as the envy of others, but of course, is not 
treated as particularly interesting.   
Patty’s inability to spend quality time with her daughter leads into the second of our 
narrative modes: the mode of “bad faith” as described by Sartre in Being and Nothingness. “Bad 
faith” is a way of understanding the limits of freedom through the act of externalisation. In this 
sense Patty “exercised her self control” and “behaved” like a grownup, even if such actions are 
immediately detached from her (F, p. 184). Through bad faith, agency and responsibility -- what 
Sartre calls “intentionality” -- is removed, while freedom is idealised and deemed impossible when 
confronted with human choice.126 Franzen also demonstrates the contradiction between personal 
freedom and bad choices that are entrenched in human expectation. A prime example is Joey 
Berglund, who embodies a traditional model of bad faith in his handling of his affair with Connie 
and Jenna, wherein he blames not himself, but Connie and Jenna, for his choices. A starker 
example is found in Andreas Wolf, who uses his position of power as a church counsellor to prey 
on young women. He is able to keep up this pretence by abiding to his own rules, that the girls 
cannot be “underage or abused” (P, p. 200). They both hunger over desires that stand diametrically 
opposed to freedom, but all but ignores these contradictions. In catering to personal desires to the 
 
126 Sartre, p. 48. 
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detriment of others, Joey and Andreas Wolf may be seen to face consequences of their actions, but 
their consequences are in fact more a move towards narrative salvation. 
Zachary Reid is one of Ghosh’s original passengers of the Ibis who goes through a 
remarkable transformation throughout the trilogy. From his initial position as the lowly ship’s 
carpenter in Sea of Poppies through to his ascendance to the Ibis’s captaincy in the final pages of 
Flood of Fire in the final volume, Zachary represents a series of compromised freedoms within 
each stage of his narrative. Ghosh underlines the consequences of Zachary’s actions and changed 
belief systems in very real terms from a deckhand without a definitive place in the crew to a man 
who clearly clings onto the tenets of his newfound station. Unlike Joey and Wolf, Zachary’s 
descent into a practitioner of ambivalent freedom is not couched in terms of forgiveness. Zachary’s 
actions in the name of freedom is rife with loss, causing both the death of Mrs. Burnham, and the 
suicide of Freddie Lee after Zachary sells him out to the triad boss Lenny Chan. Sartre’s bad faith 
has supplanted a “creaturely freedom” which moves away from a self-conscious understanding of 
one’s inner life and instead showcases the “open,” a realm of direct understanding as embodied by 
the “animal” of Rilke’s “Eighth Elegy. Unlike Fokir, who remains in the state of exception until 
his death, Zachary’s progress from a state of exception, which allows him to embody the 
experiences of others, is removed, as he takes up a colonialist understanding of what it means to 
be free. While Rilke’s understanding of “the open” seems to suggest that Zachary represents an 
extended distance from the man he is destined to become; however, a closer look at his relation to 
“creaturely freedom” and his ambivalent social status as a son of a northern freewoman from 
Baltimore exemplifies the anxieties which lead him to take up a narrower view of freedom, thereby 
safeguarding his freedom to choose, or what Dean Franco notes as the rights to desire above the 
freedom of experience. 
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Zachary Reid: “No Small Pride” 
In the Ibis Trilogy, the following conversation happens between Mr. Benjamin Burnham, a shrewd 
opium trader and Zachary. At this point in the narrative, Zachary is only a lowly ship’s hand who 
has spent the Ibis’ difficult maiden voyage working as its carpenter. The following conversation 
exposes not only the fragility of freedom, but also the complex intentions a capitalist mindset such 
as Burnham’s seeks to impose upon it which would profoundly change its meaning: 
                The suggestion startled Zachary: “D’you mean to use [the Ibis] as a slaver, sir? But have 
not your English laws outlawed that trade?” 
                That is true,” Mr. Burnham nodded. “Yes, indeed they have, Reid. It’s sad but true that 
there are many who’ll stop at nothing to halt the march of human freedom.” 
                “Freedom, sir?” said Zachary, wondering if he had misheard. 
                His doubts were quickly put at rest. “Freedom, yes, exactly,” said Mr. Burnham. “Isn’t 
that what the mastery of the white man means for the lesser races? As I see it, Reid, the Africa 
trade was the greatest exercise in freedom since God led the children of Israel out of Egypt. 
Consider, Reid, the situation of a so-called slave in the Carolinas – is he not more free than his 
brethren in Africa, groaning under the rule of some dark tyrant?” 
                Zachary tugged at his earlobe. “Well sir, if slavery is freedom then I’m glad I don’t have 
to make a meal of it. Whips and chains are not much to my taste.” (SP, p. 73) 
On the one hand, the conversation is superficially about liberal ideals such as the progress of 
culture and the continued propagation of freedom within the human race. On the other hand, the 
exchange is more focused upon the situational irony that becomes apparent in Burnham’s rhetoric 
and turns conversation into dangerous territory. Burnham’s unfettered usage of slavery to mean 
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freedom highlights the disembodied nature of his beliefs. Burnham appears to be an individual 
who values an excess of economic freedom, going so far as to displace other forms of freedom for 
financial gain. 
Furthermore, Burnham’s absurdist attitude towards the problematic relation gains a 
practical dimension and implies possible consequences to Burnham’s thinking, at least on the part 
of Zachary while Burnham himself avoids any repercussions.  Burnham’s rhetoric linking freedom 
and slavery is one that is marked by not only the apparent freedom of choice, but also calls to 
Zachary’s innate anxieties. Zachary makes clear that this sort of freedom is not to the liking of his 
stomach or indeed his ear and his bodily gesture can be read as an attempt to distance himself from 
Burnham’s troubling ideas. The telling movement of Zachary tugging on his earlobe recalls a 
specific moment in The Hungry Tide, where Kanai bids Piya to “pull out her ears and listen” while 
he tells her about a local legend (HT, p. 429). This moment, a key to representing the sharing of 
experiences in The Hungry Tide and results in Kanai and Piya recognising that they can in fact 
understand each other while being respectful of their divergent backgrounds. Zachary’s fiddling 
with his earlobe and his proclamation of slavery not being a hearty meal suggests the opposite this 
time around. Bodied terms in this particular circumstance become a powerful form of abstract 
irony. By associating physical gestures with slavery, Ghosh further creates an ironic juxtaposition 
between the sign and intent. While Zachary’s gesture is intended to solicit intimacy and 
understanding, he is only met with a sense of alienation.  
 Zachary is first introduced as an optimistic, hardworking boy who becomes a standout for 
the “brilliance of his gaze” (SP, p. 10). In the tangential second volume of the trilogy, Zachary’s 
gaze is the unique feature that is inscribed in Deeti’s shrine, and she describes him to her 
descendants as she’d known him in the beginning of the first novel: “That is Malum Zikiri, he 
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saved us all” referring to the plight of the group at the end of the first novel (RS, p. 3). The shrine 
does not seem to account for Zachary’s adventures in the third volume, where he actively retracts 
his sense of belonging as part of the Ibis’ ship-family and cements his place amongst the very 
forces that have made the Ibis a slave ship. Zachary’s lack of hesitation is on the one hand, seen 
as sudden, but on the other hand, his transformation once he has been assured of a real place in 
society, and told that he can exercise the freedoms afforded to a “Sahib” or a gentleman, is a clear 
product of anxieties of his matrilineal freedom, as granted to him as a son of a freewoman from 
Baltimore (SP, 10). Compounding this very anxiety is also the fact that his father is never 
mentioned.  
One of the first things we learn about Zachary is his staunch belief in Christian values, 
imparted to him by his freewoman mother. As a way to mind his “sharp tongue,” it becomes 
Zachary’s habit to think of “at least five praiseworthy things” with which to quell his boyish temper 
(SP, p. 10). The externality of this habit allows for Zachary to temper his inner anxieties. It is not 
a coincidence that the tongue, used to consume food and to verbalise his praiseworthy thoughts, is 
used to defend against Burnham’s blatant attempt to legitimise slavery. This active displacement 
is aligned with his mother’s circumstances. As a freewoman, his mother would have been more 
than a free black woman and to understand his discomfort with his status, we have to first 
understand what it means for Zachary’s mother to be a freewoman in early nineteenth-century 
America, as well as what it means for Zachary to be considered “black” in the Ibis’ manifest (SP, 
p. 12). During the first national women’s suffrage conference ever held in Washington D. C. in 
1869, Robert Purvis, an American abolitionist of mixed-race like Zachary, argued that black 
women should not be disenfranchised from the vote just because the Southern black gentlemen 
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has need for the need to vote to contest the wrath of former slave owners.127 Quoting the historian 
Paula Giddings, Jean Fagan Yellin points out that black women still retained control over the 
domestic sphere, just like their white women counterparts. Black men, however, did not have this 
parity and would continue to “vindicate their manhood largely through asserting their authority 
over women.”128 However, Zachary is free by virtue of his mother’s authority as a freewoman, and 
this lack of selfhood have a telling influence upon his actions after the events of Sea of Poppies. 
Despite the contradiction which complicates his status, Zachary’s personal freedoms is at 
first a point of great pride; he thusly acknowledges this freedom, which allows for him to retain 
his own name and the knowledge of his personhood: “he took no small pride in. . . knowing his 
precise age and the exact date of his birth” (SP, p. 10). These personal, specific details further 
allow Zachary to hold a ship-mate’s license, and earn a living, rather than being constrained to a 
life of indentured servitude, despite the ship manifesto’s damning categorisation of his person as 
“black.” Even though some other passengers wonder if he “changi colour,” the true nature of 
Zachary’s identity doesn’t quite yet pose a problem because his “colour,” - the fact that he might 
change from “blue to black” - is not a matter of categorising him out of a societal place which feels 
obligated to police its own borders (SP, p. 140). Zachary’s origins at the moment holds no precise 
value to those wondering about his heritage. Moreover, his bicultural heritage is also not a threat 
to a society built upon an ironic hierarchy; Zachary is not subject to passing privilege, and his 
freedom is not at the expense of someone else’s ability to exercise their power. As we shall see, 
Zachary’s heritage in the volume practically removes him from such discourses. In fact, Zachary’s 
first voyage with the Ibis also strongly denies these assumptions, as he receives a varied schooling 
 
127 See Margaret Hope Bacon, “The Double Curse of Sex and Color": Robert Purvis and Human Rights”, The 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 121 (1997), 53-76 (pp. 53-4.)  
128 Jean Fagan Yellin, “‘Race’ and Nineteenth-Century American Womanhood”, Legacy, 15 (1998), 53-58 (pp. 54-
55). 
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from the ship. His “stern schooling” as part of the Ibis’s crew betrays the privileged state of his 
position of being neither here nor there, therefore remaining open to experiences that might be 
considered “other” (SP, p. 11). As the second-mate falls ill during the first leg of the Ibis’ maiden 
voyage, it falls on Zachary to mediate between various parts of the ship. Not only has Zachary 
incurred valuable experience in the role he originally signed on for, he has gained a working 
knowledge of how the other parts of the crew ought to be run without taking part in full or limiting 
himself to just a singular role in the crew.  
Zachary’s in-between status is akin to the idea of the “creaturely,” which Eric L. Santner 
describes as 
...a piece of the human world presents itself as a surplus that both demands and resists 
symbolisation, that is both inside and outside the “symbolic order”. . . what I am calling 
creaturely life is a dimension of human existence called into being at such natural historical 
fissures or caesuras in the space of meaning. These are the sites where the struggle for new 
meaning – in Nietzsche’s terms, the exercise of will to power, is most intense.129 
This freedom is also explicated at length in Rilke’s “Eighth Elegy” where two types of subjectivity 
are discussed at length. The first is the “open[ness]” of the animal, who is able to understand its 
experiences “naturally” and in full.130 Rilke’s animal remains a reproach to these human limits and 
still keeps “its progress behind it,” meaning that the animal does not hold itself to its own past, nor 
does it question the freedom it possesses in relation to whatever might have happened in the past. 
The animal’s freedom is closely entwined with all possibility of the future and shrugs off any 
obstacles which might stand in its way, including, as Rilke notes towards the end of the poem: 
death. As death represents the most surreal and yet the most certain of human boundaries, Rilke 
 
129 Santner, p. 13. 
130 Rainer Maria Rilke, Duino Elegies, edited and translated by Stephen Mitchell (New York: Vintage, 1982), p. 49. 
 107 
 
considers it human nature to be inclined towards death, so much so that life becomes secondary to 
the business of ending of a human life: “So we live here, forever taking leave” (DE, “Eighth 
Elegy”, p. 53). 
 This creaturely, uncanny freedom which allows for an individual to understand a world 
outside of one that he preoccupies though the act of un-belonging is also present in The Hungry 
Tide in the representation of Fokir. Zachary’s embodiment of the “creaturely” now highlights its 
tendency to alienate those who are in possession of it, leading to its urgent disavowal.  Perhaps the 
creaturely aspect of Zachary’s freedom is most obvious in the nickname that is given to him by 
the lascars, a group of migrant seamen. The lascars take to calling him Malum Zikiri, while 
instilling in him the ambition of becoming a gentleman. The name they give him run 
counterproductive to their ambition for him and acts as a warning Zachary is ultimately unable to 
heed. When Zachary meets Paulette Lambert, she refutes his previous assumption that his 
nickname is only a slip of the tongue, and proceeds to imbue the name with real meaning: “it means 
one who remembers” (SP, p. 147). His nickname Malum Zikiri embodies Zachary’s greatest 
failing: he forgets all of his experiences from the past as he trains his gaze upon wealth and 
modernity. Most of all, he forgets and forgoes a freedom which keeps him from partaking in 
fulfilling experiences that is not just dependent on escapism and self-referential hypocrisy.  
 As such, the freedom which Zachary embodies in the trilogy is one that is couched in 
increasingly alien turns and falls away from a subjectivity that is open to others to one that is blind 
to new opportunities. The estranged nature of his freedom aboard the Ibis is increasingly felt by 
Zachary as an individual. Instead of recognising his unique status as one that rebukes problematic 
taxonomies and upholding practices that are decidedly diametric to freedom like indentured 
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servitude and slavery, Zachary instead latches onto a definition of absence, so as to emphasise the 
absence of status and place rather than freedom of movement.  
 During a banquet held by the Raja Neel Rattan, whose name and station are one and the 
same, Zachary’s name, previously able to stand in for a creaturely freedom, is seen as incapable 
of participating in discourse and loses its meaning and functions not as a means towards 
transformation but is relegated to a silent and non-participatory role. Neel’s position as a Raja, 
betrays his inability to connect to others as anything other than “foreign” (SP, p. 100). Neel further 
expands upon these prejudices and pronounces all of his guests “unclean” (SP, 100). When Neel 
and Zachary first become acquainted with each other during a banquet hosted by Neel on his estate, 
Neel mistakes Zachary’s hometown of Baltimore, Maryland to mean that Zachary himself is a 
relation of Lord Baltimore; Neel asks Zachary outright, “Lord Baltimore was an ancestor of yours, 
perhaps?” (SP, p. 101). Zachary, who proudly views his hometown in relation to his freewoman 
mother, is left to suffer this awkward misunderstanding, as other well-known names of the time 
such as John Locke and David Hume are discussed in an exercise of name dropping. 
We now know, remembering Locke’s devotion to the connection between freedom and 
personal choice, that the mention of Locke, as well as Hume, who is known for his secular moral 
philosophy, that Ghosh is making a point that these tendencies to uphold freedom are ironic 
practices that instead uphold British rule in the nineteenth century and defend the enslavement of 
the subaltern to the production of opium. It is also interesting to note that because Zachary is still 
at this point in the novel more of a representation of a “creaturely” freedom, he is unable to 
communicate effectively with Neel. Neel’s mode of language and his subservience to British rule 
(although this changes as he becomes - in the second book - a devotee of language rather than 
merely English), Zachary’s insistent refusal of this false heritage is seen as modesty, as not to 
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disrupt Neel’s structure of thought, isolating Zachary even further. Zachary’s definition of a 
freewoman’s Baltimore is unable to carry any purchase at the dinner table. More importantly, this 
definition isn’t subsumed as part of a “lesser” Baltimore and put alongside a discussion of slavery, 
either. Zachary’s “Baltimore” is merely misunderstood and rendered void of meaning. It is also 
outside of the symbolic order as upheld by polite manners and India’s complicated caste system. 
In understanding Zachary’s predicament at this party, we also understand his anxiety as 
situated between the discourses of race and class and his being alienated from both. As Zachary 
begins to realise his previous pride of place - as upheld by matrilineal freedom - is not sustainable 
alongside a colonial, patriarchal freedom, he begins gradually to buy into a materialistic freedom 
as afforded him by the lascars’ ambition. Where Zachary is at first happy enough to “pass muster,” 
as the lascars buy him new clothes, he begins to work harder at upholding this guise as he notices 
that others take to treating him with more respect (SP, p. 48). He is also given a watch inscribed 
with the name Adam T. Danby. It transpires later that Danby’s watch is a foreshadowing of 
Zachary’s uncertain origins, as Danby is revealed to be a notorious pirate (SP, p. 308). Danby’s 
watch and status, conferred with the ambiguous rituals of what it means to be a gentleman, both 
emphasise the difficulty of being a gentleman in a society in which no one is entirely certain of 
how they are perceived by others, and that being a gentleman necessarily comes with pressure to 
be wealthy, which are sometimes or even mostly achieved through illicit ways within the trilogy. 
In River of Smoke, Bahram, a Parsi trader expresses his surprise as his Armenian companion Zadig 
Karabedian shows up to visit him wearing Western-style garments: “Zadig Bey, you have become 
a white man!” (RS, p. 51). 
Gentlemanliness and wealth are co-mingled with notions of playing at a privileged 
whiteness. As Deleuze and Guattari observe in A Thousand Plateaus, the institution of racism is 
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not a matter of negotiating meanings of ourselves and those who are “othered,” they point out that 
most systems of exclusion operate in degrees: 
European racism as the white man’s claim has never operated by exclusion. . .Racism 
operates by the determination of deviance in relation to the White Man face, which 
endeavours to integrate non-comforming traits into increasingly and backward ways. . . 
From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside. There 
are only people who should be like us and whose crime it is not to be.131 
Deleuze and Guattari suggest that racism too is not a matter of binary choices, but an ambivalent 
order which carefully protects itself. This echoes the crisis of degree experienced by the family 
now transposed again upon the individual in terms of his or her relationship. On the surface, this 
mode of distinction-via-the possibility of inclusion (rather than exclusion) seems to suggest a 
society that is open to social mobility. The lack of a certain “outside,” however, actually works to 
remove any certainty of an individual’s place, and is contingent upon a sense of “inside” that must 
position itself as the only possible option. For Zachary, this means that his previously embodied 
freedom must be traded in for something ambivalent, abstract, and also non-threatening to a 
discourse that is constantly without definition. 
Zachary’s ambitions erode his connections to a creaturely, bodily, freedom and takes 
several forms, each transforming his previous contentment in life to channel a sense of excess. In 
Flood of Fire, he is released from jail only to waylay celebrating his freedom and worry about 
earning money as his previous plight aboard the Ibis, which is also a clear break from his openness 
to experience in Sea of Poppies. He begins working on the Burnham estate as a “Mystery” who 
takes care of odd jobs around the place (FF, p. 133). Mrs. Burnham, horrified at Zachary’s uncouth 
 
131 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, translated by Brian Massumi (London and New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), p. 208. 
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living arrangements at a boarding house in Kiddipore, insists that he move into a budgerow - a 
houseboat - to do work on it. This isolation is ironic because it provides him with the privacy 
needed to become ill; the budgerow, a moored barge that serves as Zachary’s accommodation, is 
also in conversation with the Ibis, a vessel whose main purpose is to travel freely at sea. It is when 
Zachary falls into the comfort of a vessel that is necessarily precluded from travel that he becomes 
ill. This illness is vivaciously described in the scientific literature of the time as “onanism,” 
presenting symptoms which pushes its patient to “practice it seven to eight times a day,” eventually 
driving the patient to an “emission” so difficult to be only represented by “only a few drops of 
blood” (FF, 118). This natural act of the body is depicted as “immodest” and “without a place” in 
the Burnhams’ “Christian household” (FF, p. 98). 
The insistence on the Christianity of the Burnham household holds the weight due to not 
only Mrs Burnham’s unhappiness but also her husband’s colonial conditioning towards her. 
Zachary’s own Christian views, first instilled in him by his mother, are subsumed and disembodied 
by the preoccupations of both Burnhams, and his mother’s Christian teachings of gratefulness are 
quickly forgotten. While Zachary’s status as a “Mystery” folds him carefully into a discourse of 
race and class which has previously rejected him, his newfound sense of privacy and privilege 
begets yet another kind of anxiety, which leads him to question his choices; his choices are ones 
born out of anxiety which, previously, led by his mother’s matrilineal freedom, is now displaced 
and overtaken by Mrs. Burnham’s guilt. We learn that Mrs Burnham’s given name is “Cathy,” 
which echoes Emily Bronte’s Gothic heroine in Wuthering Heights, but this irony is two-fold as 
she is a Cathy without her Heathcliff. Also in this formulation, Heathcliff’s absence is understood 
as a lack in Mrs. Burnham; in her parting letter to Zachary, she so confesses: “I am a vain unhappy 
creature” (FF, 594). All of the men in Mrs Burnham’s life, her economically minded husband Mr. 
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Burnham, the ambitious Zachary, and the civil minded, cash-poor Captain Neville Mee, all share 
the dangerous common denominator of not having her in mind.  
Under Mrs. Burnham’s well-meaning yet entirely misguided instruction, Zachary’s view 
of freedom becomes one that is contingent upon self-deception, or what Jean Paul Sartre calls “bad 
faith.”132  This re-framing of freedom suggests that freedom is not defined by its lack of restraint 
on one’s personhood but act instead as a mask rather what freedom is meant to hide. It is held 
captive by secrets which others can use against you. It is a freedom which entails self-punishment 
and repressed guilt. Sartre’s “bad faith” circumscribes a specific kind of self-deception which 
eventually leads to beliefs which may not be accurate or helpful to an individual’s existence but 
this belief is what sustains the individual’s being in spite of whatever consequences it might hold 
for the individual. We are meant to “hide freedoms from ourselves” in order to avoid taking 
“responsibility” which freedom necessarily bestows upon its takers. 
By declaring freedom as too much responsibility, the individual is reduced to not being in 
control of his freedom but is given a specific version of it to consume as a party not responsible 
for its form. While this definition is easily recognisable as the mantra of colonial enslavement, of 
a dangerous reimagining of Kipling’s white man’s burden, a more insidious version of such an 
ambivalent freedom emerges when the subject in question is by all accounts free without need to 
justify his freedom to others. Bad faith so visits Zachary in several forms and he fails to understand 
the choice presented to him via bad faith, which in itself is a slave to economic freedom.  Zachary’s 
first experience of this freedom isn’t one so entwined with money as it is with his body, in fact, 
his affair with Mrs Burnham strongly contributes to the erasure of his previous bodily freedom. 
 
132 Sartre, p. 50. 
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Zachary’s illicit liaison with Mrs Burnham begins as an act of good Christian charity, as 
she sees that Zachary is suffering from chronic masturbation. Instead of seeing this as a chance to 
widen Zachary’s scope of experience as to not rely upon masturbation, she distils his person and 
the whole of himself down to the “malignancy of his malady” and refuses to see other parts of him 
(FF, p. 158). Much like Franzen’s notion of depression, we see Mrs. Burnham’s language as 
carefully curated to lead into only one possibility: the fact that Zachary must be ill with “onanism”  
can be interpreted as an expression of her guilt towards her husband in itself rather than Zachary’s 
actual claim to have this illness. Under the guise of bad faith, Zachary’s primary freedom 
connecting him to his body is slowly erased and shamed, to ensure its continued impracticality. 
He changes his diet and “only ate crackers” to rid himself of his habits (FF, p. 200). Zachary’s 
new diet is a response to his previously embodied sense of freedom, as he enslaves himself to 
narrow goals and Wherein Mrs Burnham has expressed to Zachary her unhappiness of his habits, 
it is his newfound ambition to be productive within his society that pushes him into leading an 
emaciated existence with an eye towards “progress” (FF, p. 500). 
 
Joey Burglund: “Something Deeply Wrong” 
Zachary’s anxiety is linked strongly to the absence of women in his life and this idea gains 
purchase in Franzen’s writing as well. We first get to know Joey Berglund as himself and not as 
an idealised charming presence to so have terrorised the community of Ramsey Hill with his 
effortless presence in a chapter called “Womanland.” As Philip Weinstein observes, the tone of 
the chapter is deeply misogynistic and views women and their sexual organs as ultimately 
“chartable territory.”133 However, I argue that this almost galling representation of Joey’s attitude 
 
133 Philip Weinstein, Jonathan Franzen and the Comedy of Rage (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015), p. 167. 
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towards the female sex is this way and points to unsettling notions of maternal anxiety. Such 
notions are connected primarily to Joey’s newfound penchant for masturbation but also include 
and reinforce notions of how one might live confined by anxiety. This anxiety is problematic for 
them as their masculine privilege does not exempt them from anxiety. It is also paradoxical in that 
maternal anxiety and male excessiveness seem to be inextricable from each other. While male 
competition (between Joey and his father Walter; between Walter and his seemingly more 
successful friend Richard Katz; between even Joey and his Jewish roommate Jonathan) is prevalent 
throughout the novel, I would like to argue that it is the male anxiety as expressed in maternal, 
undoubtedly female terms that is the source of the male drives in the novel. “Womanland” 
chronicles Joey’s life in college and halfway through “life as he knew it, but only better,” we are 
hit with this telling passage that describes Joey’s descent into chronic masturbation, a habit he used 
to be exempt from because of Connie: 
Masturbation itself was a demeaning dissipation whose utility he was nevertheless learning 
to value as he sought to wean himself from Connie. His preferred venue for release was 
the Handicapped bathroom in the science library at whose Reserve desk he collected $7.65 
an hour for reading textbooks and the Wall Street Journal and occasionally fetching texts 
for science nerds. Landing a work-study job at the Reserve desk had seemed to him another 
confirmation that he was destined to be fortunate in life (F, p. 236). 
This insight into Joey’s character and his circumstances remains telling on several levels. First, is 
that he is very much his mother’s son while any mention of her is absent within this passage. 
Franzen is careful to couch Joey’s experiences as a first-year undergrad as exceedingly average, 
and Joey’s matriculation into a public institution like the University of Virginia stands in clear 
rebuke to the other possibilities that might have been otherwise offered to Joey at an Ivy League 
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institution or perhaps even somewhere more intimate and prestigious like Franzen’s own 
Swarthmore. We remember that Patty, Joey’s mother, also chose the average public university in 
Minnesota, and that her choice is indelibly connected to facilitate the unhappiness of Patty’s 
mother, Joyce: “Joyce’s transparent aversion to Minnesota along with Minnesota’s distance from 
New York, was a key factor in Patty’s deciding to go there (F, p. 50). 
 From this maternal link which now informs every part of his university experience, the 
female-oriented nature of Joey’s anxiety becomes much more complicated in its overtness. The 
idea of romanticised and sexual love is entangled with maternal desire. Joey “wean[s]” himself off  
Connie, another term that has acquired widespread use as a substitute for dependency, but it is a 
term which retains the connection between mother and child.  So too, is Joey, with all facets of 
fortune, unable to escape Carol Monaghan’s phone call, blaming him for Connie’s depression and 
the fact that he has been “absent” (F, p. 237). Joey’s absence in Connie’s life is in fact the trade in 
for Joey’s freedom, but at the presence, this freedom is being redefined as absence (and therefore, 
as loss) and it is this loss that continues to plague Joey’s time at university. He is “Handicapped” 
(capitalised in both instances) by his masturbation to such an extent that he starts to see its value, 
in order to continue justifying its presence. Like Zachary, Joey’s penchant for masturbation 
becomes the postmodern allegory for anxiety and the lack of self control.  
 While sex (both practical and imagined) with Connie punctuates Joey’s narrative in 
“Womanland,” it is the presence of Jenna (no last name) as if to reinforce her status as a fantasy, 
the older, sophisticated sister of Joey’s college roommate that represents anxiety outside of sex. 
Jenna is someone who embodies sex as discourse while sex, as circumscribed by Connie, is bound 
up with internalised maternal anxiety. Joey’s failed courtship with Jenna implicates Joey’s sexual 
urges in the discourses of race and class. While Weinstein only devotes one line to describe Joey’s 
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and Jenna’s lack of consummation, pointing out that “the pair collapses under the weight of its 
own incompatibility,” 134 I think a closer look at this perceived incompatibility draws out Franzen’s 
consistent allergy when it comes to addressing certain issues of race and class. Had Jenna and Joey 
consummated their relationship through sex, then Joey, being from a small town in the Midwest, 
risks rising in the ranks of the upper echelons of society without putting in the work, which is 
against Franzen’s ethos.   
 Additionally, in “Womanland,” his roommate Jonathan comes to the revelation that Joey 
is Jewish and promptly invites him to Thanksgiving. Joey is reluctant at first, downplaying his 
heritage and avoiding his mother’s shadow: 
 “My grandmother’s a politician, in the state legislature or something. She’s this nice, 
elegant Jewish lady who my mom apparently can’t stand to be in the same room with.” 
 “Whoa, say that again?” Jonathan sat up straight on his bed. “Your mom is Jewish?” 
 “I guess in some theoretical way.” 
 “Dude, you’re a Jew! I had no idea.” 
 “Only like, one-quarter,” Joey said. “It’s really watered down” (F, p. 252).  
But while Joey insists that his Jewishness is “watered down,” he also follows in his mother’s 
footsteps in denying her own parents, thus in a perverse way, bringing mother-and-son closer 
together in almost a perverse way, implying a severe. Franzen then follows this What follows is 
an unmistakably male bonding exercise which manages to include, in the same breath, the 
contested existence of the state of Israel, along with the biological disposition of Jonathan to enjoy 
“Israeli Goddesses” on the Internet (F, p. 252).  Joey’s avoidance of his Jewish heritage transports 
Zachary’s matrilineal anxiety to the twenty-first century and gives it material dimensions, but fails 
 
134 Weinstein, p. 69. 
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to follow up on its political implications. Having previously disregarded Franzen as having no 
critical position from which to write, Jesus Blanco Hidalga accepts on some level that by attaching 
himself to Jewish identity, which he sees as an “ideological fetish,” patterned after Slavoj Zizek’s 
remarks on Westernised Buddhism. The ease of these identities and the manner in which they 
might be applied and discarded to suit an individual is found in the way that they must be “user 
friendly.”135 
 The idea of Jewishness as an instrument of ideological fetishisation provides another 
important link for sex (specifically masturbation) as applied to the discourses of race and class. 
This approach is at the centre of Dean Franco’s revisionist approach to Roth’s Portnoy’s 
Complaint. This novel not only highlights possibilities for Freedom, but again demonstrates 
Franzen’s retreat from social issues.  
The parental anxiety is nominally present in Portnoy is both Oedipal (between Alex 
Portnoy and his father Jack), which represents the tension between blacks and Jews during the 
1960s and also maternal, in that an instance of Portnoy’s “purity-obsessed” mother washing a knife 
previously used by the family’s coloured maid, Dorothy. Franco interprets the knife as a symbol 
of Portnoy’s fear of castration, as well as a symbol of “prohibition” against his chronic 
masturbation. The knife also represents the Jewish practice of “circumcision,” racialising the male 
body in practical terms and supplementing the matrilineal nature of identifying as Jewishness. 
Portnoy’s Complaint is a novel which brings together sex and race as not disparate topics but one 
“inextricably related” under the “analytic of rights.”136  
 
135 Jesus Blanco Hidalga, Jonathan Franzen and the Romance of Community: Narratives of Salvation (New York: 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), p. 216. 
136 Dean Franco, “Portnoy's Complaint: It's about Race, Not Sex (Even the Sex Is about Race)”, Prooftexts 29 
(2009), 85-116 (p. 87). 
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 However, this possibility is more or less lost upon Franzen, who appears to separate the 
discourses of race and class with sex, which is understandable as there are a number of silences 
which prevail in Franzen’s work. Hidalga offers the following list:  
A great part of the silences and denials in Franzen’s work are related to class issues. Some 
examples of what Franzen’s novels resist recognising or showing are the persistence of 
class struggle and the novelist’s own partaking in it; the reality of class domination that 
underlies his liberal stance; the failure of the latter to cope with pressing social 
contradictions. . . 137 
In almost all of his writing, Franzen continues to subscribe to outdated modes of the American 
Dream that involves a white working-class character (Alfred Lambert of The Corrections, Martin 
Probst of The Twenty-Seventh City, and most recently Walter Berglund of Freedom) who are 
rewarded for their hard work. And yet, Franzen’s hardworking fathers seem to have all passed on 
these opportunistic freedoms to offspring who refuse to honour their hardworking ethics, although 
an exception might be Gary of The Corrections, but this pattern again repeats in Gary’s sons, who 
take advantage of their father’s success.  
In a sense, the “incompatibility” between Joey and Jenna is bound by such a pattern and 
reinforces these silences and does not just make little narrative sense for Franzen. Had Joey 
fulfilled his dream of copulating with Jenna, his sexual practices would have gone a step beyond 
maternal anxiety to broach castration. According to Freud, the castration complex creates various 
neurosis, one of which is narcissism.138 Joey doesn’t get the Princess in this instance, because he 
hasn’t yet done the work and the freedom which Jenna represents to him is a freedom that goes 
 
137 Hidalga, p. 18. 
138 See Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (London & New York, NY: Penguin 1991), pp. 
358-359. 
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against Franzen’s notion of class consciousness. Joey could have gone to work for Goldman Sachs 
from his encounter and closeness to Jenna, but early on in their relationship, she makes sure to set 
him apart: “No offense? But you seem too nice for that.” (F, p. 257). Franzen here distinguishes 
between two modes of capitalism, one that allows for rampant prostitution, and one that casts 
morality at its centre. By choosing the route of moral capitalism, Joey earns a chance at a new life 
and is allowed to get out of trouble without too much fuss.  
That said, Joey is redeemed and offered a freedom which does not cause him anxiety. He 
sits comfortably as an antithesis of his father, who has at this point, given into his own anxiety and 
carried out an affair with his assistant Lalitha, only to have this affair end when she dies in a tragic 
accident. Joey is redeemed and rescued by virtue of Franzen being “an emotions guy.” Characters 
are felt for and given a tremendous amount of leeway to accept their flaws and to be accepted by 
others by virtue of recognising their own weaknesses. Freedom continues to put women in 
compromising positions as men come to these realisations about themselves. In the next section, 
we see Franzen’s Wolf grapple with freedom-as-surveillance, and that his choices are likewise 
narrowed and driven by maternal anxiety.  
 
Andreas Wolf: Freedom, Privacy, and the Gothic 
Andreas Wolf in Purity bears the distinction in Franzen’s work as someone who is established to 
the readers as a person who is certainly pitiable and wanting reader sympathy, but such 
rehabilitation is denied him in the end. The confines of freedom which Wolf inhabits appear to be 
awarded to him by privilege, which as we have seen, is a contentious position in most of Franzen’s 
writings. The careful veneers of “maternal anxiety” are given a certain elevated privilege. Consider 
this description of Katya Wolf, entwined with Wolf’s early childhood:  
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Andreas’s real love affair was with his mother Katya, who was no less perfect and much 
more available. She was pretty and lively and quick; rigid only in her politics. She had 
boyishly short hair was unrivaled redness, blazing but natural looking redness, the product 
of a Western bottle obtainable only by the very privileged. She was a jewel of the Republic, 
a person of great physical and intellectual charm who’d elected to stay behind (P, p. 104). 
Katya falls into a long line of Franzen’s women who are subjected to a gaze which is undoubtedly 
male, but unlike any of Franzen’s mother figures before her, Katya appears to be an independent 
spirit who also is, to recall a turn of phrase in Freedom, “very into her son,” (F, 10). However, this 
motherly adoration is uncoupled from any real critique of its inherent inappropriateness and 
exalted to echo and emphasise the privilege embodied by the Wolf family. Katya’s sense of 
privilege is underlined by her “natural” yet “privileged” red hair, and this contradiction is further 
blurred by her choice to stay behind. Unlike the other choices previously discussed in this chapter, 
this choice is not couched by anxiety or the desire for more, but it is a choice that flouts practical 
issues and impresses the impossibility of such a choice for everyday citizens of the Republic. 
Where Joey is clearly bothered and anxious about his closeness with Patty and this 
closeness is set out in Freedom as in beyond the norms of accepted parental involvement, Katya’s 
closeness to her son is exalted and moulded as a privilege of a privilege, as most mothers in East 
Berlin (and therefore subject to the “two-dimensionality” of the Wall), are unable to devote such 
so much time to childrearing (P, p. 70). Privilege is the concept that continues to resonate through 
this passage which is meant to sing praises about the advantages of communist Germany, 
conversely a society which goes against the very idea of privilege and inequality. Franzen seems 
to imply through this contradiction that due to the nature of such freedoms, characterised as hard 
won (in Joey’s case) or simply compromised (in Zachary’s case) Wolf’s innate freedom seems to 
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live somewhere beyond compromise and remain haunted by privilege. Unlike Joey, Wolf is not 
able to tell apart his privilege from a more moral way of being and therefore, his freedom continues 
to be contaminated by an urgent sense of excess.  
In addition, the language which Andreas uses to describe his mother and his youthful 
adoration of her seems to cut dangerously close to the sort of poetic convention reserved for a lover 
and his beloved and therefore is inappropriate. Katya’s numerous other achievements appear to 
highlight the fact that she is a rare figure who is only incidentally a mother. In Franzen’s other 
permutations of the mother figure, their identities are mostly centred on their wish to be a good 
mother; they are mothers who are overly inundated with a maternal sense of duty. Wolf figures 
Katya as a queenly individual and rarified in her immediate surroundings. Katya Wolf is to her 
son three dimensions in a world without dimensions and Franzen’s notion of East Germany as flat 
likely takes some inspiration from the minimalist art movement that had its beginnings in rejecting 
the fundamentals of art. As Kazmir Malevich points out in 1913, “Art no longer cares to serve the 
state and religion it no longer wishes to illustrate the history of manners, it wants to have nothing 
further to do with the object as such, and believes that it can exist in and for itself without 
things.”139  
The same concept of abstractness can be said to describe Wolf’s relationship to his mother. 
Because he is offered dimensions in his relationship with his mother, it is this rarefied quality 
which continues to blur Wolf’s upbringing is key to the way he deals with anxiety and also the 
way he sees freedom. If his whole life is abstract, it seems only fair that he would like to maintain 
some sense of practical self; Wolf’s freedoms are made continuously ambivalent as he continues 
to search for a sense of self. The novel offers several modes of freedom to Wolf, but each of these 
 
139 Kazmir Malevich, The Non-Objective World, translated by Howard Dearstyne (Chicago: P. Theobald, 1959), p. 
74. 
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options are, ultimately, unworkable because they conflict with Wolf’s inner turmoil and recalls the 
presence of his mother. Masturbation also features heavily as a bourgeois malady for which fifteen-
year-old Wolf is sent to a psychologist (P, p. 108). Wolf is perhaps best described in connection 
with Joey Berglund as a version of Joey who is withheld reader sympathy; as Franzen is an author 
who carefully trades on emotion in order to forgive his actions. Throughout most of the novel, in 
which the meeting with his psychologist is exemplary, Wolf has bought into a persona which voids 
him of any real sincerity. Irony becomes his only register, and as we shall see, it is giving up irony 
for sincerity that gives Wolf his freedom, but also robs him of his own life. 
 The conversation between teenaged Wolf and the psychologist is flat and ironises the sense 
of flatness in Wolf’s own life. The session concludes with Wolf suggesting that he “supposes he 
should feel bad for the psychologist for only having one job and not being very clever at that. 
Wolf’s newfound hobby carries new dimensions of his relationship with his mother, and while 
Hidalga leans heavily upon the “ambiguity” of the relationship, going so far as to cite the purely 
sexual relationship between Wolf and the actress Toni Fields who is around Wolf’s own age, but 
is assigned to play his mother in an upcoming biographical film. I find that the connection between 
Wolf and Katya is made excessively abundant and inappropriate and it is this uncertainty which 
leads to much of the Gothic threat of incest within Purity, a possibility which again deconstructs 
the capacity of purity in the novel.   
Hidalga goes to some lengths in order to establish the connection between Purity and the 
way Franzen utilises Gothic conventions. He starts with the idea that excess moves to make the 
most intimate aspects of our lives foreign, strange, and even ambivalent, as we are no longer 
equipped with the discerning eye needed to understand its subtlety. Hidalga writes, “ Melodramatic 
excess takes on a new distinctive quality in Purity. Melodrama is here deliberately tinged with the 
 123 
 
eerie flavour of the Gothic in an attempt to invest it with a measure of the latter’s own sublimity - 
the uncanny of family relationships.”140 For Hidalga, the  of the “Do you know what it’s like to 
live with a man who is haunted by a woman he has not seen for 25 years?” (P, p 223). 
By underscoring the Gothic conventions inherent to Purity, Blanco attempts to focus in on other 
aspects of the Gothic novel, not least of which Wolf’s continued tortured relationship with his 
mother, which he reads as “ambiguous,” to give some credo to the Gothic trope of incest or the 
fear of incest. However, I feel that it is the strong implications of a mother-son relationship that is 
intimate outside of what the culture feels is right or moral, which holds Wolf hostage. There is 
nothing inappropriate about his relationship with Katya outside of the ironic dimensions which 
Wolf prescribes to their relationship, and for good reason. His only sin towards his mother, if we 
accept the Edenic definition of the original sin, which understands that all human evil is derived 
from knowledge, is one of knowing. Around the time when Wolf was sent to the psychologist as 
a teenager, he finds out that he was likely born out of wedlock and his biological father is one of 
his mother’s former students at the university. This makes Wolf’s very existence uncanny and 
should be excised as a point of law.  Wolf’s crimes are best described by the Marxist critic Mikhail 
Bahktin, who circumscribes Wolf’s final turn into a fatal blindness caused by a lifelong devotion 
to Irony. As Linda Hutcheon notes, irony is wholly Bahktinian an “equivocal language of modern 
times’ for he saw it everywhere and in every form -- from the minimal and imperceptible to the 
loud which borders on laughter. In other words, the existence of one signifier “irony” should never 
blind us to the plurality of its functions as well as effects.141 
 
140 Hidalga, p. 313 
141 C.f. Linda Hutcheon, Irony’s Edge: The Theory and Politics of Irony (London and New York: Rutledge, 1994), 
p. 48. 
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 Wolf gains freedom in death, which is the highest form of ambivalence, as he carries with 
him secrets to the grave. Throughout this chapter, I have showcased freedom in its ideological 
forms, but the disseminations of such forms of freedoms give way to fairly practical expressions 
of anxiety such as masturbation. This also underscores the question of certain privileges and 
freedoms as long established under traditions of patriarchy. The next section which concludes this 
thesis looks to dismantle these stringent ways of thinking in order to offer a more ambivalent, 
“expectant” view of the coming decades.  
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Coda 
 
“A Really Serious Glitch”: Competing Views of Knowledge 
 
Throughout this thesis, I have argued that ambivalence is an important artistic and psychological 
survival mechanism for the new millennium. Such survival strategies are vital to a reconstitution 
of themes, such as the self, family, and the notion of freedom. Ambivalence is a key technique in 
all of the novels considered by my thesis. It is, however, worth noting the different types or degree 
of ambivalence that is presented by Franzen and Ghosh, is especially prevalent in their 
understanding of knowledge and its subsequent impact upon identity. On the one hand, Franzen 
presents a pessimistic form of ambivalence which works against itself. Franzen’s ambivalence is 
mostly born out of a discomfort with his own privilege as a white middle class male.142  On the 
other hand, Ghosh presents a more humanistic form of ambivalence as he attempts to renegotiate 
what could be seen as impeachable, privileged, silences (maintained thusly in Franzen’s fiction) 
into something that resembles more a political ambivalence that  welcomes new ideas rather than 
shirking away from their contrarian implications.143  
This dichotomy has real-world implications for various modes and venues of knowledge, 
not least of which include the much contested role of the university, environmentalism and socio-
economic inequality. The uncertainties which surround these previously solid ideas can be 
explained through Marshall McLuhan’s theories of hot and cold media, wherein “hot” 
sensationalist media encroaches upon aforementioned cold spaces enriched in context.144 
Throughout this chapter a surprisingly diverse range of authors, including Don DiLillo, Terry 
 
142 Cf. Colin Hutchinson, “Jonathan Franzen and the Politics of Disengagement”, Critique: Studies in Contemporary 
Fiction, 50 (2009), 191-207 (p 191).  
143 Anshuman A. Mondal notes that ambivalence is an “appropriate position” for a novelist such as Ghosh because 
“it can be read as a register of an ethics that recognises the inescapable duality and impossible paradox of the 
postcolonial predicament. See Mondal, Amitav Ghosh (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), p. 110. 
144 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (Oxford: Routledge, 1964), p. 24. 
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Pratchett, David Foster Wallace and even the horror writer H. P. Lovecraft—with stunning 
prescience for someone writing in the 1920s and 30s—-have each recognised the ambivalence that 
is now a mainstay of our world, which is characterised more by its crowdedness than by its 
vastness. In other words, the immediacy of the world today, championed by soundbites and 
truncated tweets, becomes antithetical to an examined life as these fragmentary, sensationalist 
pieces often obscure the bigger picture or whole. My coda reflects on ideas in previous chapters to 
delineate Franzen’s and Ghosh’s respective positions regarding the application of knowledge in 
contemporary society. I show how their respective positions gain a liquid possibility (to borrow a 
term from Zygmunt Bauman) when considered together, which hints at a new form of ambivalence 
as an approach to life.  
 In this unsteady dialectic between knowledge and experience, it is only natural that the 
lingering spectre of trauma has emerged from a lack of resolution to this interplay. As Walter 
Benjamin puts it in his influential essay “The Storyteller,” experience and knowledge are 
circumscribed anew by the traumatic experiences of World War II. Soldiers returned home not 
“richer but poorer in communicable experience.”145 The new emphasis upon the exchange of 
experience, which Benjamin argues that we have lost through communicable language, means a 
sharp rise in the importance of information (most recognisable by its immediacy). This 
methodology is expanded upon in Marshall McLuhan’s Understanding Media: Extensions of Man 
in which he writes that is not the content of the information, but the medium by which it is delivered 
that holds more sway. “Cool” media, such as print, television, and telephone conversations are 
ameliorated by surrounding contexts. Because of this, cool mediums demand more participation 
from the audience, not least of which because these mediums are narrativelydriven by nature. 
 
145 Walter Benjamin, The Storyteller”, in Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, edited by Hannah Arendt, 
translated by Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), p. 84. 
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McLuhan contrasts cool media with “hot” media, which are better understood in technical-sensory 
terms rather than the narrative value they might otherwise provide to their audience. Hot media 
such as photography, radio, and more recently cinema, are media that might be abundant in spatial-
visual stimulus, but its participatory value to the audience remains limited to a certain sensory 
singularity. Thus, another way of looking at the unease between knowledge and experience could 
be attributed to the sudden lack of distance between ourselves and the presence of hot and cold 
media. Given the invention of the Internet, the relationship between these mediums and the 
messages they purport to maintain and disseminate has become increasingly convoluted (or in a 
word, more ambivalent).  
The conflict between hot and cold mediums can therefore be seen as a reduction of 
knowledge and experience as afflicted by continued cultural trauma. This trauma has established 
itself as a staple of literary dread in contemporary fiction. Don DiLillo’s 1992 novel Mao II argues 
that the individual is paralysed from fear by this very conflict.146 Mao II’s protagonist is the 
novelist Bill Grey, who agonises over his return to the public eye through his new novel yet to be 
published. Grey lives as a recluse in deference to his work but secretly harbours the contrarian 
desire to stop the novel’s publication in order to preserve its “purity.”  It would seem then that, 
without completion and, therefore, retaining “purity” - or perhaps what Franzen would call 
“status,” - a book can survive audience engagement. Franzen contrasts the coldness of the “status” 
novel (sprawling postmodern doorstoppers in the mode of William Gaddis, one of Franzen’s 
former literary heroes) to the warmness of the “contract” model, wherein an author actively seeks 
out the approval and the participation of his readers.147 Despite Franzen’s reformed approach to 
 
146 Don DiLillo, Mao II (London: Picador, 2016). 
147 Franzen, A., p. 240. 
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literature, he still appears to share DeLillo’s concern.148 This concern is not without some founding 
as DeLillo states that, the future, as “inherited by the crowds” is an unhappy, unfriendly one 
towards knowledge and its much needed contexts (sometimes known as experience).149  
 More pointedly, perhaps, the question of the crowd is reassessed in Terry Pratchett’s 
Discworld novel, Jingo, which extends the analogy proffered in DeLillo’s Mao II. Pratchett not 
only consents to the presence of the crowd as inevitable, but he also notes the influence of the 
crowd as being not particularly conducive to the keeping of peace. According to Pratchett, “The 
intelligence of that creature known as a crowd is the square root of the number of people in it.”150 
The novel’s title also attests to this lowest common denominator. Pratchett’s title is derived from 
the word “jingoism,” which is a form of extreme patriotism most often found in the form of 
aggressive foreign policy -- again, another form of knowledge willfully dislocated from contexts 
which surround and are meant to inform it. This suggests that knowledge has become emaciated 
due to catering to the lowest common denominator or -- as Pratchett argues by way of DeLillo -- 
the mob. The mob has little use for knowledge outside what it narrowly understands. This 
continued self-enforced ignorance then creates a vicious feedback loop wherein hot media will 
always triumph over cold: as witnessed by the recent slide of TV down the scale from cool media 
in McLuhan’s time towards hot media due to pointed advertising and increased special effects. 
This is also reflected in an earlier discussion in Chapter One of Franzen’s Purity, whereby Andreas 
Wolf as a living man is considered detached from his media image, and the memorialising of his 
life after his suicide is considered much more meaningful to both his fans and detractors.   
 
148 Perhaps an uncharitable, but accurate assessment of Franzen’s relationship to DeLillo’s struggles with the 
particulars of American culture might be found in James Wood’s review of The Corrections, in which Wood states, 
“Jonathan Franzen is the slightly damaged child of Don DeLillo’s peculiar relationship with American culture.” See 
James Wood, “What the Dickens”, The Guardian, 9 November 2001. 
149 DeLillo, p. 15. 
150 Terry Pratchett, Jingo (London: Corgi, 2013), p.436. 
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 As such, the ubiquitous mob enters into the conscious of the new millennium by the way 
of trauma still unaddressed. Cathy Caruth remarks on this point that trauma is necessarily hard to 
place, and any hope of placing such experience is impossible in the present: "the impact of the 
traumatic event lies precisely in its belatedness, in its refusal to be simply located.”151 Carving out 
a safe space in which trauma can be addressed takes on an added urgency as the world grows 
smaller. Crowds and trauma inevitably shadow Franzen’s and Ghosh’s imaginations. One could 
argue that 9/11 remains the definitive Event of the twenty-first century and continues to occupy a 
large part of our cultural conscience because we haven’t found a way to confront it in earnest. 
While it could be viewed as a uniquely American problem and seen by many to mark the end of 
American exceptionalism, even such an opinion, which seeks to diminish the idea of Americanism, 
is done so with limited association to other acts of terrorism such as the Troubles in the 1970s and 
1980s, the 7/7 bombings in London, and also suicide bombings and attacks elsewhere, and not 
always in the West. In his essay “The Anglophone Empire,” published in The New Yorker after 
9/11, Ghosh offers this contextualisation of the event: that his personal experiences as an individual 
of Indian descent has informed by “the institutions of this empire as by a long tradition of struggle 
against them.” It is because he as an inheritor of such an ambivalent context that “the September 
11th attacks and their aftermath were filled with disquieting historical resonances.”152  
The following examples provided by Franzen’s Freedom and David Foster Wallace’s short 
story “The View from Mrs. Thompson’s House,” effectively represent the greatest tragedy of 
Western education in light of these troubling contexts. These two writers express this tragedy in 
two parts. The first part is that the academic language used to explain and theorise a situation in 
 
151 Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996), p. 8. 
152 Amitav Ghosh, The Anglophone Empire, The New Yorker, 7 April 2003.  
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order to provide meaning is now obfuscatory and complex to the point where it drives the layman 
away from the possibilities of critical thinking. This then leads into the second part, wherein 
students and otherwise educated laypersons become alienated by such language and by extension 
the academic process. The value of the university degree is currently under debate, and the 
outcome of this will influence both the practical (whether a degree will help its holder gain 
employment),153 and theoretical value of the degree (how a future graduate might engage with 
critical thought outside of the academic sphere).  In a New York Times Op-Ed piece, the esteemed 
academic Stanley Fish notes that after serving as a dean of a university, he has learned that 
academia is at its most effective when adhering to certain limitations.154 Fish suggests the academic 
should not be tasked with obligations to “fashio[n]” future “citizens.” This contemporary addition 
to the responsibilities of the academic troubles Fish, as academic research should not be expected 
to perform the Herculean task of preparing students for the wider world. Even, as Fish admits, that 
questions such as, ''What practices provide students with the knowledge and commitments to be 
socially responsible citizens?'' are important, but providing answers “should not be the content of 
a university course.”155 As we will see, Franzen and Foster Wallace appear to argue for the 
university as a corporate entity of social responsibility but, opposing Fish’s view, Ghosh, in the 
The Hungry Tide revisits this question with an eye towards a degree of personal responsibility and 
growth being taught to the students.156   
 
153 Stanley Fish, “Why We Built the Ivory Tower,” The New York Times, 21 May 2004. 
154 Fish, ibid.  
155 Fish, ibid. 
156 Umberto Eco proffers a similar perspective to the conclusion eventually arrived at in The Hungry Tide, except 
Eco’s demonstration is meant to revitalise the classroom.  The real occupation of teachers, is not to filter and censor 
information in real time for the students they are meant to teach. Instead, Eco argues that the presence of a teacher is 
invaluable because he or she provides “an example of a selection made from the great sea of all possible 
information.” Such a selection would then encourage critical thinking or as Eco puts it, carefully “discriminat[e]” 
thinking. See Chronicles of a Liquid Society,  translated by Richard Dixon (London: Vintage, 2017), pp. 57-59. 
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In Franzen’s Freedom, a similarly disquieting scene unfolds around the tragic event of 
9/11. Students’ inability to cope with such a seismic event is largely depicted as a failing of the 
university. Previous to 9/11, Joey Berglund is a sophomore at the University of Virginia. Chiefly, 
Joey’s concerns as an up-and-coming business studies major is how to keep up with his much 
wealthier friends and whether or not to remain faithful to his girlfriend. Joey, having received 
“numberless assurances that his life would be a lucky one,” approaches the world with a laissez-
faire attitude, thinking that things will always work out favourably for him. This can be considered 
a negative form of ambivalence, as he is unable to cope when things have gone wrong (F, p. 232).  
When the reality of 9/11 hits, Joey’s sense ambivalence is sorely misplaced: 
On the morning of September 11 he actually left his roommate Jonathan to monitor the 
burning World Trade Center and Pentagon while he hurried off to his Econ 201 lecture. 
Not until he reached the big auditorium and found it all but empty did he understand that a 
really serious glitch had occurred. (F, p. 232) 
As a second-year business student, Joey’s initial reaction to 9/11 is verging on the absurd, but such 
absurdity is itself only an emphasis of Joey’s incapability to connect to the tragedy as a cultural 
event. Joey’s attitude towards 9/11 is simultaneously ridiculous and also a more sinister sign of 
the possible waning in value of a university education. The ivory tower that is the university proves 
a sanctuary in the wake of these traumatic events—a santinised and warded bastion against the 
weight of liberal progress which denies 9/11 its appropriate contexts. Franzen appears to suggest 
in the above passage that the university resolutely lacks the ability to connect students to the wider 
world and to provide them with much needed context. Instead, the university is stunted as an elitist 
institution which is more suited to keeping students well informed.157 The opposite becomes true, 
 
157 Stephen J. Burn, Jonathan Franzen at the End of Postmodernism (London and New York, NY: Continuum, 
2008), p. ix.  
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as Joey’s know-how from Econ-101 keeps him from making connections that should otherwise be 
obvious.  Being a keen student of business, Joey should be among the first to worry about how 
such a global event, tearing at the seams of long-established global trade routes and alliances that 
would affect his future career prospects.158 
More significantly, Franzen’s flippant usage of “glitch” to summarise Joey’s predicament 
is meant to highlight the fact that Joey might have realized that something is wrong, but he is still 
unable or unwilling to understand the problem in context. Later, this problem resurfaces with more 
urgent repercussions than just Joey’s ignorance, as Joey’s work with the organisation RISEN leads 
him to doctor reports and sell rusted tank parts to the United States government having salvaged 
them from South America.   
Yet Joey is still ready to be annoyed by the reactions of other people as they struggle to 
come to terms with the reality of 9/11. Franzen implies in the following passage that Joey remains 
protected by the distance of campus and the closed-circuit ideas in a classroom: 
In the days after 9/11, everything suddenly seemed extremely stupid to Joey. It was stupid 
that a “Vigil of Concern” was held for no conceivable practical reason, it was stupid that 
people kept watching the same disaster footage over and over, it was stupid that the Chi 
Phi boys hung a banner of “support” from their house, it was stupid that the football game 
against Penn State was cancelled. . .The four liberal kids on Joey’s hall had endless stupid 
 
158 In his recent study on socio-structural inequality, Richard V. Reeves paints an even more disturbing picture vis-
à-vis Joey’s ignorance. Reeves argues that attending a selective institution of higher learning reinforces a sense of 
privilege among the upper middle class. This leaves them unable to engage with the ramifications of 9/11. Reeves 
writes that “the problem we face is not simply class separation but class perpetuation.” Under this vicious cycle, 
“people from affluent backgrounds,” represented in Freedom by the Berglunds, “further increas[e] their own 
chances of ending up as affluent adults.” These same affluent adults, would then be similarly protected by their 
wealth and status, as evidenced by Joey’s landing on his feet near the end of the novel. See Richard V. Reeves, 
Reeves, Richard V., Dream Hoarders: How the American Upper Middle Class is Leaving Everyone Else in the 
Dust, Why That is a Problem, and What to Do About it (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2017), p. 58. 
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arguments with the twenty conservative kids, as if anybody cared what a bunch of eighteen-
year-olds thought about the Middle East. (F, p. 233).    
The last description in the above paragraph about the students’ opinions on the Middle East reads 
as very dismissive of the critical thinking capabilities that should have been inculcated by the same 
university. This perceived loss as noted by Franzen stands against the narrowed confines of 
academia as suggested by Stanley Fish. Later, Franzen appears to double down on this lacuna 
between knowledge and experience, as Walter’s and Lalitha’s environmental summer camps for 
college students from the preferred caliber of colleges devolve into chaos.  
Such an attitude, which insists on keeping knowledge and experience as separate from one 
another, plays no small part in perpetuating the alienation that academia and academics engender 
in their students. So in this sense, Franzen’s opinion more or less lines up with Allan Bloom’s 
argument in The Closing of the American Mind that, rather than the classroom fostering a sense of 
ambivalent curiosity, it has given rise to the opposite. Bloom notes that we have taken “a lode of 
serious questions, and treated them as though they were answers, in order to keep from confronting 
them ourselves.”159 The student experience within the university adheres to this view, as students 
are encouraged to interact with the world through a certain lens that detracts from and abstracts 
experience. This contrarian view of higher education can be attributed to a clash between hot and 
cold mediums. According to McLuhan, a university lecture counts as a “hot” medium, as it is 
meant to engage students with meaningful ideas, but the structure of their education is still 
ultimately considered cold, as they are systematically examined to a prior standard that can 
sometimes be seen as closer to resembling cold media.  
 
159 Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (London and New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 
113. 
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A similar obtuseness that is also clearly the product of the assuredness of the American 
higher education system comes to the fore in David Foster Wallace’s short story “The View From 
Mrs. Thompson’s House.” Written as a direct response to 9/11, Foster Wallace makes short work 
of summarising the event, calling it “obvious” and the practice of putting pen to paper contorted 
by “probably what qualifies as shock,” shows too how philosophy, in this particular case a 
simplification of Sausserian semiotics, is ill-equipped to make sense of a national crisis.160. A 
reporter visits a certain suburban block in Bloomington, IN to collect responses to the event. Most 
of the reactions are run-of-mill practical patriotism. The sudden mounting of American flags on 
people’s porches, notes one denizen, is to “show that Americans don’t bow down to anybody” 
(DFW, “View”, ibid). Other responses fall more or less along these lines, with most Americans 
understanding the flag as a way in which they could show solidarity with the event. However, one 
response stands out; whereas all of the quotes remain unmarked, the one labeled “grad student” 
reads: “The flag is a pseudo-archetype, a reflexive semion designed to pre-empt and negate the 
critical function” (DFW, “View”, ibid).  
What is important to note here is that Foster Wallace’s student, while well-versed in post-
structuralist terminology and one version of its practical application, still fails to bridge the gap 
between the classroom debate and the wider world. Simply put, the critical function of the 
American flag as a signifier has not been negated by the sudden stubborn presence of the flag. The 
planes still hit the Towers and Ground Zero is still memorialised so that the critical function will 
always remain critical and functional. Claims of American exceptionalism since, by the same 
token, have not grown less but more stubborn. What keeps America exceptional is no longer rooted 
in fact, but instead transposed into our fragile perception in order to protect ever fragile American 
 
160 David Foster Wallace, “The View from Mrs. Thompson’s House”, Rolling Stone, (2001), p. 94. Subsequent 
quotations given in-text as “View”.  
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ego. As stated plainly in Benjamin’s “The Storyteller,” we have lost sight of our fragile bodies and 
therefore have to resort to trying to reach our practical selves again through thinking that has been. 
In the other patriotic comments, none mention the tragedy by name. Foster Wallace shows here 
that flags are a gut reaction, which actually in turn tells us we lack the propensity for real action. 
 While Joey’s institutionalised ignorance seems to be the fault of his collegiate education, 
Franzen’s earlier novel The Corrections illuminates the flaw of the university system itself. At 
D______ College, We are reminded of Chip Lambert’s former job title, “Assistant Professor” of 
the “Textual Artifacts” course at D___ College, (perhaps a thinly veiled reference to Cultural 
Studies offered at many institutions). As Chip attempts to engage his students in a critique of a 
feminist ad campaign called “You Go Girls,” he remains blinded by the fact that this critical 
position is itself subsumed and inextricable from the corporations Chip wants so badly to critique. 
 Tellingly, Chip’s course is evocatively titled “Consuming Narratives,” which also recalls 
the aptly terrifying supermarket “Nightmare of Consumption.” This troubling parallel speaks to 
the impossibility of his task as a professor. Any possible critique that he offers as an academic is 
constantly conflated with and hindered by the unshakeable presence of corporate consumption. 
Chip may see himself as one such fashioner of “socially responsible citizens,” to borrow a phrase 
from Fish, but instead Chip himself, as a member of staff in a university, finds himself hampered 
by the insidious relationship between D____ College and the ubiquitous W______ Corporation. 
James Annesley argues on this point that Chip’s attack on the W_____ Corporation, the intangible 
propagator of the “You Go, Girls” campaign can be ultimately seen as a futile exercise. Even if he 
has the wherewithal to recognize his situation as problematic, Chip has no real say in the reality 
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that Denise’s generous paypacket, provided by her boss Brian who has sold a piece of music 
software to W____, is currently subsidising his unemployment.161  
 While this glaring contradiction is never explicitly acknowledged by Chip himself, Franzen 
is at pains to point out such a contradiction is unavoidable in Chip’s life, and is especially untenable 
in his teaching. Where Chip endeavours to think of himself as the encouraging proprietor of young 
minds, the reality is quite the opposite. One student, Melissa Paquette accuses Chip of not being 
interested in the opinions of others “unless [their opinions] are the same as his” (C, p. 42):  
“This whole class. . .is just bullshit every week. It’s one critic after another wringing their 
hands about the state of criticism. Nobody can quite say what’s wrong, exactly. But they 
all know it’s evil. They all know ‘corporate’ is a dirty word. . .And people who think they 
are free aren’t ‘really’ free. And people who think they’re happy aren’t ‘really’ happy” (C, 
44).    
Although Franzen’s sense of irony is on full display here, as in an effort to critique the 
misalignment of hot and cold medium in the classroom, the irony of the scene exposes a more 
sinister practice of silence and ignorance within everyday society. Melissa’s and Chip’s 
disagreement over the efficacy of the “You Go, Girls” campaign point to an inability to 
communicate, in which monologues (in The Corrections and elsewhere represented by various 
lectures) always triumph over the practice of dialogue (wherein opinions are exchanged and 
discussed on an equal footing). It is useful here to remember Naomi Klein’s remarks regarding the 
continued obfuscation between a product and its consumers. 162 This then leads to a reassessment 
 
161 See Annesley, p. 114. 
162 As Naomi Klein argues in No Logo, in order for any corporate empire to gain traction with a world oversaturated 
with various products of the same guise and intention, the best way to develop a plethora of consumers is to develop, 
not a product, but a brand. Such “brand identities” are, in effect, in direct conflict with a consumer’s individual 
identity and sense of self. Klein argues that, when advertising in predominantly B.A.M.E. neighborhoods, clothing 
companies claim that consumers will a “better” lifestyle by consumption of their products. That this lifestyle is at 
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of physical enforcements upon these theoretical challenges. When Chip goes to Vilnius, Lithuania, 
to help his married girlfriend’s Lithuanian husband, Gitanas, to defraud Lithuanians, he comes to 
the realisation of the uselessness of trying to apply theory to only ideas without any practical 
applications. Theory, Chip thinks, has now become the propriety of “farce”:  
It warmed his Foucaultian heart, in a way, to live in a land where property ownership and 
the control of public discourse were so obviously a matter of who had the guns (C 441).  
Though Chip might prefer it in his heart to witness the direct connection between experience and 
knowledge, which takes a troubling step towards mending the distance between the two, there is 
something to be said for the price of realising such a union has to do upsetting the balance between 
the two, long maintained because of the threat to social stability. As Giorgio Agamben writes in 
Destruction of Experience:  
The idea of experience as separate from knowledge has become so alien to us that we have 
forgotten that until the birth of modern science, experience and science each had their own 
place. What is more, they were even connected to different subjects. The subject of 
experience was common sense, some~ thing existing in every individual. . . while the 
subject of science is the noūs or the active intellect, which is separate from experience, 
'impassive' and 'divine.'163   
However, Chip’s veneration for post-structural theory as played out in real life has little bearing 
upon the very real consequences brought on by this flagrant marriage, thus making all possible 
means of critique (at least, in the sheltered way  that Chip is used to doling out behind the safety 
of his desk) rather difficult to undertake.  
 
odds with B.A.M.E cultures and/or lifestyles (and economically unobtainable for the majority) is ignored. (See 
Naomi Klein. No Logo, (London: Harper Perennial, 2005), pp. 112-113). 
163 Giorgio Agamben. Infancy and History: Essays on the Destruction of Experience, translated by Liz Heron 
(London: Verso, 1993), p. 18. 
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 As such, there are compelling comparisons to be made between Franzen’s narrative 
intentions and the distant critiques of the Frankfurt School, a group of German philosophers 
(including Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno), who are collectively known for their scathing 
comments on the state of early-twentieth century culture and its abysmal direction.  Despite such 
comments and fervour for change, the members of the Frankfurt School (excluding Herbert 
Marcuse) still found it much easier to critique society at large when they did not have to face the 
reality that it provided. As Stuart Jefferies puts it in his group autobiography:  
[Adorno’s conception of theory as freedom in the midst of unfreedom] was where the 
Frankfurt School felt most comfortable. Instead of being caught up in.revolutionary 
euphoria, they preferred to retreat in a non-repressive intellectual space where they could 
think freely. That kind of freedom is, to be sure, a melancholy one since it is born of a loss 
of hope in real change.164   
Jefferies’s astute description of the Frankfurt School encapsulates Franzen’s dilemma as he tries 
to reform the novel into something participatory. While Franzen does not lack for the desire to 
critique real life through his preferred theme of the family unit, he lacks the drive to put his theories 
into practice. Franzen’s narrative ambivalence, which often sees characters take on a reformed 
view towards their lives; in which grandiose ambitions (see Walter’s environmentalism, Joey’s 
farcical business plans which in fact work to defraud the United States government, Pip’s wanting 
to change the world) are usually misinformed by theory or the promise of a certain individual 
specialness. Jesus Blanco Hidalga sees this reformation as a natural consequence of privilege: 
The question for a writer such as Franzen is how to substantiate a critical position from the 
mainstream, with no minority or underprivileged group to rely on, even more when critical 
 
164 Stuart Jefferies, The Grand Hotel Abyss (London: Verso, 2016), p. 6. 
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subgenres such as the Systems novel have been discorded and political utopias are out of 
the question. In this sense, environmentalism may afford a much needed critical position 
for the novelist. However, we should bear in mind that the same non-specific character 
which makes environmentalism available for any novelist as an instrument of critical 
leverage, in practice undermines its actual power.165 
One such privilege becomes more tangible than any of its theoretical counterparts in the form of 
technology. Unlike other Big Questions that the world faces today which retain their seeming 
opacity, technology has become more and more transparent and a more recently, treated as a 
marker of alleged privilege.166 By extension, Franzen seems not to have realised that the newest 
technological update or upgrade may not be immediately available to everyone. In an Op-Ed piece 
in The New York Times, this issue is given a sense of universality when Franzen alludes to the 
dampening of experience by technology. In the essay, “Liking is for Cowards, Go for What Hurts,” 
Franzen writes an ironic ode to his new Blackberry Pearl, with which he is “infatuated”: 
To speak more generally, the ultimate goal of technology, the telos of techne, is to replace 
a natural world that’s indifferent to our wishes — a world of hurricanes and hardships and 
breakable hearts, a world of resistance — with a world so responsive to our wishes as to 
be, effectively, a mere extension of the self. 167 
For Franzen, it is not only experience that has become limited by technology. The presence of 
technology and its in-built demand for upgrades (as Franzen notes, upon replacing his Blackberry, 
 
165 Hidalga, p. 204.  
166 Perhaps the most egregious display of this idea is made by U.S. House of Representative Jason Chaffetz, who 
recently suggested that “Americans may need to choose between a "new iPhone... they just love" and investing in 
health care.” See “Congressman suggests poor Americans should give up iPhones for health care” (2017) 
<https://www.theverge.com/2017/3/7/14841736/chaffetz-says-americans-must-pick-between-iphones-and-
healthcare> [Accessed 4 November 2019]. 
167 Jonathan Franzen. “Liking is for Cowards, Go for What Hurts,” The New York Times, 28 May 2011. 
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that such an act constitutes the equivalent of “outgrowing a [human] relationship”)168 indicates a 
shift between the individual and their devices. Under the threat of new technology, individuals 
become consumers, to be effectively influenced by advertisement. Due to technology being the 
newest extension of self, this suggests that what constitutes personal identity is not only up for 
debate but also purchasable. The largely accepted practice of switching out technology for better 
(sometimes billed more attractively as more secure and reliable) models has also seeped into the 
way we see ourselves.  
 Academia and technology also make for awkward bedfellows in Amitav Ghosh’s The 
Hungry Tide. Unlike Franzen, who seeks to disavow technology because it shows society as having 
something unpleasant at its core, Ghosh instead takes the approach that technology can be useful. 
Yet he, too, shares Franzen’s concern that technology can easily take away from experience if it is 
properly contextualised. Piya, the marine biologist researcher, who comes to the Sundarbans to do 
a dolphin survey carefully limits her experiences with nature and her surroundings with scientific 
equipment -- thereby also excluding any part of her environment which does not agree with her 
thesis. This is at first portrayed in a positive light because it demonstrates the depth with which 
she is able to use her academic knowledge. Early in the novel, Piya notices a sunning crocodile 
while on the Mej-da’s boat. When the Mej-da demands a tip for alerting her to this creature, Piya 
is reassured by her tools and her scientific expertise that this sunning crocodile is not relevant to 
her thesis. The irrelevance of the crocodile here doubles as a metaphor for the presence of both the 
Mej-da and the forest guard, who represent postcolonial oppression. Their attempt to censor and 
curate Piya’s knowledge is unsuccessful. Piya’s knowledge stands above the Mej-da’s attempt to 
subsume what she knows. This is characteristic of Ghosh’s work, as he is interested in knowledge 
 
168 Franzen, “Cowards,” ibid. 
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as a chaotic force which defies the forces of categorization and delineation. Within the context of 
Ghosh’s work, Anshuman A. Mondal circumscribes this ambivalence as a product of irony which 
renders reason “vulnerable.”169 Mondal writes, “in fact, knowledge does not describe the world ‘as 
is,’ but rather expresses our desire to to see order. . . in the world, even when it is not warranted.”170 
However, when Piya meets Fokir, she is compelled to rethink her approach to her project. 
In trying to prove her thesis, Piya has blocked herself from truly experiencing life since she 
discounts all other experiences that do not align with the scope of her project. This is especially 
true as critics such as Ismail S. Tahlib and Tuomas Huttunen suggest that this is due to Piya’s 
distrust of language and a problem that arises out of a lack of communication, which has always 
been her experience with language. I would like to contend that it is in fact less a problem of 
language than her own over reliance upon language as a mode of communication. With Fokir, 
language cannot fulfill its usual function for he is illiterate and nearly mute. Fokir has been 
previously discussed in Chapter 1 as a figure who represents a perfect juxtaposition of experience 
and knowledge and is not made any the less by what he does not know (in this case, communicable 
spoken language): he becomes an embodiment of ambiguity and of what ambiguity can achieve 
especially when it comes to perceiving new ideas.171 Compared to Fokir, Piya’s hard-earned 
scientific knowledge at her university begins to appear inadequate in the face of the practical 
experiences the crab fisherman even if he cannot completely express this inwords. Pramod K. 
Nayar, for example, points to this chasm in Piya’s knowledge as reminiscent of Freud’s conception 
 
169 Mondal, Ghosh p. 54.  
170 Mondal, Ghosh, ibid. 
171 Although an ambivalent reading of Fokir’s character can also be drawn from the novel, as even though Ghosh 
seems to prefer Fokir’s mode of existence, as the man lives on the careful precipice of experience and knowledge, 
but Ghosh is aware too, of the harsher realities of the world today that naturally opposes this sort of living. Fokir’s 
wife Moyna, for example vehemently opposes her husband’s occupation because it has no future rather than 
pointing to his lack of education.  
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of the uncanny. Nayar argues that technologisation in the novel ultimately aids the “displacement” 
of knowledge, and that knowledge systems therefore “codified” by a “Westernized, metropolitan 
and technology-reliant culture” in fact adds to the unfamiliarity of the tide country.172 Later, since 
Piya has already discarded the crocodile from view, the creature re-emerges and demands to be 
seen and imprinted on her affective memory; Piya becomes haunted by “[the crocodile’s] ghostly 
outline. . .almost as large as the boat” (HT, 175).  
Where Franzen and the extended landscape of the new millennium as he envisions it 
alludes to the impossibility of returning experience to its roots, Ghosh seems to be in favour of 
reconstituting experience and knowledge in a way that does not take away from the strength of 
either. With Ghosh’s continued interest in connections and contextualisation, and what is often 
lost in affecting one perspective over another, experience becomes an invaluable part of how 
knowledge is seen.  Ghosh never loses sight of the importance of surrounding context. Unlike 
Joey, who is determined to relegate immediate contexts like 9/11 as separate from the classroom, 
Ghosh understands all systems of knowledge as connected.173  
This is perhaps most clear in The Hungry Tide. In praise of the novel,  Rajender Kaur calls 
the novel an ‘uncannily prescient text,’ in that the title and the novel itself ‘can be seen to portend’ 
the Indian Ocean Tsunami that occurred in December only later in the same year.174 As a follow 
up to his supposed omnipotence, Ghosh’s own journalistic report of the incident, laid out in an 
essay titled ‘The Town By the Sea,’ remains for Kaur one of the more ‘sensitive’ narratives of the 
 
172 Pramod K. Nayar, The Postcolonial Uncanny: The Politics of Dispossession in Amitav Ghosh’s The Hungry 
Tide”, College Literature, 37 (2010), p. 110. 
173 C.f. Amitav Ghosh. “The Anglophone Empire”, The New Yorker, 7 April 2003.  
174 Rajender Kaur, “‘Home Is Where the Orcaella Are’ Toward a New Paradigm of Transcultural Ecocritical 
Engagement in Amitav Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide.’ Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment, (14) 
2007, (125-141), p. 125. 
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tsunami.175 Notably, Ghosh not only recounts the event at face value, but he also stays true to his 
training as an anthropologist. He takes great care to carve a definitive space for the tsunami within 
the wider scope of history. In doing so, the tsunami gains a discursive advantage in being written 
strategically into the heart of the dispute between ‘the hurried history of the emergent nation 
[which has] collided here with the deep time of geology.’176 Ghosh uses this dispute to create an 
inextricable contradiction between the old autonomy of the natural world and the newness of 
human ambition. He therefore carves out a space for both possibilities.  
Though it may appear from the above that Ghosh’s humanist take on ambivalence is the 
preferred perspective of the two, there is something to be said about the fact that Ghosh could 
effectively adopt such a position at all. Ghosh is an individual who identifies strongly with his 
Indian roots and has consistently relied on his background as a platform to effectively put across 
ideas which champion cross-culturality for a more holistic experience, he has arrived at such a 
position by way of postcolonialism. As a writer who has come from an established tradition of 
struggling to speak for himself (see his letter to the Manager of the Commonwealth Prize in the 
Introduction) and feeling as an intrinsic part of his epistemological system that he must necessarily 
depend upon lesser known venues of achieving knowledge. Franzen’s characters, largely middle-
class and comfortable with the state of their own opinions, are prone to lecturing and not listening 
to others, so that information and experiences exchanged in conversation, and by extension, in 
narrative are often lost. 
As such, Ghosh reconstitutes the seemingly forgotten and neglected relationship between 
an individual’s knowledge and his or her experiences. While it is not expressly stated that Kanai 
is an educated man, he is the epitome of what happens when an individual values knowledge 
 
175 Kaur, p. 126. 
176 Amitav Ghosh Incendiary Circumstances. (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2005), p. 2. 
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without experience. In a telling conversation with Fokir’s mother, Kusum, Kanai makes fun of her 
for not being able to understand English. Again, this showcases Kanai’s ignorance rather than his 
knowledge: 
   “Do you read English?” 
    “No.” 
    “Then why would you want to see it, it would not make any sense to you.” (HT, p. 250) 
Kanai might think that his city education -- itself at first the initial cause of his inability to 
communicate with the people of the tide country, though he might readily share a spoken language 
with them -- puts him squarely above the others. However, as Moyna, Fokir’s wife reminds him, 
Kanai’s education is something that continues to put him at odds with the residents of the tide 
country and it becomes increasingly clear that his education and knowledge actively works against 
his efforts to be a more rounded individual.  
Despite Kanai’s growing limitations as a person who refuses to see experience 
(particularly, experiences that are not the result of academic learning), Fokir’s wife Moyna still 
attempts to use Kanai as a gateway to get through to her husband in the following exchange: 
“It would be good for him to hear it from you, Kanai-babu. Who knows what he’s begun 
to expect -- especially when she’s giving him so much money?” 
“But why me, Moyna?. . .What can I say?” 
Kanai-babu, there’s no one else who knows how to speak to both of them -- to [Piya] and 
to [Fokir]. . .But for you neither of them will know what is in the mind of the other. Their words 
will be in your hands and you can make them being what you will.’  
. . .Kanai laughed. “Moyna, it’s true he’s your husband -- but then why can’t you talk to 
him yourself? Why do you want me to do it for you?” 
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“It’s because he’s my husband that I can’t talk to him[,]” Moyna said quietly, “Only a 
stranger can put such things into words.” (HT, p. 257-8) 
Moyna’s appeal to Kanai shows that she is aware of the limitations of her own experience which 
would naturally to Kanai. Further, Moyna is aware too, of the parameters of her relationship to 
Fokir as his wife. Even though Moyna, like Kanai with his Detective novel, has also placed certain 
restrictions upon her interaction with him, she does so with a view towards what differing 
knowledge can add to her experience, rather than what it takes away. By emphasising his talent 
with language, Moyna has seamlessly integrated Kanai’s knowledge where it had no place before.  
 By being willing to conceive of knowledge as a vital part of experience, Kanai and Piya 
both move towards what Emily Johansen calls “territorialised cosmopolitan—cosmopolitanism 
located in specific, though often multiple, places.”177 Though Johansen’s understanding of this 
concept is deeply rooted in the way city individuals such as Kanai and Piya perceive rural spaces, 
territorialised cosmopolitanism represents a unique opportunity in terms of ambivalence as a 
learning experience and is one possibility of reuniting one with the other without either losing its 
own integrity. At the end of The Hungry Tide, instead of retreating into familiar, familial spheres 
of influence, both Kanai and Piya are richer in having faced new experiences. For Kanai, who 
values language above all, finally admits that language is an inadequate tool of communication 
without experience behind it. His parting letter to Piya bears this caveat which does not take away 
from the translation, but rather propels the translation to an ambivalent position, becoming an 
integral part of the tide country:  
That was the song that you heard on Fokir’s lips yesterday: it lives in him, and in some 
way perhaps, it still plays a part in making him the person he is. . .Such flaws as there are 
 
177 Emily Johansen, “Imagining the Global and the Rural: Rural Cosmopolitanism in Sharon Butala’s The Garden of 
Eden and Amitav Ghosh’s The Hungry Tide”, Postcolonial Text, 4 (2008), 1-18 (p. 13). 
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in my rendition of it I do not regret, for perhaps they will prevent me from fading from 
sight as a good translator should: for once, I shall be glad if my imperfections render me 
visible (HT, p. 354) . 
Where Kanai previously clung to knowledge while he disregards the necessity of experience, he 
finally understands that his flaws in translation in fact adds to the holistic nature of his endeavour. 
For perhaps the first time, Kanai’s view towards language becomes an inclusionary one, upheld 
by a much-needed sense of uncertainty.  
As such, ambivalence points to the state of the postmodern world and the individual’s 
seeming inability to live within it. In its more pessimistic form, championed by Franzen, newly 
ambivalent individuals seek to retreat from making real judgments and decisions, whereas Ghosh’s 
more humanistic approach to the subject allows for the reunification of experience and knowledge. 
The early horror writer, H. P. Lovecraft, who bears the distinction of bringing existential dread 
into our intimate reality rather than just some alternative faraway universe, offers remarks:  
The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the human mind to correlate 
all its contents. We love on an island of ignorance in the midst of black seas of infinity, 
and it is not meant that we should voyage far. The sciences, each straining in its own 
direction, have hitherto harmed us little; but some day the piecing together of dissociated 
knowledge will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, and of our own frightful position 
therein, that we shall either go mad from the revelation or flee from the deadly light into 
the peace and safety of a new dark age.178 
In a world that is all but held hostage by disassociated, deterritorialised knowledge, madness seems 
to be on the rise: the return to nationalism in global and local politics and the tribalism that is 
 
178 H. P. Lovecraft, The New Annotated H.P. Lovecraft, edited by L. S. Klinger (New York, NY: Liveright 
Publishing Corporation, 2014), p. 124. 
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emerging in the digital world so forces knowledge to look for other ways of self-preservation that 
does not rely on exclusivity or reclusivity. Ambivalence becomes then, perhaps the fourth 
possibility in Nietzsche’s famous maxim: “To live alone one has to be a beast or a god—says 
Aristotle. A third case: one has to be both—a philosopher”.179 In a civilised society, all of these 
states of living alone have become impossible by the new smallness of the world; one simply 
cannot be a beast in the world living alongside others; godhood is a notably empty pursuit—again 
to quote the old saying “God is dead”180; and as we have seen, philosophy has largely lost the 
ability to connect with practical realities at least within the academic context in which it is most 
often found, and is antithetical to “hot” media. The pursuit of ambivalent knowledge is all that 
remains. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
179 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols and Anti-Christ, translated by R. J. Hollingdale (New York, NY and 
London: Penguin Books 1968), p. 33. 
180 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, edited and translated by Graham Parks, (London: The Folio 
Society, 2012), p. 5. 
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